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This thesis argues for building a robust framework of good corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia as a key policy option to realize the country’s Vision 2030 goal to 
transform the national economy from chronic dependence on (decreasing) oil 
revenues to a diversified resources economy. The thesis adopts a modelling 
approach to examine experiences and challenges of corporate governance reform 
nationally and internationally to enlighten and enrich the Saudi reform agenda. 
After brief introductory background about the country and the research problem 
and methodology (Chapter 1), the thesis discusses (in Chapter 2) the definition, 
elements, efficiency and theoretical framework of corporate governance as a 
foundation for the analysis in subsequent chapters. A generic three-layer 
taxonomic model of core values, supra-national and national standards of 
corporate governance is proposed (in Chapter 2) and used as a framework for 
subsequent discussion and analysis.  
Corporate governance reform has generally been slow in Saudi Arabia. The 
prevailing Saudi institutional and statutory frameworks of corporate governance 
and their past and recent reforms are discussed in Chapters (3) and (4). The thesis 
argues strongly for aligning the Saudi regulatory framework of corporate 
governance with contemporary international principles and international best 
practices and model of corporate governance. 
Accordingly, and considering in particular that the Saudi legal system is 
fundamentally based on supra-national Islamic Shari’a law, a comparative analysis 
is conducted in Chapters (5) and (6) to establish compatibility or otherwise between 
the model of Shari’a principles and modern OECD corporate governance 
principles. Moreover, Chapter 7 discusses models of national application of 
corporate governance standards in various jurisdictions to draw lesson for Saudi 
corporate governance reform. Finally the thesis ends with conclusions and 
recommendations in Chapter 8 to strengthen both the institutional and statutory 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
This thesis explores the subject of corporate governance reform in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia with a view to attaining a greater implementation of good corporate 
governance standards in the country. For a number of reasons, the subject of good 
corporate governance continues to attract widespread attention both on the 
national and international levels. 1  First, corporate governance is pertinent for 
regulators on both levels in their efforts to enhance and strengthen trust in financial 
markets. Secondly, it is also of special importance to investors to preserve their 
interests and increase their profits in the companies in which they invest. Thirdly, 
global economic crises and financial scandals such as the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, Enron and Worldcom have attracted increasing attention to the regulation 
and practice of corporate governance particularly because lack of adherence to 
standards of good corporate governance was arguably a main reason for these 
collapses.  
Fourth, particularly for countries with emerging market or transforming economies 
such as Saudi Arabia, improving corporate governance can serve a number of 
important public policy objectives. Arguably, good corporate governance reduces 
emerging market vulnerability to financial crises, reinforces property rights, reduces 
transaction costs and the cost of capital and leads to capital market development. 
Contrarily, weak corporate governance frameworks reduce investor confidence, 
and can discourage the flow of outside investment. Research over the past several 
years increasingly demonstrates that good corporate governance practices have 
led to significant increases in economic value added (EVA) of firms, higher 
productivity, and lower risk of systemic financial failures for countries.  
For all these reasons, the subject of corporate governance occupies a central and 
vital position in academic research and literature endeavouring to explore and 
understand the essentials of effectiveness and success of practical regulatory 
framework of good corporate governance.  
																																								 																				
1See e.g. ‘G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: OECD Report to G20 Finance Ministers and 





This introductory chapter aims to offer brief background information on the country 
and economy of Saudi Arabia and the significance of corporate governance in the 
country. The chapter also outlines the research problems addressed in this thesis, 
its questions and methodology, aims and contributions. Accordingly, Section 1.1 
provides a general background on the country and economy of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. The remainder of the chapter outlines the research problem and 
questions, research methodology, research objectives and contributions, and 
thesis structure and organization in sections 1.2 – 1.5	respectively. 
1.1 The Importance of Corporate Governance for Saudi Arabia: 
a country background 
The contemporary modern state of Saudi Arabia was founded by the first King 
Abdul Aziz Al Saud in 1932 and has since been ruled by descendants of the 
founding king.2 The incumbent monarch, King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, is 
the seventh monarch to rule the country. He ascended to the throne on 23 January 
2015 following the death of his brother the late King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz Al 
Saud. Crown princes are, invariably, chosen by the monarch in power and the 
succession in power is thus streamlined. Presently, the incumbent is Crown Prince 
Mohammad bin Salman Bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud who was appointed on 21 June 
2017. 
The Basic Law of Governance3 (BLG) is the principal legislation dealing with state, 
the authority and structure of the Kingdom. This law was enacted by Royal Decree 
in 1992 and contains 83 articles of a constitutional nature pertaining, inter alia, to 
the government, social values, rights and duties, economic principles and the state 
authorities. Article I of the Basic Law establishes the Qur’an (The Book of Almighty 
God) and the Sunnah4 of the Prophet Mohammed as the “formal” constitution, thus 
																																								 																				
2 The Basic Law of Governance (see n 3 below) states in Article 5 (b): Governance shall be limited to the sons 
of the Founder King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd ar-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud, and the sons of his sons. 
Allegiance shall be pledged to the most suitable amongst them to reign on the basis of the Book of God Most 
High and the Sunnah of His Messenger (PBUH).  
3 Basic Law of Governance is enacted by Royal Order No. (A/91) 27 Sha’ban 1412H – 1 March 1992 
Published in Umm al-Qura Gazette No. 3397 2 Ramadan 1412H - 5 March 1992. 
4Sunnah or Sunna (plural sunan) is defined as the verbally transmitted record of the teachings, deeds and 
sayings, silent permissions (or disapprovals) of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as various reports 




instituting these as the fundamental sources of law in the country which may not be 
contravened by any subordinate legislation. The relevant Article of the BLG states: 
Art. 1. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its 
religion shall be Islam and its constitution shall be the Book of God and the 
Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger, may God’s blessings and peace be upon 
him (PBUH). 
1.1.1 Population and Geography 
According to the General Authority for Statistics5 the current population of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 31,7402,308. The country’s total land area is 2,143,865 
Km2 (827,751 sq. miles) thus making it the largest country in the Arabian 
Peninsula and the second largest country by size in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, after Algeria. 
Geographically, the country is strategically located between the two busiest sea 
routes: the red sea and the Arabian Gulf and it shares boundaries with nine 
different nations. Riyadh is the capital city, and the country houses Islam’s two 
holiest shrines, Mecca and Medina, which are visited by millions of pilgrims every 
year.  
Table 1 below shows some of the basic information about the country: 
Official name Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
                Location              Arabian Peninsula, MENA  
                Land Area              2,143,865 Km2 (827,751 sq. miles) 
Population              31,7402,308 
      Capital Riyadh 
                Currency              Saudi Riyal (SAR) 
	
Table	1	 Saudi	Arabia	Basic	information 
The landscape of Saudi Arabia is dominated by the Arabian Desert, which includes 
the world’s largest contiguous sand desert known as the Rub’ al Khali or the Empty 
Quarter. Agricultural activities are relatively much smaller compared to the total 
																																								 																				




land area amounting to a total of 285,166 agricultural holdings with land and 
61,663 holdings6 without land. Thus, due to its mostly arid land the bulk of the food 
requirements of the country are imported. The country is split into 13 administrative 
areas, which are further divided into 118 governorates. The biggest area of all is 
the Eastern Province, which contains the bulk of the country’s oil reserves. Despite 
the vast area, Saudi Arabia’s population is concentrated in the cities. Makkah 
(Mecca) is the most populated administrative area, where about 26% of Saudi’s 
population resides. 
Saudi Arabia is a prominent regional power and takes an active role in the politics 
of the MENA region. The country is part of many economic and political groups like 
the GCC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Saudi Arabia is also the only Arab state 
to be part of the Group of Twenty (G-20) nations. 
1.1.2 National law and legal system  
As already mentioned above, the Basic Law of Governance 7  establishes the 
Qur’an (The Book of Almighty God) and the Sunnah8 of the Prophet Mohammed as 
the “formal” constitution, thus instituting these as the fundamental sources of law in 
the country which may not be contravened by any subordinate legislation. A 
number of other Articles thereof deal with governance, state authorities and the 
adjudication, including: 
Art 7: Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the 
Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of his Messenger, both of which govern 
this Law and all the laws of the State. 
Art 8: Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be based on justice, shura 
(consultation), and equality in accordance with the Islamic Shari‘a. 
Art. 44: Authorities in the State shall consist of:  
																																								 																				
6Ibid. 
7See (n 3). 




- Judicial Authority. 
- Executive Authority. 
- Regulatory Authority.  
These authorities shall cooperate in the discharge of their functions in accordance 
with this Law and other laws. The King shall be their final authority.  
Art. 45: The source for fatwa (religious legal opinion) in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah of his Messenger (PBUH). The 
Law shall set forth the hierarchy and jurisdiction of the Board of Senior Ulema and 
the Department of Religious Research and Fatwa.  
Art 48: The courts shall apply to cases before them the provisions of Islamic 
Shari‘a, as indicated by the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and whatever laws not in 
conflict with the Qur’an and the Sunnah which the authorities may promulgate. 
The constitutional provisions above are underpinned by the Islamic precept of 
primacy of Sharia as the supreme law. It is the law given by God to man. According 
to Islam, God is the sole legislator and no man, not the temporal ruler nor 
parliament or assembly has the authority to legislate. This explains why Article 44 
above does not explicitly refer to a ‘legislative’ authority in the state power structure 
in Saudi Arabia.9  
However, the absence of a stricto sensu legislative body does not mean that there 
is no legislation in the Kingdom. It worth noting that Sharia recognizes the right of 
the ruler to make administrative ordinances intended for policy making to fill gaps 
left open by Sharia rules. Accordingly, by the exercise of this policy right the 
sovereign may promulgate regulations for the good administration of his 
government and prescribe the rules for public law, administrative law or 
commercial law, as these are areas where Sharia law has left great gaps.  
 
																																								 																				
9 Saudi Arabia is commonly regarded to have only two authorities (executive and judicial) particularly in the 
prior to the enactment of the BLG. See more on this topic section (3.1), also Joseph L. Brand, Aspects of 




Saudi regulations are called nizam. These are promulgated pursuant to the Islamic 
principle of Shura, i.e. governance by consultation. The legislative process begins 
with proposed regulation by a minister of a cabinet office, then drafted and 
approved by the Council of Ministers and finally ratified by the king. Following 
publication in the Official Gazette the regulation, now a royal decree, becomes law. 
Alternatively, the king has delegated to his ministers and to the heads of some 
government agencies the authority to make regulations by issuing administrative or 
ministerial circulars. Both regulations promulgated as royal decrees and 
administrative or ministerial circulars have equal weight as "law".  
It is important to note three main features of promulgating policy regulations in 
Saudi Arabia: 
1. The right to promulgate regulations is exceptional and applies only to cases 
where Sharia, the primary source of legislation, has left some gaps open in 
administrative matters. 
2. Regulations are subordinate to Sharia and each regulation usually contains 
a clause so stating. Thus, in the view of Saudi Arabian legal professionals, 
regulations are needed only to supplement and enforce the Sharia. 
3. As subordinate legislation, regulations may not contravene or contradict 
Sharia. Moreover, they may not be issued to regulate any subject that has 
been clearly and sufficiently regulated by Sharia. 
1.1.2.1 Civil law influence: the mixed Saudi legal system 
Unlike most Muslim countries, Saudi Arabia did not experience Western 
colonization and, consequently, western law and legal conceptions have never 
invaded the core Saudi legal system. However, the discovery of oil in the 1930s 
heralded a new dawn for the country and extensive national regulations were 
needed to reconcile the traditional society in unprecedented way with modern life. 
Given the extensive use of governance by regulation in Saudi Arabia since the mid-
1950's, it would seem that ‘policy’ has been at least adequate to the task of 
modernizing the law to fill gaps between the Sharia and modern needs. Such 
needs were first and sharply felt when the oil industry but rapidly to other economic 




and the need to regulate them.10 Thus, it could be reasonably argued that the 
Saudi Arabian legal framework for modern commerce and national development 
through regulations is largely modernised along western legal tradition with the 
Sharia law providing a general framework.  
In the context of the present research, the discussion above raises the following 
important question: granted that the Saudi legal system has had to yield to 
economic and development pressures to modernize its national laws along western 
lines, which western tradition (i.e. civil v common law) has in particular had more 
impact on the contemporary Saudi legal system?  
In answering the above question, most analysts agree that the influence of the civil 
law tradition on Saudi Arabian procedure and its substantive reception in the 
commercial field have been both significant and continuing. This is explained by 
two reasons. First, some argue that Roman law, the ancestor of the civil law, has 
closer affinity than the common law with the Islamic law and tradition. In both 
systems the ‘jurists’, as opposed to the judges, play law an important role as 
progeny of reason and justice. The civil law's importance as an influence in modern 
Saudi is explained by the need to fill a vacuum which Islamic law did not provide 
for, such forms of business entities suitable for modern commerce. The second 
reason is the direct transplantation of the French code into Saudi Arabia law. The 
first Saudi Companies Law (1965) was directly transplanted from the France 
rending the system a mixed legal system.11  
1.1.3 Economy and transformation in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is a global leader of oil production and, consequently, the country’s 
economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues. Saudi Arabia is also the largest 
among the wealthier Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) sub-group of nations in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Collectively, the GCC countries are 
net exporters of oil and have immensely benefited from their huge oil wealth and 
																																								 																				
10 See Brand (9) p. 20 ff; Frank E Vogel, Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. 
Studies in Islamic Law and Society Vol 8 (Brill 2000), p. xiv. 




control 29% and 23% of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves, respectively. 
Saudi Arabia is the biggest among them in terms of both GDP and oil reserves.  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not only the world’s largest producer of crude oil 
but it also has the second largest oil reserve in the world. Thus, oil is unsurprisingly 
the lifeblood of the Saudi Arabian economy contributing about 20% of the country’s 
GDP and 85% of its exports. Additionally, the country also controls 3% of the 
world’s natural gas production and has about 4% of the world’s gas reserves under 
its soil. 
Saudi Arabia’s economy witnessed a boom at the start of this century. By 2014, the 
nominal GDP of the country quadrupled to USD754bn from just USD188bn in 
2000. The nominal GDP of the economy posted a compound annual growth rate 
(CAGR) of 10% over the past 14 years. However, the prevailing sharp decline in oil 
prices is projected to have a strong impact on the country’s economy. Observers 
indicate that the economy has indeed slowed down in recent years. Following a 
boom in 2011, when oil prices ranged from USD90-130/bbl, the economy is 
growing at a declining rate. The GDP growth rates for 2015 and 2016 were 
estimated to be 2.8% and 1.8%, respectively.12 
1.1.3.1 Economic transformation: Vision 2030  
The peculiar dependence of the Saudi economy on oil has for a long time been 
simultaneously a source of concern and a motive for economic innovation and 
diversification. Consequently, over the years the Saudi economy has become 
gradually diversified and more so particularly in recent decades. In 2003, about 
31% of Saudi Arabia’s real GDP was contributed by the oil sector. However, 10 
years down the line, the economic activity in the country is more diversified. In 
2013 the oil sector was responsible for only about 20% of Saudi’s real GDP and 
the GDP shares of the trade and transport and communications sectors grew about 
5% each in this 10-year period.13 
Moreover, it is worth noting that Article 22 of the BLG provides that:  
																																								 																				
12 GT Finance, ‘Saudi Arabia: Country Profile. Available at <www.gt-finance.fr/wp-





Art 22: Economic and social development shall be accomplished according to a 
sound and just plan. 
This provision constitutes the legal basis for continuous efforts to modernise the 
and diversify the economy. The Vision 20130 of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia14 is 
the latest and most comprehensive vision of the country’s economic future with 
tremendous implications for the need to enhance corporate governance in the 
country. The Vision was launched by Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, the 
chairman of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs, in April 2016. The 
vision articulates a range of commitments and aspirations, including:   
1. The vision represents a plan aimed primarily to reduce Saudi Arabia's 
dependence on oil, diversify its economy, and develop service sectors such 
as health, education, infrastructure, recreation, and tourism. Some goals 
include reinforcing economic and investment activities, increasing non-oil 
industry trade between countries through goods and consumer products, 
and increasing government spending on the military, manufacturing 
equipment and ammunitions. 
2. Transforming the Saudi Public Investment Fund to sovereign fund assets 
valued at $2.5 trillion, thus making it the largest global sovereign fund. 
According to the Crown Prince the fund will consequently control more than 
10% of global investment capacity, and the estimated size of the property is 
more than 3% of global assets. The cumulative impact is that Saudi Arabia 
will strengthen investment through the fund, which will be a key global 
driver, not just within the region. 
3. It is envisaged that Saudi Arabia can wean itself off oil by 2020, decreasing 
oil prices notwithstanding. Thus, the vision aims to increase non-oil revenue 
six-fold from about $43.5 billion annually to $267 billion, and also aims to 
increase non-oil exports as a share of GDP from 16% currently, to 50%. The 
cumulative aim is to improve the global position of Saudi Arabia to become 
one of the top 15 economies in the world, instead of its current place as the 
20th.  
																																								 																				




4. It is also envisaged that Saudi Arabia will offer less than 5% of the giant 
national oil company Aramco in an initial public offering (IPO) on the stock 
exchange, and will allocate the proceeds of this IPO to finance the Saudi 
sovereign wealth fund. Aramco's expected value is more than $2 trillion. 
5. The vision also includes a plan to implement a green card system within five 
years in order to improve its investment climate, and that the system will 
enable Arabs and Muslims to live in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom will also 
open tourism to all nationalities in line with the nation's values and beliefs.  
6. There are currently about 8 million annual pilgrims visiting the holy places 
Saudi Arabia. The vision aims to increase this number to 80 million by 2030. 
For this purpose it intends to develop and expand the infrastructure and to 
broaden the investment in areas surrounding certain holy places. 
7. The vision also aims to strengthen the fight against corruption and measure 
the performance of government departments through 551 indexes 
measuring about 17 major components, with a focus on education, health, 
housing, and social justice. In addition, infrastructure will be created to 
confront the corrupt implementation of plans and programs by officials in 
government agencies. It will also raise the efficiency of the public sector, 
with a focus on supporting small enterprises and expanding privatization. 
1.1.4 The importance of corporate governance reform in Saudi 
Arabia 
The above discussion indicates a number of factors signifying the importance of 
studying reform of the Saudi framework of corporate governance including the 
following:  
First: Saudi Arabia has one of the largest 20 economies in the world and is a 
leading political and economic power.  By 2014, the nominal GDP of the country 
quadrupled to USD754bn from just USD188bn in 2000. In the preceding 14 years 
the nominal GDP of the economy posted a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 
of 10%. Having such a large economy presents ample investment opportunities 
and the Saudi economy can be expected to attract a substantial range of domestic 




Second: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest producer of crude oil 
and has the second largest oil reserve in the world. Thus, oil is unsurprisingly the 
lifeblood of the Saudi Arabian economy contributing about 20% of the country’s 
GDP and 85% of its exports. Additionally, the country also controls 3% of the 
world’s natural gas production and has about 4% of the world’s gas reserves under 
its soil. 
Third: Greater emphasis has been placed in Saudi Arabia in recent years on 
transforming the national economy and developing potentially alternative economic 
sources in a commitment to free the national economy from its dependence on oil. 
There are plans in place to increase non-oil revenue six-fold from about $43.5 
billion annually to $267 billion. These plans also aims to increase non-oil exports as 
a share of GDP from 16% currently to 50% and to improve the country’s global 
economic position to become one of the top 15 economies in the world, instead of 
its current 20th place. 
Fourth: in addition to the above characteristics, Saudi Arabia hosts the two holiest 
places for Muslims, Mecca and Medina and the Saudi monarch has traditionally the 
title of being the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”. There are currently 
about 8 million annual pilgrims performing Hajj (pilgrimage) and other religious 
visits to these holy places and the number of these pilgrims is expected to increase 
to 80 million by 2030. From an economic perspective this offers ample 
opportunities to enhance ‘Religious (or faith) tourism’ which presents substantial 
and unique investment opportunities.15 
Fifth: While being based fundamentally on the principles of Islam, the Saudi legal 
system has also traditionally benefitted from legal principles and experiences from 
other legal systems. 16  Accordingly, in addition to Islamic principles there is 
presently a growing body of international principles of good corporate governance 
including those elaborated by the G20, of which Saudi Arabia is a member, and the 
OECD. Hence, one of the main arguments advanced in this thesis is that, rather 
than being assumed antithetical or conflicting, these sources can profitably be 
																																								 																				
15See e.g. Anna Rita Pinter, ‘Religious Tourism to Mecca, Saudi Arabia’, (BA thesis, Budapest Business 
School 2014).	
16See e.g. F Facchini, 'Economic Freedom in Muslim Countries: An Explanation Using the Theory of 




jointly utilized to maximize the efficiency of the legal framework of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. Thus, Islamic and international principles of corporate 
governance should jointly be viewed welcomingly and their respective merits 
harnessed to further develop and strengthen the corporate governance framework 
of the country. 
Sixth: Increased worldwide competition to attract international investment has 
made the convergence of national corporate governance and the international 
standards an imperative policy consideration. This applies not only on policymaking 
but also on the way in which companies “adopt regulation and governance 
practices, opting in many instances to implement international standards of best 
practices".17  
Finally, corporate governance is therefore at the heart of these endeavours to 
transform the Saudi economy and develop alternative economic resources. 
Accordingly, this study aims to contribute to the on-going efforts to bolster the 
national preparedness and requisite legal and institutional framework to achieve 
the desired development goals. 
1.2 Research problem and questions 
The economy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is presently facing multifaceted 
challenges and prospective milestone changes. The underlying and corner stone of 
these challenges and changes is the plans being advanced to steer the economy 
from dependence on oil revenues to a more diversified economy with developed 
alternative resources. Developing an efficient and robust governance of the 
corporate sector is at the heart of the strategic options to move the economy 
confidently forward to achieve the desired economic transformation and 
development goals. This, in turn, requires keen assessment of the prevalent 
corporate governance structures in Saudi Arabia and the potential for their further 
enhancement. Thus, the research problem addressed in this thesis is twofold.  
First: the research attempts an analysis and assessment of the prevalent 
corporate governance structures in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, 
																																								 																				
17 S Morley, 'The Subject Matter, ‘Form and Process of Convergence and the Ever-Increasing Role of the 




the thesis focuses specially on the institutional and statutory (legislative) 
frameworks as these jointly constitute the legal framework and the most crucial 
structures of corporate governance in the country. The analysis is aimed at 
establishing the shortcomings and the required reforms. 
Since the 1950s corporate governance in Saudi Arabia witnessed gradual 
legislative and institutional developments through the introduction of a number of 
stock exchange regulatory authorities besides the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry.18 These include the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which was 
established in 1952 and the creation of the Capital Market Authority in 2003. 
Equally, the first Company Law was enacted in 1965 and was followed by a 
number of crucial capital market regulations. More recently an enhanced new 
Company Law was promulgated in 2015.  
Second: given that the Saudi legal system is fundamentally based on Islamic legal 
principles, the thesis also explores the question of compatibility or otherwise 
between modern principles of corporate governance (i.e. OECD) and Islamic 
principles of corporate governance.   
Third: the research also studies the ways in which the compound legal, i.e. 
legislative and institutional, framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia 
can be further developed and strengthened with particular focus on the country’s 
objectives of prospective economic transformation. This involves the question of 
defining the appropriate paradigm and means to enhance the efficiency of the 
Saudi legal framework of corporate governance. 
In this respect the thesis adopts a modelling approach and draws on a broad range 
of resources including international standards of good corporate governance and 
cross-country models and experiences. In both the developed and developing 
world, the national supervisory authorities strive to enhance the applications of 
good corporate governance for its vital role in protecting rights and prevalence of 
welfare. There are a number of model adopted in this regard which differ according 
to socio-political and economic environments and systems. However, it could 
																																								 																				
18 Renamed Ministry of Commerce and Investment by a Royal Decree on 30/7/1437 (07 May 2016). The two 





safely be said that the insightful among these is a comprehensive approach 
encompassing all scene elements; explores legislative and regulatory frameworks, 
analyses their malfunctions, and determines reform needs, and, at the same time, 
makes use of the other international best practices. 
1.3 Research type and methodology 
Corporate governance regulation is regarded in this research as a continuously 
evolving edifice. It requires development and adjustment to national and 
international economic conditions and regulatory standards. 
The thesis examines experiences of reforming the Saudi legal framework of 
corporate governance in order to enlighten possible reform in the future. 
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to note at the outset that the subject of this research, 
as outlined in the research problem and questions above, is rather complex and 
multi-layered. Consequently, its investigation and the questions it seeks to answers 
cannot be properly addressed or captured exclusively through a single research 
approach or methodology. Instead, it is deemed necessary that a thoroughly 
research into the subject of reform to build a robust and efficient legal framework of 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia can more properly be achieved through a 
combination of approaches and methodologies. Thus this research employs the 
following methods: 
1.3.1 Descriptive method 
In principle, this research may be described as mainly descriptive in that the 
principal constituent variables in the research, including the legislative and 
institutional elements of the legal framework of cooperate governance, are 
addressed ex post facto. In particular, chapters (3) and (4) are devoted to the 
discussion of the institutional and legislative aspects of the Saudi framework of 
corporate governance. These aspects exist ex post facto. However, the research 
aims to examine them analytically to evaluate their merits and suggest the means 




1.3.2 Qualitative method 
Moreover, this research can also more appositely be described as fundamentally 
qualitative in its approach since the investigation and assessment of the national 
reform experience in this research pertain essentially to the quality (and not the 
quantity) of the Saudi legal framework of corporate governance. This is particularly 
the case in the discussion and evaluation discussed in chapters (3) and (4) but also 
in a number of chapters and section elsewhere in the thesis. 
1.3.3 Analytic method 
In addition to this, however, the research also employs rather extensively the 
analytical method. For example, conceptual analysis is extensively used in 
chapters (2) (3) (4) and (7) which may accordingly be described as partly 
analytical. These chapters address a conceptual analysis of corporate governance 
in chapter (2); a generic model of corporate governance standards is developed in 
chapter (2.4, especially at 2.4.1); analysis of the institutional and legislative 
frameworks of corporate governance in Saud Arabia, and cross-country models of 
corporate governance application.  
1.3.4 Comparative method 
National systems of corporate governance have many varieties to the extent that 
some assert that ‘there are as many corporate governance systems as there are 
countries’.19  
Thus, the research also employs the comparative method particularly in chapters 
(6) and (7). This method is used to comparatively discuss, on the one hand, Islamic 
an international principles of corporate governance and, on the other hand, to 
conduct a comparative analysis of cross-country corporate governance models and 
reform in a number of jurisdictions. 
																																								 																				
19 Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, 2nd edn, (John Willey & Sons Press, West 





1.4 Research objectives and contributions 
The main objective of this thesis is to offer an analysis and evaluation of the legal 
framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia with a view of further reform to 
ultimately to build up an efficient and robust national system. In this regard the 
thesis attempts as through analysis as possible within the limits that have been 
available to conduct the research. The investigation in this study will incorporate an 
analytic investigation of the institutional and legislative frameworks of corporate 
governance as well as a comparative discussion of these through the prism of 
Islamic corporate doctrines and international principles and reform experiences. 
Accordingly, another main objective of this thesis is to recommend the path to 
enhance the efficiency of the Saudi corporate governance system in convergence 
with Islamic and international principles of good corporate governance. 
The subject of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is attracting the attention of a 
growing number of national and international academics. This is illustrated in the 
growing number of PhD and MA theses being undertaken on the subject at various 
universities.20 This thesis is an additional contribution to these academic efforts 
and is focused mainly on enhancing the efficiency of the legal framework of the 
Saudi corporate governance system. Thus, the present thesis aims to make the 
following contributions:  
1. The thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature and offer an up to date 
investigation of the prevalent legislative and institutional framework of 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia by including in the analysis more 
recent legislative development such as the new Company Law 2015, and 
the new Corporate Governance Regulations 2017. 
2. The research also aims to contribute by bringing new insights into means 
and methodologies which can be employed to further develop and 
strengthen the efficiency of the Saudi corporate governance system with 
particular focus on the country’s objectives of prospective economic 
transformation. The investigation in this respect involves defining the 
appropriate paradigm through comparative and analytic methods. 
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3. As it has already been mentioned, the Saudi economy is presently facing 
milestone challenges and changes. The economic aspirations and plans are 
clearly articulated in the Saudi Vision 2030 which has been discussed in 
section (1.1.3.1) above. Therefore, this research is intended to contribute to 
the national strategic economic planning by offering an investigation into the 
ways in which the corporate sector could be strengthened in the face of the 
challenges to realize the transformation objectives. 
4. As discussed in more detail in chapter (5), it has been observed by 
researchers that continued ignorance in western academic literature of the 
applications of Islamic law in practice weakens understanding of Islamic 
religion, Islamic history, and Muslim societies. It has also contributed to the 
prevailing assumption that ‘Islamic law early in its career had rigidified into a 
fixed corpus of doctrines considered divine and unchangeable, and hence 
had grown progressively out of touch with the societies it professed to 
rule’.21 By studying the contemporary framework of corporate governance in 
the Saudi legal system, which is fundamentally based on Islamic law, the 
present thesis also aims to contribute, though in a limited way, to the 
academic literature on contemporary application of Islamic law and the 
means to foster and maintain synthesis of Islamic and modern legal 
principles. 
1.5 Research Structure 
This thesis consists of eight main chapters. The present Chapter 1 (Introduction) is 
introductory in nature and is aimed to offer background information both on the 
country and the research problem and academic organization. 
The second Chapter (2) is focused on the Definition, Elements and Theories of 
Corporate Governance. This chapter is aimed to give in-depth background 
information and analysis of the concept of corporate governance, its core 
constituent elements and the theoretical frames which shape-up the field of 
corporate governance in the academic literature. Section (2.4) develops a multi-
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layered generic model of corporate governance standards including the pillars, 
international principles, and national applications of good corporate governance.  
Chapters (3) and (4) analyse the Institutional and Legislative framework of 
Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia, respectively, in order to discern their 
strengths and any weaknesses. In particular, the Saudi legal framework of 
corporate governance is divided into these two components in order to facilitate in-
depth analysis and to highlight its problems. A corollary aim is that this division is 
also part of the solution as the thesis concludes that success of enhancing the 
efficiency of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia requires attention and action on 
both the legislative and the institutional levels of the system. 
Additionally, chapter (5) studies the false assumption, which claims that there is no 
relationship between the principles of corporate governance applications and the 
applications of Islamic Law. The chapter explores the Islamic Law literature related 
to the rights of ownership, the agency theory, and “Gharar” (ambiguity) 
applications, which are prohibited by the Shariah scholars. There is evidence that 
corporate governance applications are deeply rooted in the literature of Islamic 
Law. The discussion included in this chapter is aimed to enhance the functional 
review tools used for evaluating the Saudi legal framework concerned with 
corporate governance as the Shariah is considered the main source for law in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
Chapter (6) discusses international corporate This chapter tackles the OECD 
Principles of corporate governance and embodiment of the main international 
standards of corporate governance. The chapter also discusses some of the 
predecessors of the OECD developed in the UK such as the Cadbury and 
Greenbury committee reports which paved the way for the OECD principles to 
evolve. The objective of discussing these international standards is to set the 
required benchmarks both to evaluate the Saudi legal framework of corporate 
governance and simultaneously to extract the requirements for its development 
and further enhancement. 
Chapter (7) examines a number of cross-country corporate governance models 
and country-specific experiences which are frequently discussed in the literature. 




enabling v the mandatory model. The discussion and analysis in this chapter is 
intended to inform and enlighten future reform of the Saudi framework of corporate 
governance.  
Thus, these chapters are collectively intended to articulate a wealth pool of 
doctrines, standards and experiences which can profitably be utilized to enhance 
the efficiency of the legal framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. 
First, owing to its fundamental basis in Islamic law the Saudi corporate system can 
be ameliorated consistently with Islam corporate principles when the latter are 
clearly elucidated and articulated. In addition owning to its reciprocal relationships 
internationally, the Saudi system can also utilize international standards to 
streamline its corporate governance system with those of its partners and also lead 
the way forward for further regional development particularly within the GCC 
countries. 
Finally, chapter (8) ends with Conclusions and Recommendations of the thesis 
regarding the subject of efficiency of the legal framework of corporate governance 





2. Chapter Two: Theories, Elements and Models of 
Corporate Governance 
 
This chapter is devoted to the discussion and conceptual analysis of the concept of 
corporate governance. 22 The aim of this discussion is to provide in-depth 
background of the definition, elements and theoretical framework of corporate 
governance which will be the foundation for the analysis that follows in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
Accordingly, the analysis here will focus on four related aspects of corporate 
governance. Section 2.1 will address the concept and definition of corporate 
governance. Section 2.2 will discuss the core constituent elements which shapeup 
the field of corporate governance including the corporation, the investors, the 
managers, the directors and stakeholders. Accordingly, the analysis in that Section 
will define these elements and simultaneously establish the foundations of the 
universe of corporate governance discourse. Section Error! Reference source 
not found. will address the theoretical models of corporate governance.  
2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
This section tackles the definition and concept of corporate governance. The 
discussion and analysis here are aimed to elucidate the concept of corporate 
governance and to investigate the proper definition thereof. Thus, the discussion 
will focus on the etymology and evolution of corporate governance (in 2.1.1) and its 
definition and phenomenology (in 2.1.2). An important related concept is that of 
‘efficiency’ of corporate governance which is central in this study in relation to the 
legal framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. This concept is 
discussed in section 2.1.3. 
2.1.1 Etymology and evolution of corporate governance 
From a terminological point of view “Corporate Governance” suggest conceptual 
linkages and analogy with the more familiar phenomenon of government of nations 
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or states. As commonly understood, the governance of the modern state refers to 
the ways in which the state official apparatus is instituted and how the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers are exercised. Comparatively, the term ‘Corporate 
Governance’ is used to denote how companies should be, and are in fact, directed 
and controlled.	23 The term involves two components: corporate and governance. 
The former refers to corporations which will discussed in more detail in subsection 
(2.2.1), while the latter, in its Latin root, gubernare, means steering a ship.24  
However, the semantics of the second component ’governance’ might often be the 
principal source of confusion in clarifying the concept, owing to its allusion to 
government, which brings a public element into a domain that is considered as 
essentially private. 25  Thus, while being etymologically related, corporate 
governance and state governance are distinct terms which can be distinguished 
primarily by reference to the subject matter of their respective application.  
Thus, Magnier 26 , for example, has stressed three features which distinguish 
corporate governance: First, corporate governance is characterised by private 
mode of governance in contradistinction to the public mode of governance which 
pertains to government. Second, corporate governance is furthermore essentially 
a capitalist mode of governance as opposed to other of private governances such 
as associations and cooperatives. Third, the concept largely involves all those who 
are involved in the management of the company and thereby contributing to 
significant decision making. 
This thesis is concerned with the application of the term ‘governance’ to 
corporations, and not to states, which may thus be metaphorically defined as the 
stewardship of corporations.	27	  
																																								 																				
23 Robert Tricker, Corporate Governance: Practices, Procedures and Powers in British Companies and Their 
Boards of Directors (Gower Pub. Co. 1984 ). 
24 See the entry ‘govern’ at dictionary.com  
25 Karel Lannoo, ‘A European Perspective on Corporate Governance’ (1999) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 271. 
26 See the Introduction in Veronique Magnier, Comparative Corporate Governance: legal Perspectives. 
(Edward Elgar Publishing. 2017). 




Historically, it is commonly believed that the term ‘corporate governance’ was first 
used in the academic literature by Richards Eells in the USA in the early 1960s. 28 
However, earlier origins of modern corporate governance may be traceable to 
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property.29 Thus, the term ‘corporate governance’ has an American origin but it has 
gradually become internationally a feature of corporation and securities regulative 
discourse. In this process of internationalization of the term the popularity of 
corporate governance was boosted from the 1970s onwards by endeavours to 
improve the ethical governance and operation of the business sectors particularly 
in the USA.30 Both the use and importance of corporate governance have become 
globally pervasive which prompted James Wolfensohn, former president of the 
World Bank, to state that: “the governance of corporations is now as important in 
the world economy as the government of countries”.31 
This thesis is not particularly aimed at offering a detailed or comprehensive 
account of the evolution of corporate governance.32 Nevertheless, the subsequent 
discussion of the development of the legal framework of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia (in chapters 3 and 4); Islamic and international standards (chapters 5 
and 6) may be regarded, at least partially, as an account of the global evolutionary 
narrative of corporate governance. More particularly, the discussion in chapter 5 
may be regarded as a contribution to the growing body of literature on Islam and 
good corporate governance. 
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2.1.2 Phenomenology and definition 
A conceptual analysis of “corporate governance” shows that the term involves a 
number of interrelated elements and key players and is, accordingly, susceptible of 
definition from a number of perspectives. 
Broad definition: broadly defined, corporate governance as a collective term 
refers – in the broadest sense – to all rules (whether imposed by law, ethics, 
custom, best-practice or contracts), processes, decisions and concerns by which 
businesses are operated, regulated, and controlled. The term certainly suggests 
and makes reference to factors and interests defined by reference to all players 
concerned with the corporate process and business; they are mainly shareholders, 
management and concerned stakeholders. Thus, on its broad definition corporate 
governance can encompass the combination of laws, regulations, listing rules and 
voluntary private sector practices that enable the corporation to attract capital, 
perform efficiently, generate profit, and meet both legal obligations and general 
societal expectations. 
Narrow definition: Narrowly defined corporate governance concerns the 
relationships between corporate managers, board of directors and shareholders. 
But it might as well encompass the relationship of the corporation to stakeholders 
and society. Thus, the OECD defined the terms as follows 
“Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, 
the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the 







2.1.2.1 Definition of corporate governance in Saudi law 
In practice, different national systems of corporate governance articulate the 
primary objective of the corporation in different ways and thus implicitly espouse 
either a broad or narrow definition of corporate governance. Accordingly, 
predominately in states in continental Europe and Asia the focus is on the need to 
satisfy societal expectations including, more particularly, the interests of employees 
and other stakeholders, variously defined to include suppliers, creditors, tax 
authorities and the communities in which corporations operate. In other states, 
typical the Anglo-Saxon country, the emphasis is often on the primacy of ownership 
and property rights with particular focus on returning a profit to shareholders over 
the long term. Under this view, employees, suppliers and other creditors have 
contractual claims on the company. As owners with property rights, shareholders 
have a claim to whatever is left after all contractual claimants have been paid. The 
corporate focus is on shareholder value.  
Remarkably, the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations (2006)34 did not include 
a definition of the term corporate governance. However, the new Corporate 
Governance Regulations 2017 include the following narrow definition: 
“Corporate governance means “rules to lead and guide the Company that includes 
(sic) mechanisms to regulate the various relationships between the Board, 
Executive Directors, shareholders and Stakeholders, by establishing rules and 
procedures to facilitate the decision making process and add transparency and 
credibility to it with the objective of protecting the rights of shareholders and 
Stakeholders and achieving fairness, competitiveness and transparency on the 
Exchange and the business environment.” 35 
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It worth noting that both the broad and narrow definitions, relate to the two 
perspectives of shareholder- and stakeholder orientation. It therefore revolves 
around the debate on whether management should run the corporation solely in 
the interests of shareholders (shareholder perspective) or whether it should take 
account of other constituencies (stakeholder perspective).  
Taking purpose as a definition reference, corporate governance is the tool that 
aims at safeguarding the legitimate benefits and interests of everyone concerned 
with the operation of the company, mainly shareholders, and more generally, 
stakeholders. This can be done by ensuring that the company's insiders adhere to 
the accepted ethical/legal standards and the best practices, as well as to formal 
laws when dealing with them (i.e., the shareholders and the stakeholders) or when 
otherwise making decisions and activities affecting them. 36 
Building on the above analysis and by taking the operational side of the definition, 
corporate governance could be defined as the rules and practices by which the 
board of directors/management ensure accountability, fairness, and transparency 
in the company's relationship with its shareholders and stakeholders such as the 
financiers, customers and the community.37 It is therefore a comprehensive system 
of rules, which indicates how the company is directed and controlled in the light of 
the nexus of relationships that exist between the company and its shareholders 
and other stakeholders. It is also the marginal code of conduct for the management 
and the board which will act as an identifier for their responsibilities and an 
indicator for any possible misuse or breach by them.  For better understanding of 
how the corporate governance mechanism works, it is necessary to analyse the 
role of managers, directors, shareholders and stakeholders, especially in relation to 
the company’s business strategy and long-term performance. More concretely, it is 
of critical importance to examine not only the relationships between these groups, 
but also the relationships within these groups.  
																																								 																				





2.1.3 Efficiency of the legal framework of corporate governance 
Efficiency is a central economic concept where it enjoys a precise technical 
definition. The problem of efficiency of the Saudi legal framework of corporate 
governance is closely related to but distinguishable from economic efficiency. 
Economic efficiency is about maximising the aggregate or collective wellbeing of 
the members of the community. Economists commonly maintain that economic 
efficiency requires satisfaction of three components: 
Productive efficiency: which is economically achieved when output is produced at 
minimum cost. This occurs where no more output can be produced given the 
resources available, that is, the economy is on its production possibility frontier 
(PPF). Productive efficiency incorporates technical efficiency, which refers to the 
extent to which it is technically feasible to reduce any input without decreasing the 
output, and without increasing any other input. When more than one input is used, 
or more than one output is produced, the ratio of outputs to inputs can be formed 
only if inputs and outputs are summed into two scalars. If prices are used for that 
purpose, then technical efficiency merges into productive efficiency.  
Allocative efficiency: which is about ensuring that a given community gets the 
greatest return (or utility) from its scarce resources. Invariable, a country’s 
resources can be used in many different ways. The best or ‘most efficient’ 
allocation of resources uses them in the way that contributes most to community 
wellbeing.  
Dynamic efficiency: refers to the allocation of resources over time, including 
allocations designed to improve economic efficiency and to generate more 
resources. This can mean finding better products and better ways of producing 
goods and services. This involves innovation (producing more with less) and can 
also be generated from growth in resources such as capital and labour. 
Improvements in dynamic efficiency bring growth in living standards over time. 
These efficiency concepts are as applicable to the activities of the public sector 
including taxing, spending, regulating and policy making as they are to everyday, 
marketed goods and services. The difference is that for marketed goods and 




specific conditions markets can be shown to allocate resources to the outputs most 
preferred by people in way that maximizes economic efficiency. Economic 
institutions and policy can assist in improving economic efficiency by, for example, 
helping align market prices of goods and services to their true economic costs. 
Beyond this, in response to significant market failure, or for other reasons, such as 
redistribution or risk management to improve the quality of life, governments make 
decisions that affect production, consumption and investment. 
Thus, economic efficiency and legislative and institutional efficiency of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia go hand in hand. While legal efficiency in this research 
is focused on achieving the best model of good corporate governance in the 
country through a thorough examination of the prevalent system and incorporation 
of international best practice experience and principles, it can ultimately also be 
measured economically in the sense of instituting a model that is capable of 
attracting investment and increase exports, standards of living and GDP. 
2.2 Elements of Corporate Governance 
The basis of the corporate governance edifice is found on a number of intertwined 
core elements involving natural and legal persons. These elements include the 
corporation itself, the investors or shareholders, the managers, the directors, and, 
ultimately, the stakeholders. The designation ‘core’ used here to describe these 
elements signifies that these are regarded as the basic, and the scope of elements 
could certainly be enlarged on several levels of generality to include, e.g. all sorts 
of legal or ethical rules, and those imposed custom, best-practice or agreements, in 
addition to processes and various public policy decisions and institutions. 
The central legal person is the company or corporation which is a complicated 
business institution involving different contributors in capital, planning and 
management (performance) units. In fact, the corporation is nothing more than an 
organized concentration for monies and expertise towards the achievement of a 
certain business goal (mainly in the form of bigger profit and market share). As a 
matter of fact, the ramification of roles and responsibilities into different contributors 
in capital, management and planning, may by itself facilitate abuse opportunities 
within the corporation and the market. When this very fine crystallized organization 




governance is concerned with the conditions under which this institutional 
organization should operate in harmony and without abuse. 
In order to address this question properly, the specification and characteristics of 
every component in this organizational structure should be identified and studied. 
The focus in this part of the thesis will be on the players concerned with the 
corporation as an institute and on the environment in which this institution works 
and operates.  
2.2.1 The Corporation 
The roots of the contemporary ubiquitous institution known as the ‘corporation’ can 
be traced back historically to Roman law which recognized that ownership (i.e. 
dominium) could be vested contemporaneously on more than one person (or 
owner). Accordingly, it was possible for joint or co-ownership to arise under Roman 
law in more than one way. The most notable form was partnership, i.e. societas, 
created by the parties through a consensual contract which determines their 
respective rights. The contract itself would be enforceable by the action prosocio, 
i.e. by one partner vis a vis the other partner(s) to enforce the terms of the 
partnership agreement. Another way in which co-ownership arose under Roman 
law was joint legacy or inheritance. Interestingly, it was not necessary in either form 
of co-ownership that the owners have equal share as it was recognizable by 
Roman law that one heir or a partner could have more shares than others.38 
More elaborate beginnings of the modern corporation can be traced to 
developments in England as early as the 17th century during which ownership of 
corporations or companies was typically divided among a few individuals who often 
also participated in its management 39 . Accordingly, there were no organized 
markets for the transfer of ownership of corporate rights and claims.40  As a 
consequence, shares were only transferred to friends or relatives, and control was 
therefore characterized by “voice” rather than by “exit”.41 This means that any 
shareholders dissatisfied with the corporate performance would have to exert 
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personal effort and patience into the company (through “voice”) rather than being 
institutionally enabled to sell or transfer his shares (i.e. through “exit”). 
Another characteristic of the 17th century corporations is that partnership was the 
dominant form for organising jointly owned business firms. In fact, the partnership 
was the only form available for most types of business and partners often bore 
unlimited personal liability for the contractual obligations of the firm. One of the first 
corporations that came into existence was the British East India Company. It was a 
joint-stock company, which was granted an English Royal Charter by Queen 
Elizabeth I at the end 1600, with the intention of favouring trade privileges in India. 
The company had 125 shareholders, and a capital of £72,000. At the time, the 
concept of a corporation was quite different than today. Corporations were small, 
quasi-governmental institutions chartered by the crown for a specific purpose such 
as banking, and could only exist for a limited time. This was one of the first 
companies established as well to gather together investors to satisfy the huge 
capital demand of large projects. Not only Queen Elizabeth I but other European 
kings and queens closely watched these corporations and did not hesitate to 
revoke charters if they became unhappy with the way the corporations were being 
run. But being more the exception than the rule, corporations in general remained 
small institutions for the next 200 years or so to come.   
The advent of industrialisation drastically changed the prevalent operation of 
corporations as it to was tightly connected with the huge capital demand of new 
giant firms. This heralded a new era in the history of corporations in which 
legislators and regulators began to extend their regulative realm to corporations.  
Equally, corporations began to expand as they were allowed to write broader and 
less restrictive charters. In particular, the doctrine of limited liability of companies 
allowed corporate owners and managers to avoid responsibility for harm and 
losses caused by the corporation and consequently made this business form even 
more interesting. Thus, corporations were gradually transformed from state-
controlled organisations to unlimited private organisations with limited responsibility 
and limited accountability.  
The growth and increasing importance of corporations led to the emergence of 




cities. As share trading became easier to capital providers, shareholders 
increasingly relied on the exit option to express their (pleasure or) displeasure with 
the managers. Control via voice shifted to the boards of directors, which in turn 
were dominated by managers. Hence, at the end of the 19th century and beginning 
of the 20th century, control of corporations shifted more and more into the hands of 
the managers and therefore ownership and control separated. This phenomenon 
deepened as corporations continued to grow in the 20th century which gave rise to 
what is know as ‘agency problem’ (see subsections 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.4) in 
corporate governance.  
Presently laws typically view corporations as fictional persons, i.e. a legal person, 
or a moral person. That is, a corporation is a person in its own rights, i.e. has legal 
personality with the attendant duties and rights. The owners of the company are 
the shareholders (also called members). In return for the money they invest into the 
company they receive shares. Corporations are managed by directors, who may 
(or may) not be members of the company. A corporation is typically characterised 
by the following four key features: 
Separate Legal Personality:  As already mentioned, a company has its own legal 
personality. Consequently it can be a party to contracts and the subject of rights 
and liabilities. Furthermore, the existence of a corporation may continue indefinitely 
unless and until it is liquidated.  
Separation of Management from Ownership:  Modern corporate organisation is 
characterised by a formal separation of the company's management (under the 
board of directors) from the shareholders. The latter are sometimes termed “the 
owners” of the company who share the company's profits. As they are collectively 
entitled to appoint and remove directors from the board, they exercise ultimate 
control over management. The agency problem indicated above relates to the 
shareholders’ perceived limited liability and their practical inability to control 
management. Notwithstanding, the separation of the function of management from 
the function of shareholding arguably enables these functions to be performed 
more efficiently by specialists. Directors and other managers do not have to 
possess capital (and risk-bearing expertise) and shareholders do not have to 




a relatively small and cohesive group of people whereas the risks associated with 
providing equity capital can be borne more efficiently when shared among a large 
number of people, who in turn can protect themselves by holding diversified 
portfolios of investments.  
Limited Liability: The essential point for this feature of corporations is the 
company’s responsibility for its own debts and liabilities. In other words, the 
shareholders share the company's profits, but they are not responsible for its 
losses. They are only liable to the company to pay up their share capital and have 
no further liability. So limited liability actually shifts the risk of business failure from 
the company's shareholders to its creditors. This appears to give the company's 
owners and managers too much of an incentive to take risks and can lead to an 
inefficient use of resources.  
Transferability: A share in a company carries rights against the company to 
receive dividends and (usually) to vote at shareholders meetings. Thus, a share 
can be transferred to a new holder and this transfers the associated rights and 
liabilities. Shares in a public company are usually traded on a stock exchange, 
facilitating transfer and making shareholding a more flexible kind of investment. 
In the Saudi context, there is a variety of companies including listed companies and 
companies limited by liability. In addition, there are state-owned companies, 
particularly in the industrial sector such as the oil sector, but also family owned 
corporation. The latter type of corporations, i.e. family-owned, is a very dominant 
form of corporate ownership in the Saudi economy. Reportedly, the phenomenon 
of family businesses in Saudi Arabia has a profile percentage of 80% of the 
business sector. Moreover, some researchers believe that the contribution of family 
businesses to the GDP- excluding the oil industry- in Saudi Arabia is more than 
90% whereas the UK for example has a percentage of 66% of small and medium 
sized enterprises. Therefore, family business in Saudi Arabia can be described as 





2.2.2 The Shareholders (Investors) 
The shareholders or investors42 are the individual persons and entities, i.e. natural 
or legal persons, directly contributing to the issued capital of a given corporation. 
They are the joint owners of the company, its assets and any other rights 
attributable to it. In this capacity, shareholders are the sole body entitled to share in 
the dividends distributed by the company. Nowadays, particularly in large 
companies, shareholders are dispersed and individually hold a small percentage of 
the total issued shares of a company, and they exercise little control over corporate 
management.43 
Not every person who is contributing money to the corporation is considered a 
shareholder. Subscribers in bonds issued44 thereby, and providers of financial 
facilities to the company are not technically shareholders, and they, therefore, are 
not entitled to vote therein or share in its profits.  
2.2.2.1 Nature of the Relation 
The relation between the shareholders themselves is contractual in nature. All 
shareholders are signatories on the company’s articles and by-laws whether 
directly such as in the case of the institutional shareholders (i.e., founders), or 
indirectly through subsequent subscription of non-founder shareholders or share 
acquisition through the stock market. 
The articles of association signed, or otherwise endorsed, by the shareholders 
necessitate another relation between the shareholders as a whole, on one hand, 
and the company as a property on the other hand. This relation takes the form of 
ownership. In this sense, the shareholders, being the contributors to the capital 
constituting the company, are considered, from legal and factual points of view, the 
sole and absolute owners of the company and all its tangible and intangible assets.   
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2.2.2.2 Powers Vested in the Shareholders 
Shareholders enjoy essential rights enshrined in the applicable national law of 
companies and other financial regulations. These rights include attending and 
voting at general meetings, receiving dividends (profits distributed by the 
company), subscribing in new shares, appointing and recusing board members, 
appointing external auditor(s), amending the articles/by-laws, and receiving 
information about the general work and standing of the company. In addition, 
shareholders are entitled to sell their shares (exit) whether in part or in full against 
the prevailing prices in the market.45 
In spite of their substantial rights and privileges, shareholders’ practical exercise of 
most of these rights is rather restricted in practice. This is due to a number of 
reasons chief among which is the non-existence of a permanent forum for 
shareholders, the imposed power-delegation to the board and the managers of the 
company46 and shareholders’ lack of information and expertise.    
2.2.2.3 The Classical Separation of Ownership and Control 
The powers granted to the shareholders do not include powers to run the 
company’s ordinary business.47  National laws commonly allow for a complete 
separation between the ownership rights vested in shareholders and the 
management (running) of the company’s affairs - the so-called control rights.  
Vesting the company’s control and management in the executives and managers 
requires good corporate governance practices to ensure placing reasonably skilled 
and well-qualified persons at positions of control and decision making for the 
ordinary business of the company.  
This separation is truly one of the main dilemmas facing corporate governance, 
since some past experiences shown that company controllers to be the main 
source of misuse and the main cause in some major corporate collapse incidents.48 
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2.2.2.4 The main goals of shareholders 
Invariably, shareholders’ engagement in the company is basically an act of 
investment Thus, the main goal of shareholders is to maximize their equity rights 
and magnify their profits. As for any investor, the basic desire of good financial 
returns and stability in the market remain the core value of shareholder pursuit. 
Another shareholders’ goal is the market value of the share of the company. To 
some extent, the price value of shares is indicative of the size and market share of 
the company, its level of management efficiency and the profits achieved. The 
price value is also important to shareholders desiring to ‘exit’ from the company.  
Similar to the question of price value is the number of deals and purchase claims of 
the company’s issued shares. Again, it is in the interest of the shareholders that 
purchase claims for the company shares in the market increase. This will result in 
an increase in the share value, the wealth of the shareholders and more reputation 
to the company in the market.     
2.2.3 Corporate Managers and Executives 
Corporate managers and executives are the senior personnel entrusted with the 
running of the company’s daily work. Aspired by the general and strategic plan of 
the company drawn by the board of directors, the managers and executives are the 
ones entrusted with handling the operational side of business in the company.  
The term ‘manager’ is a wide term usually used to refer to the senior personnel or 
executives working for the company. In this research, however, the terms 
managers, senior personnel and executives are regarded and used as synonyms 
unless otherwise indicated.  
2.2.3.1 Managers relation to the company and shareholders 
The manager’s relation with the company is a contractual relation. It is usually an 
employee-employer relation. The managers and executives, similar to any 
personnel, are, staff members working for the company. Thus, 
managers/executives owe obligations stemming from the labour law of the 
company. On the top of these obligations comes the obligation to dedicate time 




The manager’s relation with shareholders is quite complicated. The fact that 
managers are employees of the company does not lead to the conclusion that the 
managers are working for the shareholders themselves because the company, as 
a distinctive institution, enjoys separate legal entity and capacity from the 
shareholders. Moreover, the managers are not per se signatories on the company 
articles/by-laws. Legally speaking, there is no direct contractual relation between 
managers and shareholders according to the traditional law classification. 
Given the above, there is a growing demand that, notwithstanding to the settled law 
traditions, the relation between shareholders and managers is to be regarded as a 
principal – agent relation. 49  This is because of the strong assumption that 
managers, while practicing their jobs as runners of the property of shareholders 
(the company), are doing so as agents on behalf of the owners. Management 
scientists seem to be quite settled on the classification of the relation prevailing 
between managers and shareholders as agency relation. In their view, apart from 
the legal jargon, managers are the owners’ de facto appointed agents for running 
the property they own.50 Today, there are also growing concerns amongst law 
specialists to consider the relation between managers and shareholders as 
proposed (potential) agency relation. This legal recognition is argued on the basis 
that as long as the law obliges separation between ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ rights, 
it certainly imposes some sort of relation between these two and this could be 
nothing but in the form of agency or legal representation.  
2.2.3.2  Powers and duties 
Managers’ powers are determined in accordance with many factors including their 
hierarchy position within the company, their mandate and their job description.  
Managers are generally granted comprehensive discretion in running the 
company’s ordinary and daily activities. This includes, especially for senior 
managers and executives, the right to appoint (or recommend the appointment of) 
ordinary staff and decide on their salaries and job descriptions. They also have the 
right to represent the company before clients and competitors, the right to decide 
how the business of the company is done, the right to operate and control all 
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managerial and financial systems such as the human resource systems, the 
accounting and book-keeping systems and the other systems related to invoicing, 
pricing and collection.51 
The wide powers enjoyed by managers and the thin involvement of shareholders in 
the company’s works leaves ample opportunity for the abuse by managers.52 This 
is one of the critical issues which business is facing in practice, and which the 
corporate governance as an idea, and the science of management as an academic 
subject, are trying to solve or at least minimize to an accepted level. 
2.2.3.3 Managers’ standard of responsibility 
Managers standardly owe a duty of care to the company they work for. The same 
duty of care is proposed to be vested in the managers vis-à-vis the shareholders. 
This is a direct application for the proposed agency theory. The duty of care in this 
sense imposes on the managers the obligation to dedicate their time and 
resources, including the intellectual resources, to achieve the goals and the 
interests of the company.   
As detailed above, this duty of care is a question of degree, and it differs from one 
person to another and from one circumstance to another. Moreover, finding an 
agreed-upon priority scale for the imminent objectives of the company is also an 
area of dispute.  
As a result of the foregoing, finding whether a certain manager has breached its 
duty is vested in the courts to decide; however, the matter is always surrounded 
with a great deal of uncertainty as long as there is no universal scale identifying the 
objectives of the company and the roles and priorities of the management while 
achieving the same.  
2.2.3.4 Possible problems of agency  
As indicated above, the pattern of ownership - control separation, though a pivotal 
principle of good corporate governance is equally a source of fragility in the 
corporate organization mainly because it proved to be a source for abuses by 
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managers. This could be seen as one of the problems of agency, for instance when 
managers’ varied acts and actions are factually driven and dictated by their self-
interests rather than the interests of the company.53 
The recent years witnessed many well-known scandals caused by managers’ 
misconducts. This does not usually take the form of directly enriching at the cost of 
the company, but rather by entering into agreements and taking decisions not to 
the favour of the company, a matter which results in burdening the company with 
unnecessary costs and depriving the company from actual profit had the decision 
taken been within the company’s interest. Such misconducts are numerous and 
include, for example, the acceptance of bribe, the release of confidential 
information to a competitor, concluding agreements with companies, hiring 
relatives or friends, etc.     
Even membership in businessmen clubs by managers and executives may be 
considered as misuse specially when such membership amounts to engaging the 
company in unnecessary political affairs and debates. This is, of course, driven by 
the subjective personal popularity of the managers/executives, and it usually 
results in endangering the side of the company without any objective benefit to the 
company in return.  
The second agency problem, which may operate against the interests of 
shareholders, is the management variable responses to business risks. Apart from 
the mala fide conduct of managers and executives, bona fide behaviour of 
managers and executives may result in a detriment to the company just because 
they have different levels of, or responses to, business risks.54 
The clash happens when the risk-aversion policy or attitude of the management 
conflicts with the general policy and goals of the shareholders who, in response to 
their own goals and needs, prefer adopting a different policy based on a different 
level of risk.   
																																								 																				





2.2.3.5 Accountability before the Board  
Managers and the executives of corporations and are, in principle, monitored by 
the company’s board of directors. Monitoring is comprehensive in scope and it is 
suggested to include all acts and actions of the management which may affect the 
commercial and the financial standings of the company. 
For the sake of categorization, monitoring usually takes two sides; a passive side 
which pertains to how management implements the general plan of the company, 
and an active monitoring side which aims at detecting management’s faults and 
misuses in general.  
Sometimes monitoring requires that managers and executives disclose to the 
board in full transparency any clash or conflict of interest they may have with the 
company’s business, or with any specific deal the company is to engage in.  
Boards are given wide spectrum of remedies to use in order to relieve any 
conversion the management may have from the planned course of the company. 
Again, reliefs are twofold: a passive one which depends on just directing the 
management to act for certain goal or end, and, on the other end of the spectrum, 
an active (direct) one which includes notification to management, direct 
involvement to rectify an action of misuse and, or taking an exemplary/punitive 
action such as the dismissal of the defaulted manager/executive.   
Despite the existence of monitoring and accountability as a principle, the same 
may sometimes be insufficient to safeguard the interests of the company. This 
happens especially when the board lacks the necessary means to perform these 
duties particularly when the information and reporting system does not inform the 
board of the actual position in a timely manner.   
2.2.4 Board/Directors: Definition and Relation with the Company 
and  Shareholders 
The board is a group of individuals who are appointed by the shareholders to act 
as their representatives to plan and manage the corporate business and make 
decisions on major corporate issues. In this capacity, the board is the highest 




As an institution, the board is regulated by the articles of the company and by the 
national corporate law. The board, taken as an institution, is a superior unit of the 
company, and its main role is to liaise between the shareholders and the 
management.55 In this sense, the board owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
in safeguarding their interests in the company.  
2.2.4.1 Duties 
The main duty assigned to the board is to represent shareholders’ interest in the 
company and before the management. In doing so, it liaises between the owners 
and the controllers of the company and thereby greatly reduces the consequences 
of the agency problem between managers and shareholders.  
Importantly, a board also has a number of other corporate law duties including the 
duty to draw the general business plan of the company.  In this respect, the board 
of directors draw the broad lines of the company business, activities and marketing 
strategy. This duty is not limited merely to drawing the general map; it is 
extendable to monitoring how management performs the assigned tasks and 
implements the general plans drawn. The board is required to intervene whenever 
necessary to rectify any abuse or mis-performance by the management.   
Another duty of the board is to build reliable information system in the company 
based on file and financial record keeping and reporting at different levels.56 The 
information system is very important for reliable monitoring and decision-making. In 
doing so, boards should receive from the management detailed reporting and 
information, on regular basis, on all operational and financial aspects of the 
company.  
2.2.4.2 The Nature of the Board’s Responsibility: the Fiduciary Duty  
The board is largely qualified as owing a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
because the trust relation binding it to the shareholders. As a fiduciary, the board 
undertakes an enhanced duty of care to the benefit of all shareholders taken 
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collectively; this indicates that the directors' fiduciary duties are owed to the 
company and not to every particular shareholder.57 
However, a fiduciary duty is a general term encompassing many latent duties such 
as the duty to make self-interest disclosures, obligation to act in good faith and the 
obligation of loyalty. Accordingly, directors are required to be neutral and should 
devote their efforts to result in the good of the company. Acts and transactions 
passed or otherwise approved by the board should not be induced by their self-
interest. Equally, there is a general duty of disclosure on the board members to 
disclose to the board, and in some times to the shareholders, any self-interest they 
may have with respect to any action or transaction. National laws and the articles 
usually determine the matters that need to be disclosed by the board members. 
In addition to the disclosure duty, the board and the directors are under a general 
duty of loyalty. This is a duty to act in good faith, often directly imposed by national 
law requiring the directors to act with due diligence and care to achieve the best 
interest of the company.58 
The standard of this issue is unclear; it is generally agreed that obligations, like 
acting in good faith and in due diligence, are always tested objectively. This 
obligation looks to be of subjective nature in the modern corporate law in the sense 
that members should act in accordance of what they personally think fit and in the 
best interest of the company. Under such subjectivity test, it will be extremely 
challenging to have conclusive proof of breach of this duty by the board which adds 
extra immunity to the board.  
However, to minimize or eliminate the subjective nature of this duty, courts require 
that not only the subjective good faith act of the director be the issue, but they also 
require that such an act be in the best interest of the company. The latter 
requirement is more sensible and objective. This objective technique implies the 
requirement that the directors have the necessary skills and exert reasonable care 
while doing their works. This does not imply the obligation to have distinguished 
academic degrees, but rather good judgment and full dedication to their duties.  
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2.2.4.3 The Board accountability before shareholders: the 
Disqualification System   
Members in the board hold their office for a definite term (often for one year). They 
are either re-elected or dismissed by the shareholders’ annual general assembly. 
The board is annually examined in the light of the company’s annual results and 
performance, and the shareholders are able to modify its membership in a free 
election.  
Moreover, in any particular case of serious faults or omissions by a board member, 
the member may be disqualified.59 This may be decided by an extra ordinary 
decision, by a court decision or even by virtue of law in some instances. In addition 
to dismissal or disqualification a member may still be held legally liable vis-a-vis the 
company for compensation of damages sustained as a result his breaches or 
faults.60    
2.2.5 Stakeholders  
Stakeholders are a wide variety of persons and entities having a certain interest in 
the company or in its business. These interests are not of the same type, level or 
value, but rather they share the distinctive element of being attached with the 
company or its business. 
2.2.5.1 The Main Characteristics and Sources of Relation with the 
Company 
Stakeholders are not shareholders, managers or board members in the company. 
They just enjoy recognizable interests attached to the company or its business. 
They are not signatories on the articles, nor do they form part of the management.  
As a term, ‘stakeholders’ is open-ended and refers to many persons and entities on 
the top of which comes the community; other possible stakeholders could be 
banks, lenders, unions (including labour unions), religious systems, the 
government, consumers, insurance companies and so many others.   
																																								 																				





Stakeholders may sometimes have a kind of legal relation with the company such 
as when they are bound with employment contract, loan, or contract of supply with 
the company.61 However, in many other situations, they do not have any contract 
bond with the company at all. This is why, especially for the second group, 
stakeholders’ rights may be of lesser protection, compared to the shareholders. 
Due to this shortage in the legal bonds, it was argued that stakeholders’ theory in 
the corporate governance is a theory of ethical conducts that should be recognized 
and enforced; but it should be in a creative and unique way in order to avoid falling 
fouls of the classical law requirements for institution of valid legal actions.  
In addition to the enjoyment of lesser protection stakeholders also enjoy a lesser 
information. This is basically true due to the fact that companies do not usually 
allow their information to be disseminated without a cause. This deficiency 
undoubtedly deprives stakeholders from a very important tool, which is necessary 
for participation in the corporate governance processes.  
The final characteristic of the stakeholders group is their essential contribution to 
the intangible assets of the company. Questions of competitiveness, loyalty, 
reputation, quality and goodwill of companies are all stakeholder related issues.62 
These intangible resources act as the customers’ attractive forces towards said 
company’s goods and services. Companies are today fully aware of the importance 
of building and maintaining these nexus with the stakeholders, and they are also 
aware of the fact that such forces are so vital in maintaining their profit margins and 
the shares they occupy in the market.  
2.3 Corporate objectives: a theoretical view  
Corporate governance is basically about the idea that the management, 
shareholders and stakeholders are acting, or otherwise be treated, fairly, efficiently 
and in sufficient transparency. The main goal remains to reduce disputes and 
arrive into an accepted scale for the management and board performance.  
These goals will not be firmly fixed and regulated unless the main objectives of 
companies are first identified. This identification will also provide the management 
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and the board with a kind of a road map for their work, and it will also act as an 
identifying reference for their efficiency, honesty and corrective performance in the 
sense that deviation from such objectives will be considered an act of misuse 
triggering liability of management/board.  
When scholars attempt to identify these objectives, they ramify in three main 
theories developed on different priority scales for shareholders and stakeholders’ 
interests.   
2.3.1 The Shareholder Value Approach 
According to this approach, the main objective of the company is to work for an 
increase in the value of the shareholders’ interests. This increase of value should 
be the primary objective of the management when acting and making its 
decisions.63  
This way of thinking is basically grounded on the fact that shareholders are the 
legal owners of the company, and they, in such capacity, acquire the legitimate 
interest to monitor the activities of the management, the board and the general 
conducts of the company and direct the same to their absolute interest. Under the 
same stream of thinking, all planning, transactions and decisions to be made by the 
management should be reasoned on grounds of, and only be triggered to seek or 
achieve, shareholders’ interest. That is to say, the shareholder’s value 
maximization should be the single guiding principle of the management and the 
board. 
The shareholders interest in this meaning is financial in nature. It is the vindication 
and increase of shareholders’ investments in the company in commercial means. 
Unquestionably, supporters of this approach believe that stakeholders and 
corporate social responsibility affairs enjoy a secondary importance when 
compared with the shareholders’ interests.  
Shareholder value theory has had wide acceptance in the academic references 
and the actual business practice in the West, especially in the era of the 1990’s. 
The theory has also a legal support based on the assumption that while 
																																								 																				




shareholders provide their monies in the company as investors, the company shall 
operate to provide them with a sufficient and secured return. The theory also 
applies as a parameter for the management and the board performance because 
they are hired in the first place to achieve this goal.   
2.3.1.1 The Parameters 
This theory has mainly three parameters; namely, the profit maximization of the 
company and dividends value, the increase of the company share price in the 
market and the risk aversion.64   
As for the first parameter, the management will devote its activities to realize more 
financial returns to the shareholders. It shall work hard on making the equation of 
‘return’ and ‘cost’ balances positively in favour of more profits. By doing so, 
companies are also required to operate efficiently and to cut unnecessary 
operational costs. Since the realization of profits becomes the supreme goal of 
business, companies will turn to operate on large scale, and economies of large 
scale (for efficiency reasons and for the sake of cutting operational costs) will be 
more witnessed. The increase of profit will also increase the value of dividends to 
be distributed annually to the shareholders.  
The second parameter comes as a direct result for the first one; the good financial 
results of the company (profit), and the large scale efficient operations of business 
the company has, will both result in more confidence in the company’s financial 
status by the financial market. Investors will start to invest more money in the 
company and will try also to acquire its listed shares. This logical attitude, coupled 
with the fact that a large amount of money is annually distributed to shareholders 
as dividends, will result in the rise of the company share price which, i.e. the rise, 
will also act by itself as an indicator to the prosperity of the company and its current 
business.   
Finally, the management of a company having the sole purpose of profit 
maximization will be risk sensitive. It will prefer safe investments instead of high-
risk investments even if the latter may derive more profits. For example, a company 
will not usually concentrate on intensive investments in research and development 
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and will depend instead on purchasing licenses and new technologies from 
external resources. The management will expand into new markets indirectly 
through appointment of dealers or commercial representatives instead of directly 
existing in these new markets as operational utilities.    
2.3.1.2 The Main Trends 
Companies working for the maximization of shareholders’ values as a main 
objective usually share some contractual and operational trends. These trends are 
the actual tools that are necessary to achieve the shareholders’ value and to allow 
the parameters, indicated above, to operate successfully.  
The main trends are usually four; aversion of long-term investments and depending 
instead on short-term ones, building of efficient and reliable information system, 
contracting with managers and executives on out-come basis, and paying 
secondary attention to the stakeholders’ interests.  
As indicated above, companies that are totally devoted for shareholders’ interests 
are risk aversion. This is a general policy, which usually results in making 
companies avoid engagement in long-term investments. This is reasoned on 
grounds that long-term investments are risky and unpredictable and do not 
generate profits quickly.  
 
It must be noted that companies need to realize income and profit on regular short 
intervals within the financial year. Profit realization in every fiscal year is necessary 
in order to enable the company from meeting the desire of the shareholders in 
receiving returns in the form of dividends.  
Investments on the long run, to the contrary, are not producing profits within a short 
period. Although returns from the long run investments could be sometimes 
guaranteed, the fact that most shareholders are not economically educated to 
catch this result will cause the managers to avoid this form of investment. 
Managers, as per this traditional perspective, are aware that the evaluation of their 
performance will be tested with reference to profits achieved and dividends 




term conditions. Besides, people making investments in shares are usually 
investors of short-term goals and their main concentration is on the annual result 
instead of the strategic future of the company.        
The second trend is monitoring related; it is built on the creation and operation of 
very reliable and accurate information system about the operation of the company 
and the results thereof. The system should reach and report all aspects of the 
company in sufficient manner to enable the board and the shareholders to monitor 
the performance of the management and reduce any possible abuse thereby.65 On 
the top of these systems, naturally, comes the financial reporting and auditing.  
The third trend is the outcome-oriented nature of executives/managers 
employment contracts. For reasons related to reducing agency problems and 
possible misuse of power by managers. Companies will seek new contractual 
strategy with managers and executives. According to this strategy, managers and 
executives will be rewarded in accordance with the results achieved by them; 
behaviour-oriented contracts stating fixed monthly salary as reward will seldom be 
used. This technique is also risk-related and aims at shifting risk burdens to be on 
the part of management, a matter which will reduce management misuse and will 
devote its full attention to achieve the good of the company and the shareholders.66 
Surprisingly, the outcome oriented contracts technique will also make managers so 
keen to maximize the profits of the company and will make them adopt short-term 
investment strategy for the company!  
The last trend for companies adopting shareholders value strategy is the lesser 
weight the stakeholders have in the planning and decision phases of the company. 
Managers will not give priority to building long-term nexus with the stakeholders, 
and companies will not make intensive commitments to the community. 
2.3.2 The Stakeholder Value Approach 
Some have recently argued that emphasizing the interests of shareholders over 
those of other stakeholders is not always a good strategy. They argue that 
companies should observe all interests affected by its activities, not only the 
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interests of the shareholders. This approach enjoys less legal recognition, and it 
mainly depends on rules of ethics.67 Today, the stakeholder model is widely and 
successfully prevailing in the Japanese governance schools; it has interesting 
manifestations in the German system that will be further detailed in the sixth 
chapter of this research.  
2.3.2.1 The Parameters 
Companies implementing this approach will usually have three main parameters; 
namely, seeking the satisfaction of the stakeholders, the maximization of the 
company’s intangible assets and risk acceptance in investment and in the 
conducting of business.  Planning and decision phases by managements in such 
companies should be enlightened and reasoned by these three parameters.  
The first indicator is the satisfaction of the stakeholders as a primary goal.68  
Satisfaction in this sense is not measured in money, and stakeholders will remain 
un-entitled to receive dividends or financial benefit, but, to the contrary, the 
company will take into its consideration while performing in the market, the 
legitimate interests of the stakeholders depending on principles of ethics and social 
commitment. Such prospective emphasizes responsibility over profitability, and it 
depends on acting in fairness, without causing indispensable harm to others and 
even on engagement in charity acts for the good of the society.  
The second parameter is the maximization of the company’s intangible asset. 
Intangible assets could be the result of multi-source contributors on the top of 
which are the stakeholders. Goodwill, reputation and competitiveness are all 
stakeholders related, and they usually come as a result of the stakeholders’ 
satisfaction with the company’s acts and decisions in the market and the 
community.  
The third parameter is risk acceptance. Managements will not be chained by the 
annual financial demands of the shareholders. This will allow managements to 
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apply more resources in research and development and in internal training and 
capacity building of the company’s personnel.   
2.3.2.2 The Main Trends 
Companies working for the maximization of stakeholder value as a main objective 
usually share some common trends. The main trend is the adherence to ethical 
and social responsibility rules by the management when making its decisions and 
actions in the market 69. To this end, companies will give more adherences to the 
internationally recognized codes of conduct which give more weight to the interests 
of stakeholders and push toward more fairness in dealing with them. Companies 
will engage in more social and environmental activities, and they will recognize and 
give its employees more facilities, including an option to contribute in its capital 
(equity).  
The other possible trend under this stream of thinking is the acceptance of long-
term investments. This is due to the fact that managements are no more restricted 
with the sole obligation to gain large amounts of profit annually. Finally, the 
company will act in transparency with the stakeholders and will give more advisory 
role to them. As a possible attitude, companies will seek building nexus of trust with 
major stakeholders and, they will give them some advisory role and communication 
channels with the board. The transparency attitude will depend on releasing more 
data to the stakeholders and giving bigger role to media and independent 
classification agencies.  
Despite the fair dress the stakeholder value approach has, the theory is not free 
from criticism. On one part, it might be argued that this theory was only 
successfully applied in very developed economies, such as Japan and Germany, 
where companies are so wealthy and rich, and the shareholders thereof are fairly 
satisfied with the financial results achieved annually. On the other part, the theory 
does not classify shareholders’ interest amongst the company objectives and 
somehow ignores it. In all cases, shareholders’ interest should remain the prime 
goal of any company. In addition, the theory does not give any advice to 
management on how to behave in situations of potential conflict between the 
																																								 																				





interest of shareholders and those of the stakeholders. Likewise, the theory deals 
with the stakeholders as having one type of interest while, in fact, this is 
necessarily untrue. The theory does not give clear indicators to managements on 
how to deal when the interests of different categories of stakeholders conflict 
together. Finally, the theory was criticized on the basis of being a kind of 
metaphoric thinking. Without law recognition, dependence on ethical rules to 
enforce the interests of stakeholders will be useless since stakeholders will not be 
able to institute lawsuits to vindicate their rights legally. The stakeholder theory 
simply claims while companies pursue their primary objectives they have to 
voluntarily take into account the legitimate interests of stakeholders. Ethical rules 
remain, in the legal context, optional, and they will not gain mandatory status 
unless transplanted within the law by means of corporate law reform.  
2.3.3 A Compromise: The Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach  
To overcome the rigidity of both shareholder value and stakeholder value 
approaches, some business practices and academic writers suggest a compromise 
between these two models. What is suggested is a compromising practice that lies 
in the middle of the spectrum of governance, not on any of its two different ends. 
This will happen by combining elements of both models in order to ensure justice 
for all players. According to this middle stream of thinking, the management and 
the board’s basic duty shall remain the maximization of the shareholders’ value and 
interests in the company. Nevertheless, building good nexus with stakeholders and 
recognizing their needs and concerns while making decisions will also be the duty 
of the management and the board.  
The idea is simple and it is built on the fact that it is almost impossible to find a 
successful company with disappointed customers and angry community! Building 
on this, the shareholders’ interests indispensably include achieving the satisfaction 
of the stakeholders, not only achieving return in form of good profit (money). Had 
this new definition for the shareholders’ value been admitted, managers will be 
released free to think and work for more recognition to the stakeholders’ concerns, 
which, by themselves, are the shareholders’ value on the long run. 
There is no need to make major reform in the Corporate Laws in order to adopt this 




remains the main objective of the company. All that needed to change is how such 
value is defined and within what time limits. Law implantation is not an issue since 
the reform required will be so trivial.   
The enlightened shareholders value approach requires that the shareholders’ value 
be defined on long-term basis. It also requires that the stakeholders’ interests be 
recognized and considered by managers, provided that the same conform to the 
long-term interest of the shareholders.  
Managers and directors should run the company in a manner that observes all 
interests on the long run. In case of conflict between the shareholders’ interest and 
a stakeholders’ interest, or in case of conflict of interests between two categories of 
stakeholders, the criterion to be followed is the long-term interest of the 
shareholders.  
2.4 Taxonomy of Corporate Governance Models 
The discussion and analysis in the previous sections was focused on the definition 
and conceptual analysis of corporate governance. The present section takes the 
discussion further by focusing more particularly on the taxonomy of corporate 
governance standards. Accordingly, this section will be devoted to the analysis of 
the normative aspects of corporate governance and the constitutive standards that 
characterize the various models of good corporate governance.  
In attempting to classify models of corporate governance standards this thesis 
proposes in section 2.4.1. a global model of corporate governance standards which 
offers the basis for classification of sub-models embodied therein. The proposed 
model consists of three normative layers as follows:  
a) the fundamental pillars of good corporate governance (section 2.4.2);  
b) the supranational standards of good corporate governance (section 
2.4.3); and  




2.4.1 A generic model of global corporate governance standards 
The discussions of the normative standards of corporate governance in the 
academic literature span three broad and distinguishable areas. The first of these 
areas is focused on the fundamental pillars of corporate governance whereas the 
second and third areas are focused on the international principles and the various 
national rules of corporate governance, respectively. While these areas are often 
discussed separately, an attempt is made in this section to bring them together in a 
broadly global model of good corporate governance. Thus the proposed model is 
characterized by a cascade of three normative layers, which can be visualized in 




These layers of this generic model are constituted of the following: 
1. The core or nucleus layer: consisting of the fundamental pillars or values 
of corporate governance;  











3. The outer or peripheral layer: consisting of rules constituting the national 
framework of corporate governance in various states’ jurisdiction.  
2.4.2 The fundamental pillars of good corporate governance 
It is commonly believed by specialists in the field that globalization has had a 
significant impact on contemporary corporate governance. Chief among the areas 
clearly demonstrating this is the impact globalization brought onto “the ethical basis 
of regulation and integrating ethical concerns into governance practices’.70  There 
is number of ethical concepts have been emphasized by various authors as 
constituting the ‘pillars’ of good corporate governance. For example, Abdul Munid71 
discusses accountability, transparency, fairness and responsibility, while Masons72	
discusses accountability, transparency, integrity, and risk management. 
Furthermore, while these authors approach the subject of corporate governance 
pillars from a theoretical perspective, others73 adopt a practical or operational 
perspective focusing more on the actual implementation of the pillars and the 
practical challenges they raise. The analysis of the pillars of corporate governance 
in this thesis will be undertaken from a theoretical point of view focusing on the four 
concepts of accountability, transparency, fairness and responsibility.74	
2.4.2.1 Accountability 
In the context of corporate governance accountability simply means that those 
responsible individuals or groups in a company who make decisions and take 
actions on specific issues are accountable for their decisions and actions.  
Mechanisms must be in place to ensure accountability.  This provides investors 
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with the means to question and evaluate the actions of the Board and its 
committees. Thus, accountability embraces ownership of strategy and task 
required to attain organisational goals of corporation. This also means owing 
reward and risk in clear context of predetermined value proposition. When the idea 
of accountability is approached with this positive outlook, people will be more open 
to it as a means to improve their performance. This applies from the staff all the 
way up to top leadership embracing Risk management within defined formal 
appetite for risk. This also include fostering culture of compliance to create real and 
perceived believe that the entity is operation within internal and external 
boundaries. 
2.4.2.2 Fairness 
As already discussed above, stakeholders are the central focus of corporate 
governance. Accordingly, good corporate governance denotes the collective 
standards that regulate the various relationships between various participants and 
stakeholder. “Fairness” is regarded as the underlying principle upon which these 
relationships are organised and regulated. It means treating all stakeholders s 
including minorities, reasonably, equitably and provide effective redress for 
violations. Establishing effective communication mechanism is important to ensure 
just and timely protection of resource sand people asset as well correcting of 
wrongs.  
Moreover, fairness must be recognized and implemented in practice to ensure 
balance in the organisation. The rights of various groups have to be recognised 
and valued.  For example, minority shareholder interests must receive equal 
consideration to those of the dominant shareholders. 
2.4.2.3 Transparency 
Transparency is often simply defined as “having nothing to hide” which 
encompasses both intentional and practical elements. For corporations, this means 
that each company deliberately allows its processes and transactions to be 
observable to outsiders. It also makes necessary disclosures, informs everyone 
affected about its decisions, and complies with legal requirements. Thus, 
transparency is regarded as the ease with which an outsider is able to make 




non-financial aspects relevant to that business.  This is a measure of how good 
management is at making necessary information available in an open, precise and 
timely manner – not only the audit data but also general reports and press 
releases. 
Following the financial scandals in the early 2000s, transparency has played a 
bigger role in preventing fraud from happening again, especially at such a large 
scale. But aside from stopping the next illegal moneymaking scheme, transparency 
also practically builds and enhances a good reputation of companies.75 Arguably, 
when shareholders are content and accordingly feel they can trust a company, they 
consequently become more willing to invest more, and this greatly helps in 
lowering cost of capital and positively rewards the company, the investors and 
stakeholders. 
Additionally, transparency is a critical component of corporate governance because 
it ensures that all of a company’s actions can be checked at any given time by an 
outside observer. This makes its processes and transactions verifiable, so if a 
question does come up about a step, the company can provide a clear answer. 
And after the Enron scandal in 2001, transparency is no longer been regarded 
merely as an option, but a legal requirement that a company has to comply with. 
But although transparency is a necessity for the whole company, its presence is 
even more important at the top where strategies are planned and decisions are 
made. Shareholders expect that the corporate board is open about their actions; 
otherwise, distrust will form. And when trust breaks, shareholders tend to stay 
away and invest somewhere else. 
2.4.2.4 Responsibility 
Responsibility relates to the behaviour that allows corrective action to be taken and 
penalising mismanagement and misconduct.  Responsible management would, 
when required, put in place what it would take to set the organisation on the right 
path.  While the Board is answerable to the company, it must act responsively to 
and with responsibility towards all shareholders of the company. The difference 
between accountability and responsibility is that, one is liable to provide an account 
																																								 																				




when one is accountable and one is liable to be called to account when one is 
responsible.  In corporate governance terms, one is accountable by law to the 
organisation if one is a director and one is responsible to the shareholders 
identified as relevant to the organisation.  Therefore, the pillars of accountability 
and responsibility are utilised to ensure that the Board of Directors is both 
accountable and responsible for their actions. 
Accountability denotes the obligation to answer for the conduct and execution of 
responsibilities. It differs from responsibility in that where responsibility can be 
delegated accountability cannot. Thus, responsibility can be delegated without, 
however, abdicating accountability.  
2.4.3 Supra-national standards 
As used in this thesis, the supranational standards of corporate governance refer to 
international principles with global appeal, such as UN76 and OECD principles, and 
principles endorsed regionally for designate groups of countries such as the Islamic 
principles of corporate governance discussed in chapter (5) below and EU 
principles of corporate governance enunciated through a number of instruments.77 
Presumably, supranational principles espouse the values embodied in the core or 
fundamental pillars of corporate governance and they, in turn, constitute a 
normative source to inform and guide formulation of national standards of 
corporate governance as indicated in the generic model above. 
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2.4.3.1 Motivation and rationale  
A legitimate question may be raised as to why supranational principles of corporate 
governance are considered pertinent to the discussion and analysis in this thesis. 
In fact the discussion involves a number of aims and consequently the answer to 
that question is manifold and may be summarised in the following points: 
Analytical aim: the discussion in section (1.1.2) demonstrated that the Saudi legal 
system is fundamentally based on Islamic Sharia legal principles. At the same time, 
this system includes substantial degree of western-style legislation particularly in 
the area of corporate governance. Thus, considering the mixed characteristic of the 
Saudi legal system, appeal to supranational standards such as OECD and Islamic 
principles of corporate governance may be a source of conflict. Consequently, it is 
important to discuss and analyse supranational standards in order to establish 
answers to the following questions: Are OECD and Islamic principles compatible 
(or not)? And, which set of these standards should the Saudi system adhere to?  
Informative aim: another aim of the discussion is to inform policy options designed 
to enhance the efficiency of the legal framework of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia not only of the existence but also of the relevance of a pool of instruments 
which can profitably be utilised in this regard. In particular, the OECD Principles are 
particularly relevant to Saudi Arabia on account of the country being a member of 
the G20 which is a partner to the latest version of OECD Principles published in 
2015. More generally, however, there is a need to shed light on the international 
standards and efforts by inter-governmental organisations in relation to 
standardised corporate governance rules in the context of corporate governance 
and the GCC. These standards include many aspects, such as by providing 
benchmarks and recommendations to enhance the national legislative, institutional 
and regulatory framework of corporate governance. 
Evaluative aim: as stated in chapter 1, one of the objectives of this thesis is to 
assess the efficiency of the Saudi legal framework of corporate governance. 
Hence, the various international principles and standards provide appropriate 




Teleological aim: another objective of this thesis is to recommend the means to 
strengthen the efficiency of the Saudi legal framework of corporate governance. 
International principles and standards can been seen in this regards as benchmark 
to build an environment of trust, transparency and accountability necessary for 
fostering long-term investment, financial stability and business integrity in the 
country. 
2.4.4 Models of national standards  
National application models of corporate governance refer to the adoption or 
implementation of corporate governance standards on the level of national 
jurisdiction of individual countries. The discussion and analysis of the institutional 
and statutory framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia in chapter (3) 
and (4) respectively, is an example that. Equally, the discussion and comparative 
analysis of the national models of corporate governance, such as the institutional v 
the legislative approach or the civil v the common law system of corporate 
governance, discussed in chapter (7) of this thesis.  
2.4.4.1 Distinction between supranational and national standards 
Supranational and national standards of corporate governance may prima facie be 
distinguished hierarchically. That is to say, supranational standards pertain to a 
higher level of application comparable to the distinction between international and 
national law. Another distinction is that supranational standards apply to a group of 
countries and, in contradiction, are consequently not confined to a single national 
jurisdiction.  
Another important distinction proposed in this thesis pertains to the normative 
character of supranational and national standards.  It is argued here that 
supranational standards consist of legal principles whereas national standards 
consist, largely though may be not exclusively,78 of legal rules.79 It is important to 
elaborate this distinction between rules and principle a bit further before returning 
to the nature of national standards. 
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Dworkin argued that the distinction between legal principles and legal rules is a 
logical one. Thus, while both ‘standards point to particular decisions about legal 
obligation in particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the 
direction they give’.80 Accordingly, he characterized rules as applicable in all-or-
nothing fashion for a particular decision, whereas a principle, contrarily, ‘states a 
reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular 
decision’.81  
The difference stated above between principles and rules entails another; that is, 
valid legal principles may conflict with one another but rules do not. According to 
him, if two rules conflict they can not both be valid, i.e. one of them must be invalid. 
This difference in turn entail that principles have a dimension lacked by rules; that 
is, the dimension of strength or importance. One two principles conflict the one 
which is more important or has more weight will prevail over the other. 
These characteristic differences between rules and principles must not be regarded 
as shortcoming. Instead, they must be recognized as essential attributes adding 
flexibility to the adoption of supranational principles of corporate governance in 
national jurisdictions. 82  This is particularly important because supranational 
standards of corporate governance are invariably intended to apply to more 
countries with varying needs and circumstances. 	  
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3. Chapter Three: The Saudi Institutional Framework of 
Corporate Governance 
 
One of the main arguments advanced in this thesis is that good corporate 
governance requires on the national level a well-established structure of 
government institutions based most fundamentally on the principles of separation 
of powers and the rule of law. These principles divide and balance state power in 
order to advance the values of good governance generally and serve certainty and 
predictability by delimiting discretionary power on government officials. Equally, 
they enhance investor confidence by enabling legal remedy through independent 
courts based on the important principle of equality before the law. Moreover, some 
authors point out a growing parallelism between corporate legitimacy and 
government legitimacy. 83  Therefore, this thesis argues that the substantive 
standards of good corporate governance, whether national or international, not only 
require but also actually presuppose the existence of a well-established institutional 
structure domestically. 84 
 
Thus, the analysis in this chapter will examine the impacts of the Saudi institutional 
framework on corporate governance regulation at two levels: the level of law-
making (legislation) and the level of law application. On the first level section (3.1) 
discusses the Saudi State authorities and institutions from the vantage point of the 
doctrine of separation of powers while section (3.2) focuses more specifically on 
the legislative power and process. Law application is discussed in sections (3.3) 
and (3.4) focusing the administration of justice and judicial power and institutions, 
and the supervisory authorities entrusted with implementing corporate governance 
in Saudi Arabia, respectively. 
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3.1 Saudi State authorities and institutions 
Pursuant to Article 44 of the BLG the Saudi State authorities consist of the 
following three:  
- The Judicial Authority 
- The Executive Authority 
- The Regulatory Authority’  
These authorities prima facie map well into the traditional and well-known 
distinction of state authorities into legislative, executive and judicial authority with 
the difference between ‘legislative’ and the Saudi ‘regulatory’ authority being, prima 
facie, terminological rather than conceptual. However, whereas the three doctrinal 
powers are traditionally entrusted to three different institutions, i.e. parliament, 
judiciary, and the executive (government), the institutionalization, i.e. distribution 
between national institutions, of these powers is not clear-cut in Saudi Arabia as 
discussed below.  
3.1.1 Institutionalizing State powers 
The Basic Law of Governance entrusted the regulatory authority with the 
responsibility of issuing legislations that achieve the general interest. Article (67) of 
the BLG stipulates that: 
"The regulatory authority issues the laws and motions needed to fulfil the interests 
of the State; and revises the same; all in accordance with the Sharia. This authority 
exercises its functions in accordance with the BLG and the laws pertaining to the 
Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council." 
However, the BLG does not clearly provide which institution is entrusted with the 
powers of the regulatory authority and, as such, is meant in the above provision. 
There are at least two fundamental in institutionalizing the regulatory power 
pursuant to these Articles mentioned above: 
1. Article 67 refers, indirectly to some sort of legislative partnership that is 
needed between the Saudi Council of Ministers and the Consultative 
Council for the exercise of such the regulative power. It should be noted 




Consultative Council is a quasi legislative organ. Moreover, it is unclear 
which role each of these institutions plays in the exercise of regulatory 
powers. 
2. Moreover, the above-mentioned Article 44 adds even more ambiguity in 
stating in its final part: ‘These authorities cooperate with each other in the 
performance of their duties, in accordance with this statute and other laws. 
The King shall be the Head of all these authorities.’ This means that all 
powers are ultimately not separated but rather concentrated into one body. 
Thus, the prima facie considerable weight given by the BLG to the application of 
the principle of separation of authorities is negated by revealing the role of both the 
Council of Ministers, the Consultative Council as well as the King in taking over the 
regulatory authority. In this regard, it was said that “the Kingdom followed the idea 
of cooperation between authorities by regulating the relationship between them; 
performance of the duties is meant to be a cooperative matter between the 
authorities, to prevent the autocracy of any of them in making decisions.”85  
Additionally, Article (19) of Council of Ministers Statute 199386, stipulates the 
following: “the Council of Ministers shall plan the internal, external, financial, 
economic, educational and defence policies and all the public affairs of the State, 
and shall oversee the implementation thereof.  The same shall take into 
consideration the decrees of the Consultative Council, shall have executive powers 
and will be the competent authority with regard to financial and administrative 
affairs in all the ministries and other governmental bodies.” 
Article (20) thereof further stipulates the following: “Subject to the stipulations of the 
Law of the Consultative Council; other laws, international treaties, agreements and 
concessions shall be issued and amended by virtue of Royal Decrees after the 
same having been studied by the Council of Ministers.” 
 
Article (21) of the mentioned Statute reads as follows: “The Council of Ministers 
shall study draft laws and regulations submitted thereto, vote on each article of the 
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same, and then vote on the whole articles in accordance with the procedures 
stipulated in the internal statute of the council.” 
 
It is clear from the above articles that the Council of Ministers is granted vast 
powers in this regard, making it the key element in the regulatory duty in the 
country. On the other hand, Article (15) of the Consultative Council Law (1991)87 
laid down the role of the Council by stating explicitly that it is no more than an 
advisory role, as the mentioned Statue stipulated as follows:  
 
“The Consultative Council shall give opinion on State general policies referred 
thereto by the Council of Ministers. In particular, the same is entitled to the 
following: a- discussing the general plan of social and economic development to 
give its opinion thereon. b- Studying the statutes, regulations, treaties, international 
agreements, and concessions to give its opinion thereon. c- Interpreting the Laws.” 
 
The articles discussed above demonstrate that the role of the Consultative Council 
is no more than advisory as regard to the laws and policies referred to it. The 
particular drawback in this regard is that the Council of Ministers is under no 
commitment to submit all legislations and policies to the Consultative Council for 
approval. In other words, the Council of Ministers takes the lead in the legislative 
process, while the role of the Consultative Council is only consultative and even 
evitable, i.e. it is a powerless parliament!  
 
As for the King and his role in legislation, the statute stipulates that the King is the 
Head of all judicial, executive and regulatory authorities. While the Consultative 
Council is given an advisory role, i.e. making studies and giving opinions, the 
Council of Ministers was given the responsibility of issuing legislations and policies. 
However, most of the decisions of the Council of Ministers cannot be final unless 
they receive royal ascent by the King and a Royal Decree is issued to validate 
them. Thus, the combination of all powers ultimately into a single institution is 
clearly incompatible with the doctrine of separation of powers.  
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3.2 Legislative Power and Process  
The issue of separation of powers has direct impact on the actual legislative 
process. The legislative process in the Kingdom consists of a range of references, 
including legal divisions in ministries, specialized committees in the Consultative 
Council, panels of experts in the Council of Ministers, the Council of Ministers itself, 
and at the top, the King. The components of such a system are explained herein 
below: 
 
1. Panel of experts in the Council of Ministers 
 
This Panel in particular can be technically considered as the legislative body in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  It consists of around (20) consultants, and supported by 
(10) researchers.88 
 
Article (30) of Council of Ministers Statute stipulates the following: “The following 
bodies are included in the administrative formations of the Council: 
(1) The office of the Chairman of the Council. 
(2) The General Secretariat of the Council.  
(3) The Panel of Experts. 
 
The internal statute of the Council of Ministers explains the formation and the 
specializations of these bodies and the manner in which they carry out their duties. 
According to Article (11) of Council of Ministers subdivisions statute: “the Council of 
Ministers Office shall form a Panel of Experts. The number of the members thereof 
shall be determined by the Council of Ministers as deemed necessary.” 
 
As for the competences of this Panel of Experts, the same is provided under 
Articles (14) and (15), whereas article (14) stipulates that, "the Presidency of 
Council of Ministers may assign the expert to give opinion". Article (15) stipulates 
that: "the expert may give opinion on the following matters: a- Matters referred 
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thereto by the Prime Minister or by the Council of Ministers. b- Matters referred 
thereto by competent ministries".  
 
The competencies of the Panel of Experts in the Council of Ministers can be 
viewed in more details as provided under the Regulation on the Panel Work issued 
pursuant to the Royal Decree number (431) of the year 1972. The mentioned 
Regulation stipulates that the role of the panel is limited to receiving draft laws from 
governmental entities and reviewing the drafting and other technical aspects of 
referred draft laws!  
 
This demonstrates how limited the role of the Panel of Experts is as a legislative 
body. It is very clear that the competences of the Panel are partial, limited and do 
not reflect an integral legislative process.89 
 
2. Management and Laws Committee of the Consultative Council:  
 
This Committee consists of nineteen members. The mandate of the Committee is 
limited to studying the draft laws referred from other agencies to the Consultative 
Council. In turn, the Committee reports its opinions on the draft laws to the 
Consultative Council. It must be stressed once again that the role of the Committee 
is no more than consultative. 
 
3. Legal Divisions in the Ministries:  
 
These Ministerial divisions carry out two tasks:  
1) Suggesting and preparing draft laws, then referring statute drafts to the 
Council of Ministers.  
2) Setting the executive regulations of the applicable laws.  
 
There are no reference available to specify the rules applicable on nominating the 
staff members of such divisions, or what kind of specialized training needs to be 
given to such staff members.  
 
																																								 																				




However, these divisions are given the authority to issue executive regulations. 
Such subordinate degree of legislation becomes a binding role by virtue of a 
decision issued by the concerned Minister, and hence it does not need the 
approval of legislation central institution, which is the Council of Ministers. It is, 
therefore, legitimate to express the worry as to the wide discretion granted thereto 
in this regard.  
3.2.1 Legislative Process Scrutinized 
In addition to the shortcomings pointed out above, many specialized studies 
pointed to the existence of many deficiencies in the legislative process in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which can be summarized as follows:90 
 
1. The lack of technical personnel in the legislative system of the Kingdom, 
compared to legislative systems of other countries and the many tasks 
commissioned to such a system.  
2. The legislative system in the Kingdom lacks institutional view to build the 
capacities of its personnel.  
3. The legislative system is currently no more than a range of executive cycles 
with limited competences, lacking an institutional methodology to form a 
coherent legislative view.  
 
Moreover, the weakness of the legislative system and process has negatively 
impacted the quality of legislation and the legal performance of governmental 
bodies in general. For example, and as stressed above, the discretion granted to 
legal divisions in ministries in the absence of central supervision over legislation 
represented a serious expansion of the competences of the executive authority. 
Moreover, it results in inherent contradictions in laws as well as threats to many 
individual rights.  
 
The absence of institutional view in Saudi legislative process engendered a 
number of characteristic shortcoming and defects in the exercise of the regulatory 
power. These include, slow pace of legislative reform, uncontrolled legislative 
																																								 																				




delegation, lack of legitimacy, weak methodology, heavy legal transplantation and 
duplication of legislation. 
3.2.1.1 The Slow Wheels of Reform 
One of the major requirements of enhancing commercial investment is the 
continuous review for the legislations that support investment and provide stability 
for financial markets. On the contrary, it can be clearly remarked that the reform of 
Saudi laws is in a very slow process. This has led to a situation where many 
commercial transactions were left with no legal provisions to regulate them under 
the Commercial Law. The Commercial Law, which was issued in 1931, was never 
subjected to any review, and remained valid as originally issued with a lot of old 
terminology that is completely abandoned nowadays. What yet complicates the 
scene more is the fact that the Saudi Companies Law was issued more than fifty 
years ago and have never been reviewed since then, although the Capital Market 
Authority was established. The Kingdom joined WTO and the two Basel Accords, 
and the market itself developed beyond what a conventional companies law like 
that of KSA can accommodate.   
The following list shows a number of some Saudi laws that was never reformed. 
This highlights the fact that the slow reform is the persistent character of the Saudi 
legislative process. As such, a straightforward answer to the efficiency question 
related to the Saudi Legal framework can easily be inferred. 
 
1. The Commercial Law of 1931(Known also as the Law of the Commercial Court) 
2. The Companies Law of 1965. 
3. The Buildings and Roads Law of 1941. 
4. The Bus Owners Syndicate Law of 1953. 
5. The Basic Radio Service Law of 1955. 
6. The Law of Protecting and Promoting National Industry of 1961. 
7. The Commercial Agencies Law of 1962. 
8. The Law on the Protection of Railways of 1962. 
9. The Commercial Papers Law of 1963. 
10. The Banks Regulation Law of 1966. 




12. The Law on the Disposal of Municipal Real Estate Properties of 1972. 
13. The State General Statistics Law of 1960. 
3.2.1.2 Weak Methodology 
The making of Saudi legislation is carried out without any procedural guide, which 
determines the necessary procedural steps to be taken towards making of the 
legislation. This sheds doubts on the accuracy of the title of this section, which 
assumes the presence of a specific methodology, but it is characterized by 
weakness. However, the making of Saudi legislation, whether characterized by 
absence of methodology or its weakness, is clear from the above explanation of 
the legislative process. It jumps directly to the drafting stage without passing 
through the preparatory stages. The first of these preparatory stages is the group 
of reports for the drafting instructions, upon which the legislation drafter depends. 
This stage includes analysis of the local legal framework connected with the new 
legislation and the sources of legal applications, which are expected to be utilized 
in designing the proposed legislation. Here, in this preparatory stage, we can 
assume the existence of a report specialized in analysing the position of the new 
legislation in light of the Islamic jurisdiction. This is in accordance with the 
constitutional article of the Law of Governance, referred to above and which 
stipulates that the Sharia is the source of legislations.  
 
The second preparatory stage is the design of legislative proposal in light of the 
reports of the first preparatory stage. This document includes the raw legal content 
of the new bill of law in addition to the regulatory impact analysis, which explains 
the necessary regulatory requirements of the new legislation prior to commencing 
its drafting.  These are preparatory stages which should precede the drafting 
process and which are necessary for obtaining high quality product, i. e an effective 
legislation.  
 
The absence of this methodology, which has been enhanced by the academic 
contribution, represented in the legisprudence, in addition to the advanced 
international applications, led to jumping directly to the drafting stage. This, in turn, 
makes the role of the legislation drafter more difficult, the thing that explains the 




order to overcome the impossible mission of drafting a legislation without any 
procedural framework, which organizes the drafting process.  
 
In light of this hurry review of the methodology for making legislations, it is clear 
that the absence of methodology represents the main disadvantage of the Saudi 
legislation framework. This also leads to many problems regarding the Corporate 
Legislations, which we have briefly reviewed and evaluated their contents. This 
analysis indicated the poorness of the legislation contents in addition to the 
presence of contradiction between these Corporate Legislations, resulting from the 
absurdity of foreign legislations implanting.   
3.2.1.3 Uncontrolled Legislative Delegation 
Again, this title lacks accuracy, as it implies the existence of true separation 
between legislative and executive powers, the thing that is difficult to prove. The 
Council of Ministers, in absence of any real legislative power with Ashura Council 
(the Saudi Parliament), practice both powers.  
 
However, we shall discuss the legislative delegation assuming that there are two 
powers; the first is the legislative power, resembled to the Council of Ministers, and 
the other is the executive power represented by the different ministries. The 
provisions stipulated in the main laws, which determine the scope of secondary 
legislation and refer to certain provisions included in the implementation regulations 
represent the instrument for legislative delegation. In light of the provisions of the 
Basic Law, which states that the Council of Ministers is the source of legislations 
and in accordance with the provisions of the laws, which include the legislative 
delegation instruments, referred to herein, the legality of any secondary legislation, 
produced by the executive power will be determined.  
 
The validity of the above assumption, about the existence of two separate powers: 
a legislative power (Council of Ministers) and an executive power (Ministries and 
other supervisory organs) is doubtful. Based on our previous discussion of the 
stages of the legislative process, it is apparent that the bills of laws started from the 
Ministries themselves. This means that the bill of law, which contains the legislative 




employees of the legal department in the concerned ministry itself. Thereafter, the 
proposed draft will be referred to the Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, 
which is the organ responsible for legislations. The role of the Bureau of Experts 
does not exceed the formal review of the text, without doing any fundamental 
amendments. This means that the executive authority, represented in the 
concerned ministry, is the original initiator of the legislative delegation instrument 
and its scope. I will not discuss the lack of true legislative delegation in this 
improper legislation process, but I will criticize the outputs of this legislative 
delegation, which is witnessing embarrassing disorder. It will give an easy answer 
to the question of efficiency, which encounters the regulatory and legislative 
framework of the corporate governance applications in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.  
 
The main demerits of the legislative delegation in the Saudi legislation process are 
represented in three issues, which I will tackle here with their examples trying to 
give examples from the commercial legislations. 
3.2.1.4 Lack of Legitimacy Due to the Absence of Legislative 
Delegation Instrument   
The most prominent examples of this are: 
1. The Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi 
Arabia: This regulation has been issued by SAMA in July 2012 and updated 
in March 2014. SAMA did not explain the legislative delegation instrument, 
which gives SAMA the authority to issue this law. SAMA, for sure, is a 
supervisory executive authority and not a legislative organ. Definitely, there 
is no legal provision, which gives SAMA this legislative delegation. Thus, 
this law, which regulated the principles of corporate governance for the 
banking sector, is simply without any legitimacy.  
2. The Corporate Governance Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority: CMA has issued this 
regulation on 2006. This regulation states in its preamble: "issued by the Board of 
the Capital Market Authority pursuant to the Resolution No 1- 212 2006, dated 
21/10/1427 H (corresponding to 12/11/2006) based on the Capital Market Law, 




Six of the Capital Market Authority Law, which gives the Board of CMA the "power 
to issue and amend the Implementation Regulations, as may be necessary to 
enforce the provisions of this Law." This article shows clearly that the scope of 
delegation given to the Board of Directors of CMA is very wide. This uncontrolled 
legislative delegation gives the Board of CMA the power to issue principles for 
corporate governance, while the function of CMA is limited in the capital market 
issues and the related rules for listing, registration and trading. The power for 
issuance of corporate governance rules is within the jurisdictions of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. This fact explains why some of the provisions of this 
regulation are contradicting the Saudi Companies Law. The uncontrolled legislative 
delegation given to CMA, which gives CMA the tool for overriding its authorities, led 
also to the issuance and provision of a bill for Credit Rating Agencies Regulation, 
which actually falls within the authority of SAMA. Despite the wide range of 
legislative delegation provided for by Article Six, CMA cannot justify the issuance of 
this regulation as the business of the credit rating agencies has nothing to do with 
the Capital Market Authority Law.  
3.2.1.5  Exceeding the Scope of Legislative Delegation and 
Contradiction of the Implementation Regulation to the Main 
Law  
This can be shown by the following examples: 
1. The Implementation Regulation for the Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control Law. It is not difficult to prove how this implementation regulation is 
exceeding its legislative delegation. The Cooperative Insurance Companies Control 
Law, as shown from its title, deals with the business of mutual insurance, while the 
Implementation Regulation is wholly specified for the provisions of the traditional 
insurance. This is a true exemplar for an uncontrolled legislative delegation.  
2. Another example for the uncontrolled legislative delegation, which shows 
clear contradiction between the implementation regulation and the main law, is the 
Implementation Regulation of the Enforcement Law. This implementation 
regulation stipulates in Article 98 that the Board of Grievances has jurisdiction to 
decide on the requests for enforcement of foreign judgments issued prior to the 
date of enactment of the main law, while article 96 of the main law annulled the 




foreign judgments. This is of course a clear example for disruption of the legislative 
delegation.  
3. Uncontrolled legislative delegation can also be evidenced in the provision of 
the last article of the Implementation Regulation of the Enforcement Law, which 
stipulates that the provision of the (Enforcement Law) should be applied to the 
enforcement writs issued after the issuance of the Law. The main law stipulates 
that the provisions of the Law should apply on all enforcement writs whether issued 
prior or after the date of issuance of the Law.  
3.2.1.6 Limitation of the Scope of Legislative Delegation  
The main law determines the scope of legislative delegation granted to the 
executive authority to enact implementation regulations required for completing the 
implementation of the main law. If an executive authority or a regulating body 
issues an implementation regulation that does not cover the implementation 
provisions, included in the delegation given in the main law, this is considered one 
of the main features of uncontrollability of the legislative delegation. Moreover, this 
will result in disabling the provisions of the main law itself, as some of its provisions 
will become non-operational clauses. The main legislation, if not complemented by 
the necessary implementation regulations, which explain how these law provisions 
will be implemented and fill the gabs, will turn to be non-operational clause, which 
is one of the limitations of Efficiency Question, upon which this research, about the 
legislative framework for Corporate Governance is based. Below, I will give some 
examples, which illustrate the uncontrollability of legislative delegation in the Saudi 
Arabia legislations: 
 
1. In the Finance Lease Law, there are implementation provisions, which were 
referred by the Law to its Implementation Regulation, but the Implementation 
Regulation does not include any reference to these provisions, which are:  
• Provisions of recording, amendment and cancellation in the Contracts Register 
(Clause 3, Article 18 of Finance Lease Law); 
• The right of third parties to access the register (Clause 3, Article 18 of Finance 
Lease Law); 




• Provisions for the registration information unit and exchange and access 
(Clause 3, Article 18 of Finance Lease Law); 
• The provisions for measures concerning marking on the Finance Lease 
Contracts register in case of securitization.  
• Provisions for revoking the contract in case of default of due payments (Article 
21 of the Finance Lease Law).  
2.   In the Real Estate Finance Law, there are implementation provisions, which 
were referred by the Law to its Implementation Regulation, but the Implementation 
Regulation does not include any reference to these provisions, which are:  
• Provisions allowing banks to practice real estate finance for ownership of 
properties for the sake of financing (Article 1/2 of the Real Estate Finance 
Law); 
• Provisions for publication of data concerning the real estate market activities 
(Article 4 of the Law); 
• Provisions for allowing real estate financiers to access the real estate records 
(Article 5 of the Law).  
3. In addition to that, Finance Companies Control Law referred a number of 
implementation provisions to its Implementation Regulation, but the later includes 
none of these provisions. These provisions are: 
• Provisions for carrying out finance business by legal and natural persons 
(Clause 3 of Article 4 of the Law).  
• Provisions for rehabilitation of persons nominated to perform supervision and 
executive work in a finance company (Clause 3/D of Article 5 of the Law); 
• Provisions for permitting finance companies to stop activities for more than 
three (3) successive months (Article 6 of the Law); 
• Provisions for cancelling the license if it appears that the company provided 
false information to the Agency, or failed to disclose material information (Article 
7 of the Law); 
• Provisions for dismissing a board member of a finance company or any external 
comptroller who receives finance in breach of this Law (Clause 2 of Article 12 of 
the Law); 
• The proportion to be deposited in the Authority of the value of deposits received 




• Provisions for obtaining short term foreign finance (Clause 8 of Article 11 of the 
Law); 
• The legal form of the entities willing to practice activities supporting finance 
activities and the conditions, which should be satisfied (Clause 2 of Article 10 of 
the Law).  
3.2.1.7 Heavy Transplantation 
At the beginning of this chapter, we have examined the Saudi legislative process 
and witnessed the absolute absence of any technical methodology or procedural 
manual that should be exercised or utilized in a sound legislative process. In these 
circumstances, legal transplants would be quick and easy way in responding to 
legislative needs.  
Academic debate on legal transplants has been revived in recent years, with varied 
opinions being voiced in favour of, and against, the effectiveness of transplants. 
Alan Watson, a well-known scholar in this field, states that, “Legal rules may be 
very successfully borrowed where the relevant social, economic, geographical and 
political circumstances of the recipient are very different from those of the donor 
system.” 
Professor Legrand91 and the Professors Seidman represent the other side where it 
is believed that law is a culturally determined artefact, which cannot be 
transplanted. The Seidmans have stressed this view and they even have 
formulated a “Law of non-transferability of law.”92 
Others believe that this topic is too complex to be expressed as a choice between 
these two positions. Professor Teubner and Professor Kahn-Freund have 
developed a more specific view on this regard.  Kahn-Freund’s opinion was that 
some areas of law are more closely linked to society than others, and that the 
success of transplants of more organic areas of law depends primarily on the 
political system.93 Teubner argued that some areas of law are more or less strongly 
“coupled” to “social processes”, and that the degree of success of a transplant 
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depends on the degree of coupling.94  Teubnersays that “While in the loosely 
coupled areas of law a transfer is comparably easy to accomplish, the resistance to 
change is high when law is tightly coupled in binding arrangements to other social 
processes.”95 
So what is the significance of this debate for our attempt to answer the efficiency 
question of Saudi legal framework of corporate governance? Can it be simply said 
that if the Watson is right, transplanting laws is suitable in efficient legislative 
process? And if the Seidmans and others are right, then the answer will depend on 
whether these laws are culture-neutral or culture-specific. If it is culture-neutral, no 
problem, but if it is culture-specific, it is not suitable.  However, and only at this 
point, I find it useful to refer to my review of corporate governance applications in 
Islamic Law in Chapter Two.  Nevertheless, the cultural dimension of legal 
transplants is not the only crucial consideration. In Russia experience, we have 
seen that adaptation of the U.S. corporate model has failed because the lack of 
harmonization between the Russian institutions and the borrowed U.S. model, 
which brings us back to the argument of Troy A. Parades on whether the 
transplantation of a corporate law is the right response to reform requirements.  
Whatever the answer that academics provide on whether legal transplants is 
feasible or not, heavy transplantation that has characterized the Saudi legislative 
process is an answer for distortions in Saudi legal framework that lacks a 
reasonably efficient court system, and sophisticated specialized institutions. The 
following sections of this research will shed more light on the efficiency of judicial 
and supervisory institutions.  
3.2.1.8 Duplication    
As per Article Seven of Nizam Alhokm, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopts 
Sharia as a source of its legislation.  To assess the application of this constitutional 
Article, I would refer to my evaluation to the content of Saudi corporate legislations 
conducted in chapter (5) where we witnessed the poor presence of Sharia 
principles related to fiduciary duties and transparency. In this part, I will try to 
explain why this weak operation of Sharia principles has occurred and how it led to 
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the undesired duplication. I would also mention here that this duplication was totally 
unjustified, especially in the light of the proven Sharia deep roots of corporate 
governance applications. Such proven roots were a clear result of the analysis 
conducted in Chapter (5) of this research.  In that chapter we saw how Sharia 
philosophy dealt with some particular affairs in detailed manner, and left a wide 
space for human endeavours to decide on what is in the best interest and welfare 
of human society.  
The human aspect in Sharia is an important part of its integral system dealing with 
lives of individuals and societies. While Sharia revealed detailed contexts for 
worships and rituals, it laid down general principles in which human efforts can be 
exerted in accordance with civil society requirements. Agreements for instance 
were not revealed from heavens, but the holy Quran instructed to fulfil them in 
general, and forbade some certain agreements like usury, gambling, and enriching 
on the account of others without right to do so. The Prophet, peace be upon him, 
conceded most of commercial transactions between people, and he ordered to fix 
what can be fixed, i.e. he ordered to stipulate the life period of contracts, quantity 
and price of the subjects of contracts, ordered to show the sold products and their 
characteristics, and forbade concealing their defects. This is collectively called fiqh 
Al-Mouamalat, or the Islamic law of transactions. However, the Islamic rules of law-
making are also clear and equipped with cautions parameters to make the rules 
that stem from the obligatory sources of the Islamic law by way of inference. 
Undoubtedly, this contradicts with the understanding of many researchers who 
simply think that legislation in Islam is a mere theological process. Thus, they find it 
difficult to absorb the possibility of adaptation between Islam and contemporary 
legal concepts, such as, say, democracy. Ironically, the position of these 
researchers is similar to that of a few of traditional religious institution symbols in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia who took a passive position towards legislation and 
codification as a civil process, exposing the legislative process to certain shakes, 
with which the legislative institution preferred to retreat and avoid confrontation with 




In an attempt to overcome this problem, the legislative institution used two main 
methodologies96 for two purposes: first, it is to decrease the range of its activities 
remarkably, avoid substantive legislations and focus on procedural legislations.  
Second, it is to avoid traditional jurisprudence, leaving it solely to public Sharia 
tribunals.  
This retreat reinforced the duplication in both the judicial and legislative structures. 
Passive effects of such duplication doubled with the overlooking of modern 
legislations by legislative tribunals and kept away from teaching modern Saudi laws 
in Sharia schools. This resulted in a doubled legislative system, which could not 
view its way through a coherent perspective that considers the Sharia and 
convince scholars on one hand, and meets the needs of growth and its regulatory 
requirements, on the other.97 
Saudi Arabia could develop a leading legislative thought that is legally and 
jurisprudentially advanced, giving a live example created from the womb of Saudi 
experiment, which embraced Sharia, on one hand, and continued the 
modernization journey, on the other. This can be done in a way that decisively 
proves the validity of Sharia in every place and time. 
 
3.3 Judicial Authority 
The discussion and analysis in the previous two sections (i.e. 3.1 and 3.2 ) was 
focused on the level of law creation, i.e. legislation. This section will complete the 
picture by focusing the analysis on the level of law application, i.e. the judicial 
power in Saud Arabia. 
3.3.1 The Saudi judicial system 
The competence of the Saudi Judicial Courts System as such was set up by the 
Law of the Judiciary, adopted in 1975 and reinforced in 1992 by the Basic Law of 
Governance. Currently, Saudi Arabia has a dual judicial system comprised of the 
Sharia Courts System (al-Mahakim al-Shariy'ah) and an independent 
administrative judiciary known as the Board of Grievances (Diwan Al-Mazalem). In 
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addition to these judicial bodies there are several Administrative Committees with 
jurisdiction over certain specified cases.  
Moreover, the Law of the Judiciary98 permits the establishment of specialized 
courts by "Royal Order on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council.” 
There are two specialized courts within the Sharia Courts System: the Courts of 
Guarantee and Marriages, which exercise jurisdiction over civil suits regarding 
marriage, divorce, as well as child custody, and the Juvenile Court, which hears 
Juvenile delinquency cases.  
 
According to the Law of the Judiciary and the Basic Law of Governance, Sharia 
Courts have jurisdiction over all disputes and crimes except those exempted from 
their jurisdiction by law. Sharia Courts hear cases related to personal status, family 
affairs, civil disputes and most criminal cases. However, different laws and 
regulations have granted jurisdiction over different claims and crimes to either the 
Board of Grievances or to Administrative Committees.99 
 
The 1975 Law of the Judiciary organizes the Courts System in the following 
hierarchical structure, provided below in descending order:  
- Supreme Judicial Council; 
- Courts of Appeals; and, 
- First-Instance Courts (General Courts and Summary Courts).  
 
Each of these courts has jurisdiction over cases brought before it in accordance 
with the Law. 
3.3.1.1 Supreme Judicial Council  
Article 5 of the Law of the Judiciary identifies the Supreme Judicial Council as the 
highest authority in the Saudi judicial system.  The Supreme Judicial Council is 
composed of eleven members. Five full-time members hold the rank of Chief of the 
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Appellate Court and constitute the Permanent Panel of the Council.100  Five part-
time members include the Chief of the Appellate Court or his deputy, the Deputy 
Minister of Justice, and the three members with the longest time in service as Chief 
Judges of the General Courts in the following cities: Makkah, Medina, Riyadh, 
Jeddah, Dammam and Jazan. All members constitute the General Panel of the 
Council, which is overseen by its Chairman. The Supreme Judicial Council, 
".convene[s] as a Permanent Panel composed of its full-time members, presided 
over by its Chief or by a designee from amongst the senior most member in the 
judiciary.”101 
3.3.1.2 Courts of Appeals (Courts of Cassation)  
The Saudi Courts of Appeals are the second tier in the current Saudi Arabian 
judicial system. A Court of Appeal is composed of a chief judge and a sufficient 
number of senior judges from the legal community. The Court consists of several 
panels with jurisdiction over criminal cases, cases of personal status and other 
cases that do not fall into the first two categories. The Court of Appeal can 
establish as many panels as it needs, and the Chief Judge or one of his deputies 
must head each of these panels. 
3.3.1.3 First-Instance Courts 
There are two types of First-Instance Courts under the current Saudi Arabia Courts 
System:  
• Summary Courts; and, 
• General Courts. 
Summary Courts are composed of one or more judges. The composition, 
jurisdiction, and designation of the Summary Courts are constituted by decisions of 
the Minister of Justice on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council.102 
A single judge hands down the judgments issued by these courts. 
 
General Courts are composed of one or more judges. Composition, jurisdiction, 
and designation of the Saudi Sharia General Courts are determined by decisions of 
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the Minister of Justice on the recommendations of the Supreme Judicial Council.103 
In particular, General Courts have Jurisdiction over cases wherein the sentence 
claimed is either the death penalty, or qisas (retaliatory punishments) in cases 
other than death.  They also have jurisdiction over civil claims for sums totalling 
more than 20,000 Saudi Riyals ($6,000 USD).  
3.3.1.4 The Board of Grievances 
An increasing number of disputes between government agencies and private 
contractors led to the creation of the Board of Grievances that stands in parallel to 
the Sharia Courts, while being directly affiliated with the King and falling outside of 
the Ministry of Justice.104 The Board of Grievances is composed of a President, 
one or more Vice-President(s), and a number of Assistant Vice-Presidents and 
members specialized in the Sharia and the law. 
Although Article 1 of the Board’s law states that the Board is an independent 
administrative judicial board, it has been authorized to decide cases and disputes 
to which the administration is not a party. It is authorized to temporarily adjudicate 
criminal and commercial disputes, and to have sole authority over the enforcement 
of foreign judgments and foreign arbitration decisions. It covers four main 
categories of disputes:  
·       Disputes in which the government is a party;  
·       Disputes involving unethical business practice subject to statutory provisions;  
·       Disciplinary actions against civil servants; and,  
·       The execution of foreign judgments.  
  
According to Article 8 of the Law of the Board of Grievance adopted in 1982, the 
Board adjudicates the following administrative disputes:  
  
(A) Cases related to the rights provided for in the Civil Service and 
Pension Laws;  
(B) Cases of objection filed by parties concerned against administrative 
decisions where the reason of such objection is lack of jurisdiction, 
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a deficiency in the form, a violation or erroneous application or 
interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of authority; 
(C) Cases of compensation filed by parties concerned against the 
government and independent public corporate entities resulting from 
their actions;  
(D) Cases filed by parties regarding contract-related disputes where the 
government or an independent public corporate entity is a party;  
(E) Disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and Investigation; 
(F) Penal cases filed against suspects who have committed crimes of 
forgery as provided for by law, crimes provided for by the Law of 
Combating Bribery, crimes provided for by Royal Decree no. 43 
dated 29/11/1377H [June 16, 1958], and crimes provided for by the 
Law of Handling Public Funds issued by Royal Decree No. 77 dated 
23/10/1395H [Oct. 29, 1975], and penal cases filed against persons 
accused of committing crimes and offenses provided for by law, 
where an order to hear such cases has been issued by the 
President of the Council of Ministers to the Board;  
(G) Requests for implementation of foreign judgments;  
(H) Cases within the jurisdiction of the Board in accordance with special 
legal provisions; and 
(I) Requests by foreign courts to carry out precautionary seizure on 
properties or funds inside the Kingdom. 
3.3.1.5 Administrative Committees 
Most of the laws passed in the Kingdom stipulate the formation of administrative 
committees with judicial powers to settle disputes related to the competence of 
each committee. These "Administrative Committees" have jurisdiction over civil, 
commercial, administrative and criminal cases and disputes arising out of the 
implementation of several laws and provisions. The jurisdiction of each committee 
is determined by the decree that created it. Examples of current Saudi 
administrative committees are as follows:  
  
• The Tax Committees; 




• The Mining Disputes Committee;  
• The Fraud, Cheating and Speculation Committee; 
• The Banking Disputes Settlement Committee; and 
• The Copyright Committee. 
3.3.2 Judicial system reform 
On October 1, 2007, King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz issued a Royal Decree 
approving a new body of laws regulating the judiciary and the Board of 
Grievances.105 Some observers believe these new laws represent a major step 
toward meeting the requirements of a modern and thriving economy, while also 
improving the business environment. The new law affirms the Saudi justice 
system's independence and impartiality; it also ensures the highest possible fair 
trial standards. 
3.3.2.1 The New Role of the Supreme Judicial Council 
Under the new Judiciary Law of 2007, the Supreme Judiciary Council no longer 
serves as the Kingdom's highest court. However, it will continue to oversee 
administrative aspects of the judiciary. The Supreme Judicial Council is composed 
of a president and ten members: the Chief of the High Court, four full-time 
members of the rank of Chief of the Appellate Court appointed by the King, the 
Deputy Minister of Justice, the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation and 
Prosecution, and three members, who possesses the qualifications required by the 
Appellate Judge, appointed by the King. All Supreme Judicial Council members 
serve for a period of four years, which is renewable for other periods 106. 
Under the new law, the Supreme Judicial Council performs several administrative 
roles. In its administrative capacity, the Council, as stated in Article 6 of the new 
law, has a supervisory role over sharia Courts and Judges in accordance with the 
Law of the Judiciary, adopted in 2007. The Council primarily supervisees the 
courts, administering the employment-related affairs of all members of the judiciary 
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within those limits laid down by the law. Such affairs include promotions, transfers, 
assignments, and training.  
3.3.2.2 The New Courts System  
The new Law of the Judiciary organizes the Courts System in the following 
hierarchical structure in descending order:  
  
• High Court;  
• Courts of Appeals; and,  
• First-Degree Courts, which are composed of:  
• General Courts;  
• Criminal Courts;  
• Personal Status Courts;  
• Commercial Courts; and,  
• Labor Court .107 
3.3.2.3 High Court  
The High Court assumes the previous Supreme Judicial Council's main function as 
the highest authority in the judicial system. The High Court is seated in Riyadh and 
is composed of a president-who possesses the qualifications required of the Chief 
Appellate Judge. He is appointed by a Royal Order, along with a sufficient number 
of judges who hold the rank of Chief of the Appellate Court- appointed by a Royal 
Order on the recommendation of the Supreme Judiciary Council. The High Court 
exercises its jurisdictions through specialized circuits (as needed), which is 
comprised of three-judge panels-except for the Criminal Circuit. It reviews 
judgments involving certain major punishments such as the death sentence. These 
are composed of a five-judge panel. Chief Judges of the High Court Circuits are 
appointed by decisions of the Supreme Judicial Council on the recommendation of 
the Chief of the High Court.108 
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3.3.2.4 Courts of Appeals   
The new reforms are aimed at introducing safeguards such as Courts of Appeal, 
which can overturn decisions by lower courts. The new law establishes one or 
more Courts of Appeals in each of the Kingdom's provinces. Each court functions 
through specialized circuits comprised of three three-judge panels, except for the 
Criminal Circuit, which reviews judgments involving certain major crimes, including 
those that bear the death sentence. It will be composed of five judge panels. 
Courts of Appeals consist of the following circuits: Labour Circuits, Commercial 
Circuits, Criminal Circuits, Personal Status Circuits, and Civil Circuits109.  
3.3.2.5 First-Degree Courts  
The First-Degree Courts are established in the Kingdom's provinces, counties and 
districts in accordance to the needs of the system.  First-Degree Courts consist of 
General Courts, Criminal Courts, Commercial Courts, Labour Courts, and Personal 
Status Courts. General Courts are established in provinces and consist of 
specialized circuits, including Implementation and Approval Circuits and Traffic 
Cases Circuits. General Courts are composed of one or three-judge panels as 
specified by the Supreme Judicial Council.  The Criminal Court consists of the 
following specialized circuits: Qisas (Retaliatory Punishment) Cases Circuits, 
Hudud Cases Circuits (Prescribed Punishment), Ta'zir (Discretionary Punishment) 
Cases Circuits, and Juvenile Cases Circuits. The Criminal Court is composed of a 
three-judge panel. Other cases (offences) specified by the Supreme Judicial 
Council are heard by one judge. It is worth noting that all existing Summary Courts 
are transmitted to Criminal Courts.110 
3.3.2.6 Board of Grievances Reforms  
The pyramidal structure of the new Board Administrative Courts stands parallel to 
the structure of the Judicial Courts. The new law affirms that the Board of 
Grievances, which is based in the city of Riyadh, is an independent administrative 
judicial commission responsible directly to the King.111 
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110 The Law of the Judiciary, art 18,19,20 
111 The Law of the Board of Grievances, Royal Decree No. M/78, art. 23 (19/9/1428H, Oct. 1, 2007), O.G. 




The Board of Grievances consists of a President of the rank of minister, at least 
one Vice-President, a number of Assistant Vice-Presidents, and several judges. 
Vice Presidents is appointed by Royal Order from among those who possess the 
qualifications required to become a Chief of the Appellate Court. 
Alongside the Supreme Judicial Council, the new Board of Grievances Law 
establishes an Administrative Judicial Council composed of the President of the 
Board, the Chief of the High Administrative Court, the senior Vice President of the 
Board, and four judges of the rank of Chief of the Appellate Court, all appointed by 
Royal Orders.  The Council performs several administrative tasks similar to those 
of the Supreme Judicial Council.  The Administrative Judicial Council meets every 
two months; its meetings are valid if attended by at least five of the members, and 
decisions of the Council are made by majority vote. Finally, the Administrative 
Judicial Council encompasses several committees, including the Jurisdictional 
Conflict Committee, the Judicial Disciplinary Committee, and the Department for 
Judicial Inspection. 
The Board of Grievances Law organizes the Board according to the following 
hierarchical structure:  
  
• High Administrative Court;  
• Administrative Courts of Appeals; and,  
• Administrative Courts.112 
3.3.2.7 High Administrative Court  
The new law also establishes a Higher Administrative Court, which is comprised of 
a President holding the rank of minister-appointed by Royal Order, and a sufficient 
number of judges bearing the rank of Chief of the Appellate Court-appointed by 
Royal Order on the recommendation of the Administrative Judicial Council.  The 
High Court exercises its jurisdictions through specialized circuits (as needed), 
which are composed of three-judge panels. The Higher Administrative Court has a 
General Council, which is presided over by the Chief of the High Administrative 
Court and the membership of all of its judges. Its meetings are valid if attended by 
																																								 																				




at least two thirds of its members. The Council's decisions are issued by majority 
vote. If, while reviewing a complaint, one of the High Administrative Court Circuits 
deems it necessary to depart from an interpretation adopted by either the same or 
a different circuit of the same court, the case will be referred to the Chief of the 
High Administrative Court, who refers it to the High Administrative Court General 
Council for a decision. 113 
3.3.2.8 Administrative Courts of Appeals  
The new law establishes at least one Administrative Court of Appeals. Each court 
functions through Specialized Circuits composed of three-judge panels. The 
Administrative Courts of Appeals hear appealable decisions from the lower 
Administrative Courts. The render their judgment after hearing the litigants' 
arguments in accordance with the Law of Procedure before Sharia Courts and the 
Law of Criminal Procedure.114 
3.3.2.9 Administrative Courts  
The new law establishes one or more Administrative Courts. Each court functions 
through specialized circuits such as Administrative Circuits, Employment, and 
Disciplinary Circuits, and Subsidiary Circuits, and it is composed of either a one or 
a three-judge panel.115 
After this quick review of new Law of Judiciary and new Law of the Board of 
Grievances, we clearly note that the Board of Grievances continues to handle 
administrative disputes involving government departments. The previous Law of 
Board of Grievances, adopted in 1982, empowered the Board to hear and punish 
offences involving bribery, forgery, exploitation of official influence or abuse of 
authority in criminal prosecution proceedings, or violations of human rights. 
However, the new law relinquished to the new Judicial Court System the 
jurisdiction over criminal offenses that had been granted by the Law of 1982. 
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3.3.3 Saudi Judiciary Scrutinized 
3.3.3.1 Unregulated Judicial Review 
Saudi Judges are not always keeping stable relations with the provisions of the 
laws under which they adjudicate the cases, which they consider. Sometimes 
judges issue decisions that are expressly contradicting the provisions of the laws. 
To take an example or two for this contradiction, we refer to the judgment No 
642/10/3/132H issued by Dammam Administrative Court, concerning the request of 
the Claimant, who is a partner in a limited liability company, to enable him to have 
access without timeframe limitation, to all Company’s financial books and records. 
The text of this judgment reads as follows:  
Therefore, the Circuit comes to enabling the Claimant to see the works 
of the Company and review its papers and documents. This will not be 
affected by the defence of the Defendant that Article (171) has a time 
limit for this review and it should be within 15 days prior to the date of 
presenting the final annual accounts to the partners. This time limit is 
asserting the right and intended to oblige the Company to enable the 
partners to review the documents before presenting the annual reports 
and does not mean to prohibit the partners from seeing the works of the 
company and to review its books and documents throughout the year. 
This right is granted by the law and assured by the obligation to 
disclose to the partners whichever affects its legal position of rights and 
obligations. For these reasons, and after deliberation, the Circuit judges 
that the Defendant/ The United Gulf Steel Company Limited shall give 
access to the Claimant/ Al-Marzui Holding Company to see the works of 
the Defendant company and to review its books and documents for the 
reasons stated herein. 
Article 171 of the Companies law 1965 stipulates that, “The partner who is not a 
manager in the company where no control council exists, shall advise the 
managers and shall also request, at the company head office, to be informed of its 
operations, examine its ledgers and documents, and such within the fifteen days 
preceding the appointed date of presenting the annual final accounts to the 




Here it is clearly shown that the justification given by the Judge for not abiding to 
the provision of this article is ambiguous and not understandable. The text of the 
article is clear and direct, and it gives no chance to interpret otherwise. In my 
discussion, as the attorney of the Defendant, with the head of the legal circuit, 
which issued the judgment, I reached that he thought that the article was 
contradicting one of the Islamic Sharia rules related to ownership and the rights 
resulting there from, although he had not stated that expressly in his reasoning of 
the judgment. It seemed that the judge was not able to state frankly the existence 
of this assumed contradiction because of the lack of any frame that regulates 
reconsideration and review of the legislation texts. To avoid stating directly the 
unconstitutionality of this article, the judge tended to use this ambiguous reasoning, 
which he thought appropriate to use in that context.  
Another example is Judgment No 106/D/Com/7 / 1430 H issued by the Seventh 
Commercial Circuit at Board of Grievances in Riyadh. The Circuit judged that 
partnership has not been proved. The Circuit stated in the reasons for reaching this 
judgment that (One of the fundamentals for sustaining partnership is the payment 
of the share agreed upon). This statement contradicts the Companies Law as 
payment of share is not considered a condition for the validity of partnership nor 
un-payment of share will cause invalidity of partnership, as stated in Article (5) of 
the Companies Law, which reads "Each partner owes the company the pledged 
share and in case of delay in payment of such share beyond the specified date, the 
partner shall be liable for any damage that may be incurred by the company and 
shall indemnify the company for the damage resulting from such delay).” The said 
Article does not stipulate the invalidity of the partnership in case of delay of 
payment of the share but only indemnity for the damage resulting from such delay.  
How can we explain the tendency of some Saudi judges not to be governed by the 
provisions of the legislations? Can we say that the violation of the Companies Law 
by the judge is just a technical error that the Supreme Court may revoke and 
correct? Or to consider that as a justifiable judicial review guaranteed by the Basic 
Law, which stipulates in Article Seven that, " Government in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet 
(PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the other 




Prior to giving an answer to this question, we want to refer here to the differences 
of the scope of judicial review in Common Law, Civil Law and the Saudi legal 
system, with its Islamic identity that gives wide space for scholars' judgment and 
supremacy for Holy Quran and Sunnah over other legislations. The Saudi legal 
system is similar to the customary law, which uses the judicial review as a tool for 
the legibility and interpretation of the legislations.   
The judges in Saudi Arabia are not controlled by the law provisions they are not 
practicing judicial review, on the contrary they are violating the interpretation of the 
law, which is considered a default in the legal system, attributed to the general 
regulatory structure and not the judges. Neither the Basic Law for Governance nor 
the other laws have any detailed procedures for regulating the judicial review 
process and determining the level of court that has competent to practice this 
review.  
Establishing detailed regulatory structure for the judicial review rules resembles the 
most fundamental element of the desired legal reform. The best approach for 
establishing effective corporate governance is not confined only to issuance of 
legislations, but also it includes creation of institutional structure consistent with 
and supporting to the legislative structure. As far as this inconsistency between the 
judicial system and the legislations provisions exists, it is difficult to have 
convincing and effective regulatory legal frame for corporate governance in KSA.     
3.3.3.2 Disparity in Judicial Decisions 
I am not going to discuss or analyse here the disparity of judicial decisions, but 
instead I will focus on the lack of clear vision for the remedy of this disparity. It is 
clear that the disparity of the Saudi judicial judgments is a result of the insufficiency 
of legislations in the Saudi legislation system. This system lacks criminal law, 
family law and important parts of the civil law. The legal system fill this gap by 
giving judges the freedom to use their own judgment to rule on the matters they are 
considering.  
The disparity of judicial decisions takes different forms, the most prominent of 
which is the inconsistency of discretionary sentencing and the difference of judicial 
judgments on personal matters such as divorce, custody and many issues 




predict the judiciary position in any case, which, in addition to the irritating state, 
creates to both litigants it gives sense of injustice.     
It is clear for any observer that the judicial institution is trying to overcome this 
disparity by publication of judicial precedents and classifying the judicial principles 
through specialized committees established in the Ministry of Justice and the Board 
of Grievances. These committees are attempting to publish the judicial precedents 
and principles in order to organize and rationalize the decisions of the judges. 
However, there are several questions concerning the process of publication of the 
judicial precedents, which should be within its functional and historical context. It is 
widely acknowledged that the judicial precedent takes its practical importance as a 
tool for discovering the law, when it is difficult to have access to that law. The 
judicial precedents are highly valued in the customary law because that law is non-
codified and, therefore, it is difficult to identify the applicable norm. Practitioners of 
common law introduced judicial precedents as tools for discovering the law rules 
through entrusted and liable legal body so as to be applied. The Islamic law, 
although it is non-codified, is not similar to the Common Law in this regard. The 
implications that accompany discovering the norms in the Common Law, are not 
necessarily present in the Islamic legal system. This difference is the reason 
behind the practical need for stating the judicial precedents and classification of 
principles in the Saudi legal environment. What I want to stress here is that the 
provisions of Shariah have been codified by Islamic scholars in a clear language 
and classification, which made access to these provisions very easy. The ease of 
access to these provisions by legislators and judges raises the question about the 
need for stating the judicial precedents, which function is only discovering and 
accessing these provisions. This assumption leads us to the ideal remedy of the 
disparity of decisions, which is the codification of these provisions and not the 
classification of judicial principles.  Legalization represents, without doubt, a big 
professional challenge for the specialists as it requires stable mechanisms within 
the legal reform process and having clear features according to the legisprudence 
tools.  
Absence of clear vision for remedy of disparity of judicial decisions sheds doubts 




the desired legal reform that enhances the efficiency of the Saudi legal structure 
that regulated the business environment.  
3.3.3.3 No uniform Structure 
Despite the supposed reform that the new Law of Judiciary introduces in 2007, we 
still see the existence of administrative committees (Quasi-judicial), which result in 
dividing the judiciary utility and disperse of its competences amongst such 
committees that are more than thirty committees established far away from an 
umbrella for a one unified authority. The other worrying side of these dispersed 
judicial committees is that each committee follows the ministry competent of the 
law for which the committee is held to look at the disputes arising from its 
application. The subordination of such judicial committees to the executive 
authority is considered to be a major breach to the principle of separation between 
authorities, disperse of judicial competence, disturbance of dispute parties and 
state bodies with repetitive claims. Thus, the judiciary utility is deprived from 
precedents settlement, along with the weakness of executive power of the 
judgments of these judicial committees because of the absence of complete judicial 
characteristic of such judgments.  
We can as well notice that there are no certain judgments of pleadings for all these 
committees, with the exception of trade bills, resulting in the weakness of the 
judge’s authority and ambiguity of dispute parties. Consequently, lengthening 
litigation procedures and raising their cost eventually leads to the disorder of the 
dispute parities right to plead in front of judicial authority of independence 
guarantee to protect their right, making it urgently necessary to unify these judicial 
committees under the umbrella of independent judicial authority.  
3.4 Supervisory authorities 
3.4.1 Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI/MoCI) 
The Ministry of Commerce and Investment116 is the major official body that is in 
charge of controlling companies in Saudi Arabia. The MCI is responsible for  
																																								 																				




regulating, supervising, and monitoring all types of companies, and as per the 
mandate thereof by the provisions of the law. It is entrusted with the duties of 
ensuring companies’ compliance with the Corporate Law and other related 
regulations. Within the structure of the MCI, such mandates are exercised by 
Companies General Department, which is specifically in charge of studying and 
authorizing the applications of establishing new joint stock companies and 
reviewing the articles of incorporation. In addition, the Department is responsible 
for registering and monitoring companies businesses, reviewing companies’ 
balance sheets, and supervising the proper implementation of the Corporate Law. 
3.4.2 Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The Capital Market Authority was recently established in Saudi Arabia. It is 
answerable directly to the Prime Minister, and it enjoys a juridical legal personality 
and financial and administrative independence. It was also entrusted with all the 
authorities as may be necessary to fulfil its responsibilities and functions under the 
relevant regulations. The Authority enjoys the exemptions and facilities enjoyed by 
public agencies in Saudi Arabia, and its personnel are subject to the Labour and 
Workmen Regulations. 
 
To ensure the Authority’s impartiality in the execution of its authorities and 
responsibilities in the regulation of financial markets towards the betterment 
thereof, and by explicit legal provision in the Capital Market Law (2004), the 
Authority was prevented from engaging in any commercial activities. It was also 
prevented from having any special interest in any project intended for profit and 
seeking any financing facilities, or acquiring, owning or issuing any securities. 
 
To go more specific in the description of the Capital Market Authority; being the 
Governmental institution responsible for issuing rules, directives and instructions, 
for the regulation of the capital market, and for implementing the provisions of 
these references; and in general in order to achieve its objectives, the Authority 





To regulate and develop the Stock Market Exchange, including the endeavours to 
develop and improve the methods, systems, and entities trading in Securities, and 
to develop the procedures that minimize the risks vesting in securities transactions. 
• To regulate the issuance of securities and monitor securities and trading 
therein. 
• To regulate and monitor the works and activities of the various entities falling 
under the control and supervision of the Authority. 
• To protect citizens and investors in securities against unfair and unsound 
practices or practices involving fraud, deceit, cheating or manipulation. 
• To endeavour for the realization of fairness, efficiency and transparency in 
Securities transactions. 
• To regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information regarding 
securities and the issuers, the dealings of informed parties; i.e. internal persons 
and major shareholders and investors, and to define and make available 
information which participants in the market shall provide and disclose to 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
• To regulate proxy, purchase requests, and public offerings of shares. 
 
In addition, the Authority was given, pursuant to the Capital Market Law (2004), the 
right to publish draft rules and directives before formally issuing or amending them. 
The rules, directives and instructions issued as such become effective in the 
manner prescribed thereon. The Authority also has the power to conduct 
inspections on records or any other materials, notwithstanding whoever the holder 
thereof may be, in order to determine whether any person has violated, or is about 
to violate, any provision of these Regulations or the Implementing Rules or the 
directives issued by the Authority.  
 
In its works towards the regulation of the capital market, the Authority is given, 
under the applicable regulations, rules, instructions and directives, the authorities 
needed to support such endeavours, including without limitation the following: 
 
1. To set policies and plans, and conduct studies and issue the necessary 




2. To issue and amend the Implementing Rules as may be necessary to 
enforce the provisions of the regulations. 
3. To approve the floatation of Securities. 
4. To give advice and make recommendations to Governmental authorities in 
respect of matters which enhance the development of the exchange and 
protection of investors in securities. 
5. To suspend the Stock Market Exchange activities for a period of not more 
than one day; and, in cases where the Authority or the Minister of Finance 
deems necessary, to extend such suspension; however subject to the 
approval of the Minister of Finance. 
6. To approve the listing, cancellation or suspension of the listing of any Saudi 
Security traded on the Exchange; or those of any Saudi Issuer, traded in any 
stock exchange outside Saudi Arabia. 
7. To prohibit any Security or suspend the issuance or trading of any Securities 
on the Exchange, as the Authority may deem necessary. 
8. To determine the maximum or the minimum commissions to be charged by 
brokers from their customers as the Board of the Authority may deem 
appropriate, and to approve the fees and other commissions to be charged 
by the Exchange and the Centre. 
9. To set the standards and conditions required for auditors who audit the 
books and records of the Exchange, the Centre, the brokerage companies, 
investment funds and joint stock companies listed on the Saudi Market 
Exchange. 
10.  To determine the information that should be provided in the annual and 
periodical financial statements, reports and documents that should be 
submitted by issuers of floating Securities for public subscription or issuers 
whose securities are listed on the Exchange. 
11. To define and explain the terms and provisions set out in the relevant 
regulations. 
12. To issue decisions, instructions and set the procedure as deemed 
necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the relevant 
regulations and the Implementing rules, and pose inquiries and conduct 
investigations regarding violations of the provisions of the relevant 




13. To set the internal rules, issue instructions, and set the procedures as 
necessary for the management of the Authority. 
14. To approve the rules, directives and policies of the Stock Exchange and the 
Centre. 
15. To prepare the rules and directives for the control and supervision of entities 
subject to the provisions of the regulation. 
16. To approve the establishment, merger and liquidation of investment funds 
and set the related operating rules applicable thereon such as the 
organizational structure, accounting system and operating rules, investment 
fund governance and decision-making, liquidity requirements and risk limits. 
17. To appoint a licensed auditor to audit the Authority's financial statement, 
balance sheet and final accounts. 
18. To grant the necessary licenses to be issued in accordance with the 
provisions of the regulations and their Implementing Rules, including the 
licenses for rating companies and agencies and the conditions applicable 
thereon. 
19. To prepare the Capital Market Authority's annual budget. 
 
The Capital Market Law (2004) states that, upon exercising its power in 
accordance with the above regulations and their Implementing Rules, the Authority 
should coordinate with the Saudi Arabian Monitory Agency (SAMA) in connection 
with measures that it intends to undertake and which may have an impact on the 
monetary situation. 
The Authority is supervised by a board, which should comprise five Saudi full time 
members, who should be professionally qualified. Board members are appointed 
by a Royal Decree, which shall also determine their salaries and financial benefits. 
The Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the board are appointed as such by the 
Royal Decree, and the Deputy Chairman replaces the Chairman in his absence. 
The office of the Board is five year, and it may only be renewed once. The Board 
should set the internal rules of the Authority and the manner in which personnel, 
advisors, auditors and any other experts should be appointed, as may be 
necessary, for carrying out the responsibilities and functions entrusted with the 





Any person who becomes an employee or a member of the Board of the Authority 
must immediately upon accepting its functions, declare to the Authority the 
securities he/she owns or has at his/her disposal or the disposal of one of his/her 
relatives. He should also declare any change thereon, within three days of 
becoming aware of such change; and whomever acts or works for the Authority 
must also make this declaration in connection with the work entrusted thereto, in 
the manner specified in the rules of the Authority. 
Finally, members of the Board and employees of the Authority should not engage 
in any other profession or job, including occupying a position or a post in any 
company, government, public or private institutions. Furthermore, they should not 
provide advice to companies and private institutions. 
3.4.3 Saudi Organization for Chartered Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
The professions of accounting and auditing faced two serious challenges; on one 
hand, they lack an appropriate system for educating and training professionals and 
qualified national human resources, and on the other hand, there is absence of a 
specialized organization to represent the interests of, organize and develop, the 
profession. This led to absence of professional standards, rules and regulations to 
govern the practices of accounting and auditing. In 1991, Royal Decree No. M/12 
passed a new regulation to apply on chartered public accountants in Saudi Arabia, 
which provided for the establishment of "SOCPA" as an institution that operates 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, with the view of 
promoting the accounting and auditing profession and develop and improve the 
practices relevant thereto in the Kingdom. The main objectives for SOCPA are to:  
 
1. Review, develop and approve accounting standards.  
2. Review, develop and approve auditing standards.  
3. Set the necessary rules for fellowship certificate examination (Certified 
Public Accountants exam), including the relevant professional, practical and 
scientific aspects of audit profession and applicable regulations.  
4. Organize continuous education programs.  
5. Establish an appropriate quality review program in order to ensure that 




with the provisions of Certified Public Accountants Regulations and relevant 
by-laws.  
6. Conduct special research work and studies covering accounting, auditing 
and other related subjects.  
7. Publish periodicals, books and bulletins covering accountancy and audit 
related subjects.  
8. Participate in local and international committees and symposiums relating to 
the profession of accounting and auditing.  
3.4.4 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, was established in (1952).  It has been entrusted with performing many 
functions pursuant to several laws and regulations. The most important functions 
are the following: 
1. To deal with the banking affairs of the Government; 
2. Minting and printing the national currency (the Saudi Riyal), strengthening 
the Saudi currency and stabilizing its external and internal value, in addition 
to strengthening the currency’s cover;  
3. Managing the Kingdom’s foreign exchange reserves; 
4. Managing the monetary policy for maintaining the stability of prices and 
exchange rate; 
5. Promoting the growth of the financial system and ensuring its soundness; 
6. Supervising commercial banks and exchange dealers;  
7. Supervising cooperative insurance companies and the self-employment 
professions relating to the insurance activity; 
8. Supervising finance companies; 




3.4.5 Supervisory Role Scrutinized 
The economic and legal development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia led to the 
establishment of different forms of companies such as finance companies, 
insurance companies, banking companies (banks), workforce companies, 
companies licensed to practice securities works, food & drug companies, foreign 
investment companies and media companies. Each type of these companies has 
its special provisions that regulate its legal structure, incorporation requirements 
and the rules that regulate practicing activities, control and supervision of business. 
As there are different institutions responsible for supervising the business of these 
companies, namely SAMA, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, the Capital Market Authority, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of 
Foreign Investment. The role of each of these institutions should be clearly stated. 
The legislations, subject of this study, which I have tackled in Chapter Six, do not 
include any clear regulatory structure that determines, in precise manner, the 
supervisory jurisdiction of each institution. This will ultimately lead either to 
overlapping of jurisdictions or to the existence of jurisdictional gap that leads to lack 
of control in certain aspects of the businesses of these companies, or even to the 
application of different remedies for similar issues. The lack of clarity in the roles of 
these supervisory public organs makes many of the regulations' provisions 
pertaining to business environment mere papers without any practical effect on the 
market works, the thing that reflects passively on the level of the desired integration 
between the institutional and legislative structures.  
There is nothing to say about the efficiency of these supervisory institutions and the 
capabilities of their workforce. Nevertheless, we can say that the level of efficiency 
of the supervisory institution is a reflection of the quality of regulatory and 
legislative frame that regulates its work. Clarity of legislations and the distinct 
supervisory roles of the institutions, responsible for the business environment, will 
lead without doubt, to raising the qualification level of the employees of these 
governmental institutions. They will also enable them to regulate and control the 
market works and sustain ideal compliance with standards and legal requirements 






4. Chapter Four: The Statutory Framework of Saudi 
Corporate Governance 
 
As indicated in section (1.2) analysis of the reform of the Saudi legal framework of 
corporate governance will be tackled through detailed analysis of: a) the 
institutional and b) the statutory components of this framework. The former 
component, i.e. the institutional framework, has already been discussed in the 
previous chapter (3). Accordingly, this chapter will analyse the statutory framework 
of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia focusing principally on the legal 
instruments which constitute the building blocks of this framework. While providing 
an historical account of the development of the Saudi legislative corpus, the main 
aim of the chapter is to provide an analysis and evaluation of the pertinent legal 
development and reforms of this framework from the vantage point of the 
standards of good corporate governance.  
 
Moreover, as already discussed in sub-section (1.1.2), Islamic Sharia Law is the 
fundamental source of law in Saudi Arabia. Besides Sharia, the legal system also 
includes several sources of law such as Royal decrees or orders and nizam which 
elaborate on the Sharia and govern, inter alia, commercial relations including the 
banking sector, business, labour, taxation, arbitration and the settlement of 
commercial and securities disputes. Thus, within the Saudi legal framework, Sharia 
provides the broader legal framework whereas more specific statutory 
requirements in the commercial and economic areas are implemented through 
regulations often issued by government agencies. 
 
The relevant principles of Sharia in relation to corporate governance will be 
discussed in the following chapter (0). This chapter will therefore focus more 





4.1 Overview of the Saudi corporate legislation 
The enactment of the Saudi Companies Law in 1965117 is commonly regarded as 
the cornerstone of modern corporate governance regulation in the country. It was 
followed by enactment of a number of pertinent laws and regulations in subsequent 
decades the latest of which in 2015 and 2017. For convenience of exposition and 
analysis, the development of the Saudi statutory or legislative 118  corpus of 
corporate governance can be divided chronologically into two phases: 
 
1. First phase1965 - 2012 
 
This phase starts with the enactment of the Companies Law 1965 which is 
considered the oldest legislation relating to corporate governance in the country 
and includes a number of laws and regulations enacted subsequently including, 
inter alia, the following: 
 
1. The Companies Law 1965 (the ‘old Companies Law’). 
2. The Capital Market Law 2003 (CM Law/Code). 
3. The Listing Rules regulation 2004 (LRs). 
4. The Corporate Governance Regulation 2006 (the old CGR). 
5. The Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi 
Arabia 2012 [BO-Code].  
6. The Law on Supervision of Finance Companies 2012.119 
 
2. Second phase since 2015 - 2017 
More recently, the Saudi legislative framework of corporate governance witnessed 
a substantive reform with the introduction of new legislative instruments including, 
most significantly, the following: 
																																								 																				
117Royal Decree No. (M/6) Dated 22/3/1385H (corresponding to 22/7/1965AD) endorsing the Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. (185) dated 17/3/1385H (corresponding to 17/7/1965AD). It was amended by Royal 
Decrees No. M/5 on 12/2/1387 corresponding to 21/5/1967; No. M/23 on 28/6/1402 corresponding to 
22/4/1982; No. M/46 on 4/7/1405 corresponding to 25/5/1985, and No. M/22 on 30/7/1412 corresponding to 
3/2/1992. 
118 Unless otherwise indicated, the words ‘statutory’ and ‘legislative’ are used interchangeably in this chapter 
to refer the legal instruments regulating corporate governance in Saudi Arabia.  
119This was followed by the Implementing Regulation of the Law on Supervision of Finance Companies 





1. The Companies Law 2015 (the new Companies Law, to replace the 
Companies Law 1965). 
2. The new Corporate Governance Regulations 2017.  
 
Accordingly, the discussion in subsequent sections of this chapter will be structured 
as follows: Section (4.2) will analyse and discuss the early phase of the Saudi 
legislative framework of corporate governance, while section (4.3) will discuss the 
recent developments and introduction of new legislative instruments in 2015 and 
2017 as mentioned above.  
 
4.2 Formation and early reforms: first phase 1965 - 2012  
The Companies Law 1965 represents the formative and most fundamental 
instrument of corporate legislation during the first phase. Its provisions can be 
regarded as the basis of corporate governance legislative theory in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. In order to cope with the rapid developments in the financial and 
business sector, the law has subsequently undergone many modifications, and has 
ultimately been comprehensively updated in the Saudi Companies Law 2015 
(subsection 4.3.1). The following are the most important issues that appear in the 
Companies Law 1965 in relation to corporate governance. 
4.2.1 Characteristics of the Companies Law 1965   
4.2.1.1 Board of Directors of Joint Stock Companies 
Under the Companies Law 1965, the management of the joint stock companies in 
Saudi Arabia is composed of a board of directors. This board, appointed by the 
shareholders, must have a minimum of three members. Directors must own at least 
200 shares of the company. 
 
Articles 66 to 82 of the law are provide detailed regulation regarding the Board of 
Directors. Article 66 of the Law stated that a joint stock company must be managed 




and more. Ordinary general meetings have rights of appointing, reappointing and 
dismissing board members. 
 
According to Article 68 a director must hold shares in the company of not less than 
SR 10,000 in value. The shares must be deposited in one of the banks designated 
by the Minister of Commerce within 30 days of the director's appointment. The 
shares are non-transferable until the lapse of the time prescribed for the hearing of 
any liability suit against the director, or until a judgment is entered in a liability suit.  
 
Moreover, Article 69 requires that a director must not have any direct or indirect 
personal interest in any business or contract carried out on the company's account, 
unless he holds a permit from the ordinary general meeting to do so. This permit 
must be renewed every year although transactions by a director which were 
subject to a public bid, where the director makes the best bid, are excluded. 
 
Article 72 is concerned with directors duty not divulge to the shareholders or 
others, other than at the ordinary general meeting, any of the company's secrets 
which came to their knowledge through their role as a director. Directors' 
compensations is dealt with in Article 74 which requires companies to clarify the 
which could be monetary, physical, percentage of dividend (not more than 1 0 % of 
net dividends). 
 
Article 74 states that the directors' report to the ordinary general meeting must give 
a comprehensive statement of ail fees, dividends, expenses and/or other 
advantages obtained by the directors during the fiscal year. 
 
According to Article 76 of the law, directors shall be jointly liable to pay damages 
sustained by the company if the company's Articles of association or any 
amendments to them are not published correctly.  Moreover, Articles 229 and 230 
provide for the penalties which a director may be liable for in respect of non-
compliance with the Companies Law. These penalties are without prejudice to the 
requirements of Islamic law and its relevant penalties. The penalties pursuant to 




a fine between SR I,000 and SR 20,000, depending on the nature of the non-
compliance or contravention. 
 
Thus, it can be said that the duties and powers of directors of the Saudi joint stock 
companies are both statutory and contractual in nature. They are conferred by the 
Saudi Arabian Companies Law and by the company's constitutional documents. 
Additional directors' duties are also set down in specific legislation such as the 
Banking Control Law, the Commercial Registration Law, the Commercial 
Information Law and the Commercial Fraud Law.  
4.2.1.2 Shareholders’ Rights 
The rights of shareholders are granted in a number of Articles of Companies Law 
1965. For example, Article 84 stipulated that at least one ordinary general meeting 
should be held during the six months following the end of the financial year. The 
stated purpose of the meeting is to examine and discuss the agenda items as 
indicated by the law including items such as the board of director and auditor 
reports besides any other items, in order to advise the shareholders of the 
company's position and allow them to discuss and comment on all matters related 
to the company's activities (Article 94).  
 
In addition, Article 88 stipulates that the date of the general meeting must be 
published in a local newspaper at least 25 days prior to the meeting, and the 
proposed agenda and all related documents should be sent to all shareholders and 
to the Companies Department at the Ministry of Commerce allowing sufficient time 
prior to the meeting. 
 
Moreover, Article 83 of the Saudi Companies Law (1965) stipulates that any 
shareholder owning 20 or more shares shall have right to attend the general 
meetings with the possibility of attending these meetings by proxy. Besides, Article 
91 states that general meetings would not be regarded as valid unless attended by 
shareholders owning at least half of the company's capital otherwise, another 
meeting must be called for and conducted during the following thirty days of the 





Article 93 of the Law emphasizes that the company's regulations must clarify the 
voting methods used by their system in general meetings. However, while 
shareholders are explicitly granted the right to vote and participate in the general 
assembly of the company, some practical restrictions are placed on exercising the 
vote. Although shareholders are entitled to attend the general assembly personally 
or by proxy, electronic means such as voting via email was not allowed or not 
practiced. This was deemed unduly restrictive and the law should take into account 
technological and organizational developments. 
 
There are also the right to participate in the conversations of the general assembly 
meetings of the company and voting on the relevant decisions, and the rights to 
dispose of shares and to examine the company's books and accounts. Moreover, 
Article (109) of the Law states that shareholders, who hold at least 5% of the 
company’s capital, should have the right to ask the Companies Settlement 
Authority at the Ministry of Commerce to inspect the company if they have doubt 
regarding the behaviour of the board of directors or the external auditors.  
4.2.1.3 Separation between ownership and control 
It should be noted that the separation of ownership and control in Saudi Arabia, 
however, has not yet at this stage been fully realized. This separation constitutes a 
special requirement of good corporate governance particularly after the 
international corporate crises and the call from experts in the developed countries 
recommending the separation between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
duties of the Chairman of the board. While this recommendation may in theory be 
acceptable, it proved difficult to practically implement in Saudi Arabia particularly 
because the majority of companies are family-owned. And although the Saudi 
Companies Law specified in Article 66 the minimum required number of non-
executive directors, it does not provide for the separation of the roles of the 
chairman of the board from those of the general manager (Ministry of Commerce, 
1965). The existence of three non-executive board members was considered 
sufficient to exercise independent judgment and avoid conflict of interest. 
Experience, however, showed that despite the existence of non-executive 
members, their role in this regard is not practised. In many cases, the controlling 




assigned persons are either inexperienced in the field of activity of the company or 
in financial matters, or are in close relationship with executive board members or 
the Chairman, and may feel obligated to act in the interest of the controlling 
shareholders. 
4.2.1.4  Audit Committee and Internal Audit  
Regulation of audit is regarded as an important tool in the context of good 
corporate governance in order to serve transparency and accountability and to 
enhance economic performance and market integrity. As discussed in this section, 
the evolution of audit regulation in Saudi Arabia has been piecemeal but gradual 
process. 
 
One of the earliest reforms of corporate regulation in Saudi Arabia is the issuance 
of Resolution No. 422120 to supplement the Saudi Companies Law by specifying 
certain requirements that should be complied with in order to practise auditing in 
Saudi Arabia. The resolution remained in force until the Certified Public 
Accountants (CPA) Regulations, regarded as the first foundation stone laid to 
organize the accounting profession in the Kingdom, was issued in 1395H (1974). A 
higher committee for certified public accounting was established, in accordance 
with the Regulation, to supervise and monitor the profession (SOCPA).121  
 
Recognising the importance of audit committees as a major tool to increase 
confidence in financial statements the Minister of Commerce issued a resolution in 
January 1994, mandating all public companies to establish audit committees. In 
2003, the Saudi Organisation of Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA, 2003) 
regulated the establishment of audit committees in Saudi Arabia stating the 
requirements from the audit committees' members. These regulations and 
guidelines are summarized as follows. 
 
• Audit committee must be composed of at least four members. A maximum number 
of two members could be elected from the non-executive board members. 
• Audit committee member: 
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o must be a shareholder holding at least 100 shares and not more than 5 per 
cent of the company's shares. 
o must be qualified and have knowledge of accounting and financial matters 
as well as the company's business. One of the members must: 
§  hold a P h D in accounting with at least two-year experience in the 
accounting and auditing field; could be reduced to one year if he has 
the Saudi C P A ; or 
§ hold a master in accounting with at least four-year experience in the 
accounting and auditing field; could be reduced to three years if he 
has the Saudi CPA; or 
§  hold a bachelor in accounting with at least seven-year experience in 
the accounting and auditing field; could be reduced to six years if he 
has the Saudi CPA. 
o must not be an executive board member of the company or its branches. 
o must not be a member of any other committee in the company which is 
assigned by the board of directors.  
o  must be independent. A member is independent if: 
§  he has no direct or indirect interest in the company's transactions 
and/or contracts; 
§ he has no direct financial benefits with the executive board members 
or their wives; 
§ he has no personal relationship with the executive board members; 
and 
§ he is not a member of more than one committee in the same 
industry at the same time. 
 
Each audit committee member must provide the board of directors with a 
nomination of the eligible board members with the CV for each person nominated. 
The board of directors, then, choose from those nominated by the audit committee 
members. 
 
Section 7 of the Regulation stated that the committee must meet every three 




meet with the external auditor, the chief executive officer, the board of directors 
and the internal auditor at least once a year (SOCPA, 2003). 
 
The audit committee should also nominate five audit firms (external auditors) from 
those licensed by the Saudi Ministry of Commerce. The nominated audit firms are 
then asked to submit proposals to the company. The audit committee, then, 
recommends one or more firm/s as appropriate. The recommendation will then be 
taken, by the directors, to the general meeting, which has the ultimate responsibility 
for appointing the external auditor, determining the audit fee and the tenure of 
office 
 
Subject to the requirements in the resolution, if only one audit firm is appointed, 
then the audit committee does not recommence the nomination process until three 
years after the audit firm commenced the audit. W h e n more than one audit firm is 
appointed, the nomination process does not recommence until five years after the 
audit firms commenced their audit (Ministry of Commerce, 1994). 
 
With regard to internal audit in Saudi Arabia, Al-Twaijry et al (2003)122 held some 
interviews in 1998 with academies and external and internal auditors to examine 
the effectiveness of the internal audit in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector. The 
result showed that the internal audit in the Saudi corporations "was not well 
developed"123. The authors state that: 
 
“The results show that internal audit is not well developed. Where it does exist it 
operates in departments that are inadequately resourced, lack qualified staff, have 
restrictions on their degree of independence, concentrate on compliance audit 
rather than performance audit and where internal auditors are not accepted by 
management and auditees.”124 
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4.2.1.5 Disclosure and Transparency  
Article 89 of the Saudi Companies Law 1965 emphasizes that the board of 
directors must prepare mandatory information including: balance sheets, income 
and cash flow statements, directors' reports, changes in stockholder equity and 
board composition, as well as the external auditors report. These statements must 
be prepared no less than sixty days before the annual general meetings. The 
board's chair must sign all statements and keep copies in the main branch of the 
company so that they could be available to shareholders at least twenty-five days 
before the general meeting. 
 
Compliance with these requirements is monitored and enforced by the capital 
market regulating agencies as well as the Saudi Stock Exchanges. Non-
compliance with these legal requirements is subject to sanctions. Article 89 also 
states that the board of directors must publish the abovementioned statements in a 
Saudi newspaper. 
 
Annual Reports are regarded as a principal means of information about joint stock 
companies in Saudi Arabia. Abu Baker and Naser (2000)125 argued that the annual 
report is viewed as the main source of corporate information in developing 
countries and it is used by companies as a medium to disseminate information to 
external interested parties. Given that the report contains information on a firm’s 
profitability and liquidity, it is expected to help investors, creditors and other users 
make informed decisions about the company. Unlike companies operating in the 
developed world, the annual report published by a Saudi company represents the 
only source of financial information available to users from the company. 
 
Finally, regarding remuneration of Board members Article 74 of the Saudi 
Companies Law requires the companies to clarify the board of directors' 
remuneration method in the company’s general meeting. This remuneration could 
be a salary, bonus or percentage of revenues (must not exceed 10 per cent of net 
revenues) or it could be a combination of these. 
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4.2.2 The Capital Market Law (2003) and its implementing 
regulations 
The introduction of the Capital Market Law126 and a bundle of regulations in 2003 
was considered by some authors a paradigm reform shift in the framework of 
corporate regulation in Saudi Arabia. 127  The law was intended to create a 
transparent, fair and regulated Saudi financial market consistent with international 
developments in the field. It regulates a range of issues including the capital market 
organisation, issuance of securities, supervision of transactions by authorized 
persons licensed by the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA), and the protection 
of investors and citizens from illegal practices. 
 
In fact one of the main innovations of the Capital Market Law is the creation of the 
governmental organization CMA. It has full financial, legal, and administrative 
independence, and is directly linked with the Prime Minister. The major task of 
CMA is to create a regulated, fair and transparent financial market that protects all 
investors from illegal practices or those that include fraud, manipulation and deceit. 
These tasks and responsibilities are set in Articles 5 and 6 of the Capital Market 
Law and include the following:  
4.2.2.1 Application of Implementing Regulations 
It is important to note that the Capital Market Law does not provide detailed 
regulatory provisions for each of the implementing tasks the CMA has to carry out 
as set out in Articles 5 and 6. Accordingly, the issuance of the implementing 
regulations is intended to provide the necessary details to carry out these tasks 
and responsibilities. For example, according to Article 5 one of CMA 
responsibilities is to regulate the issuance of securities and control trading in it. 
Accordingly, the CMA has issued two separate implementing regulation lists to 
regulate the issuance of securities. These are the “Offers of Securities Regulations” 
and “Listing Rules” setting out conditions for public, private and excluded offering. 
They also set the terms for the financial advisor and his responsibilities, listing 
rules, registering terms and conditions, prospectus rules and other details that were 
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not included in the Capital Market Law. Similarly, CMA issued some implementing 
regulations to regulate securities business, authorised persons, market conduct 
and investment funds. 
4.2.2.2 Achieve the Transparency and Disclosure  
The Capital Market Law and CMA’s implementing regulations require transparency 
and full disclosure on all the important financial information concerning listed 
companies. Such information should be fully and accurately disclosed at a specific 
time without discrimination. Investors are entitled to know the full and true picture of 
any company performance and to know all the information that might affect the 
price of its shares. This applies to all companies in different sectors and industries. 
 
Accordingly, the principle of transparency and disclosure is the axis that regulating 
bodies of the financial markets is based on. It ensures the effectiveness of these 
market’s performance. By improving the levels of transparency and disclosure, risk 
levels decrease and securities are valued according to their fair prices. 
 
The Capital Market Authority imposes the transparency and disclosure principle in 
its implementing regulation through two main instruments: the prospectus and 
Continuous disclosure for companies. 
 
First: Each company planning to list its shares and make them available for trading 
is required by CMA to publish a prospectus that includes all the necessary 
information to help investors assess the company’s activities, its assets and 
liabilities, its opposing parties, its financial position as well as its expected chances 
of success and its profits and losses. It should also include adequate information 
on the rights, responsibilities and privileges associated with these securities. 
 
Second: Through the Continuous Disclosure for Companies CMA imposed on 
listing companies, in addition to the prospectus, a continuous disclosure for its 
securities as long as it is traded. If there is any violation, there will be some 
penalties that range from temporary suspension of trading or paying a fine to 





The companies’ continuous disclosure is based on three pillars:  
a) Disclosure of Important Developments: The important developments according 
to CMA’s implementing regulations are any developments that might have an 
effect on the company’s assets or liabilities, its financial position or its general 
line of work which may lead to a drastic change in the listed security price. If 
these developments occur, then the issuer should disclose it to CMA and the 
public without any delay. The important developments are considered matters 
such as increase or decrease in the net assets of the company in question, 
changes in the members of the board, lawsuits (against the company) and 
increase or decrease in the total sales. 
b) Disclosure of Financial Information: CMA’s implementing regulations require 
the issuer to publish, through the “Tadawul” website, its quarterly and annually 
financial statements and the board of directors’ report as soon as it is accepted 
by the board and before distributing it on any of the shareholders.  
c) The Board of Directors Report: The Listing Rules require the issuer to attach a 
report from the board of directors to the financial statements that includes the 
company’s operations throughout the past financial year, the factors that affect 
the company and help the investor in evaluating the company’s assets and 
liabilities as well as its financial position. Article 27 of the Listing Rules 
specifies the important major points to be included in the report.  
4.2.2.3 Achieve the Justice Principle in the Capital Market  
Justice is achieved if all parties involved in the market think that they have the 
same chances and when they believe that they are all subjected to the rules and 
regulations without discrimination. 
4.2.2.4 Provide Protection for the Capital Market Investors  
Article 5 of the Capital Market Law, stipulates that one of the CMA objectives is to 
protect citizens and investors in securities. The Law gave CMA the authority to 





4.2.2.5 Develop the Procedures to Reduce Risks Related to Securities  
As in other countries, transactions in the Saudi financial markets are classified as 
high-risk investments. The sources for of risks to be reduced or avoided in in Saudi 
Arabian financial markets can be divided into three kinds:  
 
First, Risks arising from outside the financial markets such as the risks of inflation, 
recession, or volatility in exchange rates and so on.  
Second, Risks arising from inside the financial markets such as the low levels of 
disclosure and transparency, lack of justice, or imbalance in the investment 
behaviour by the parties and so on.  
Third, Risks related to the investor’s awareness and culture. The role of capital 
market authorities is primarily in dealing with the second kind of risks as well as 
doing what they can to reduce the risks arising from the third kind. CMA works on 
reducing those risks by enhancing the levels of disclosure and transparency when 
companies disclose their financial statements, any core incidents that would affect 
its operations and work to deliver the information to everyone without any 
discrimination. CMA also works to reduce dealing practices based on insider 
information and control spreading rumours and wrongful information as well as 
controlling the practices involving fraud or manipulation in dealing with securities. 
4.2.3 Implementing Regulations of the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) 
CMA has issued a number of implementing regulations to implement the rules of 
the capital market law. These include Market Conduct Regulations, which is 
considered the one set of rules that pays attention to organizing the investor’s 
activities and conduct. 
 
The Authorized Persons Regulations regulate and organizes the relationship 
between the investor and the authorised person.  
 
FIRST: Market Conduct Regulations aims to protect those who trade in the capital 
market from illegal practices. The most important types of illegal practices, 




1. Market manipulation. 
2. Insider trading based on insider information. 
3. Untrue Statements (Rumours). 
 
Second: Authorised Persons Regulations  
 
Those who work in the business of securities such as, financial advisors, brokers 
and portfolio managers are usually held responsible for most of the financial activity 
done in the capital market. For this reason, a set of rules has been set up to 
determine the necessary procedures and conditions to get the license and its 
validity. The regulations also include the rules and conduct guidelines, applied 
systems and precautions as well as the conditions relating to the clients’ assets 
and money. In addition to the general principles mentioned in Article five that 
includes licensing and licensed conduct standards such as integrity, 
professionalism, internal audit, financial sufficiency and disclosure; there are some 
other principles related to the relationship between the authorized person and the 
client. The most important one is that the authorized person must comply to:  
 
• Protecting Clients’ assets, by arranging for adequate protection. 
• Communicating with clients, by communicating information to them in a way 
which is clear, fair and not misleading.  
• No conflicts of interest, by managing conflicts of interest fairly, both between 
itself and its customers and between a customer and another client. 
• Adopting adequate risk management policies and systems. 
• Customers’ suitability, by taking reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its 
advice and discretionary managing decisions for any customer to whom it 
provides those services. 
4.2.3.1 Penalties for Violations  
The Capital Market Law stipulates some penalties for those who violate its Articles 
or any of the implementing regulations set by CMA. The penalties can be classified 
into: 
a) general penalties for any violation to the rules of the Capital Market Law or 




b) special penalties on specific violations in the Capital Market Law.  
 
General Penalties If it appears to the Authority that any person has engaged, is 
engaging, or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any 
provisions of the Capital Market Law or its implementing regulations, then The 
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes would sentence him in one or 
more of the following penalties:  
• Warn the person concerned.  
• Oblige the person concerned to cease or refrain from carrying out the act which 
is the subject of the suit.  
• Oblige the person concerned to take the necessary steps to avert the violation, 
or to take such necessary corrective steps to address the results of the 
violation.  
• Compensate the persons who have suffered damages as a consequence of a 
violation that has occurred, or oblige the violator to pay to the Authority’s 
account the gains realized as a consequence of such violation.  
• Suspend the trading in the security. 
• Barring the violating person from acting as a broker, portfolio manager or 
investment adviser for such period of time as is necessary for the safety of the 
market and the protection of investors. 
• Seize and execution on property. 
• Travel ban.  
• Barring from working with companies whose Securities are traded on the 
Exchange. 
• Impose a fine 
 
Specific Penalties: In addition to the general penalties mentioned above, CMA 
has more severe penalties for those who fall in one of the two Capital Market Law 
violations which are: market manipulation and insider trading.  
 
Based on Article 57, in addition to the general penalties, whoever commits one of 
the previous two violations may be sentenced to jail for a period not exceeding five 




in addition to a fine for whoever worked as a broker or claimed to be one without a 
license. Settling Disputes The Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes 
looks into the complaints and cases filed against the authorized persons or 
statements of claim regarding some CMA or “Tadawul” decisions or those cases 
where loses are caused as a result of violations to the Capital Market Law and 
Implementing Regulations like market manipulation or insider trading. 
4.2.4 The Listing Rules (LR) 2004 
Based on the Capital Market Law, the listing rules were issued in 2004 by the 
Board of the Capital Market Authority in 52 Articles divided into nine sections.128 In 
order to allow issuers to place securities on the capital market, the listing rules 
govern such admission and provide the description of the information that should 
be disclosed before placing the securities on the official list. Even so, this piece of 
regulation is not the first issue of listing rules in Saudi Arabia, as the Ministry of 
Commerce has issued listing rules before. Like any other listing rules, the goals of 
the listing rules in Saudi Arabia are to provide protection to investors and serve the 
market’s development.129 
According to Article 2, the objective of the listing rules is to regulate the public 
offering registration and admission to listing of securities’.130 Thus, through a quick 
review of some decisions by the Capital Market Authority, the importance of the 
listing rules in the context of corporate governance and the business environment 
is obvious. 
Article 34 clarifies the compulsory nature of the Listing Rules: ‘The issuer must 
comply with these rules and must provide to the Authority without delay all 
information, explanations, books and records that the Authority may require, which 
must be clear, accurate and not misleading’.131  
 
A very recent case that has had a great deal of resonance in Saudi and the GCC 
business environments is that relating to ‘Mobily’ company case. The importance of 
the Mobily case relates to the size of ‘Mobily’ as it is the second largest 
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telecommunications company in Saudi Arabia and has a history of revenues and 
earnings since its establishment in the Saudi Market in 2004.132 Following several 
procedures started to verify whether the company had violated the CML and its 
implemented regulations, this revealed suspicion about possible violation of section 
(C) of Article 42 of the Listing Rules and two Articles of the CML 49 and 50. The 
CMA announced the suspension of trading the shares of ‘Mobily’ for a few days. 
Moreover, the CMA announced in February 2015, the “assignment of a specialised 
team to review Etihad Etisalat Co. Mobily's financial statements, conduct site visits, 
obtain documents and hear concerned parties’ statements”.133 The case is still 
under review at the CMA now and the results could be announced any time this 
year. Furthermore, there have been many cases of the enforcement of the Listing 
Rules since their issuance in 2004, whether it is the imposition of a penalty or 
suspension of trading shares such as ‘Anam’ and ‘Bishah’ in 2007, ‘Almojil’ in 
2012, ‘Albaha’ in 2013 and many others.134 
 
Finally, in the context of corporate governance regulations, the Listing Rules have 
reinforced some of the CGR’s provisions; for example, Article 42 of the Listing 
Rules, which is about the disclosure of financial information. Another example is 
Article 43 which deals with the Board of Directors’ report and requires them to 
include any issues that impact upon the company’s operations and any other news 
or factors that are important to investors, which indicates the willingness of the 
CMA to promote transparency as a principle of corporate governance as well as 
protecting the market and investors. 
4.2.5 The Corporate Governance Regulations (2006) 
A positive effort towards greater certainty regarding corporate governance 
practices was manifested in the Corporate Governance Regulations (informally 
called Saudi corporate governance code) issued in November 2006 by the Capital 
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Market Authority. The code aims to ensure that Saudi listed companies comply with 
best governance practices that would ensure the protection of shareholders and 
stakeholders rights.  
 
Although these Regulations (also referred to informally as the Code of Corporate 
Governance) are considered guidelines and are not mandatory, they enjoys a 
considerable recognition amongst Saudi companies. The Code mainly tackles the 
following three issues through its three chapters; the rights of shareholders and the 
general assembly, disclosure and transparency, and the board of directors. 
According to the mentioned code, companies are required to disclose in the 
board’s report the provisions thereof that are implemented and those not 
implemented and explain the reasons for non-compliance. A more discussion on its 
content will be conducted in the next section of this chapter. 
4.2.6 The Principles of Corporate Governance for Banks (2012) 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) has issued the Principles of 
Corporate Governance for Banks operating in Saudi Arabia in July 2012. The 
Principles were updated in March 2014. The first Article states that these principles 
of corporate governance for banks have been issued in accordance with the best 
practices recognized internationally. The members of the Board of Directors of the 
bank and its senior management must comply with these Principles and ensure 
that capital adequacy ratios and provisions are commensurate with the size of risks 
and levels of liquidity and lending, thereby, protecting the rights of depositors, 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
SAMA states that these Principles complement the regulations, rules and circulars 
issued by SAMA and the Capital Market Authority regarding the core principles of 
corporate governance.  
4.2.7 The Implementing Regulation of the Law on Supervision of 
Finance Companies (2012) 
Introduced to the market in July 2012, SAMA has issued this legislation to 




1. Extend license to engage in one or more finance activities in accordance 
with the provisions of finance laws and regulations. 
2. Take necessary measures for maintaining the integrity and stability of the 
finance sector and fairness of transactions. 
3. Take necessary measures for promoting fair and effective competition 
between finance companies. 
4. Take proper means for the development of the finance sector, Saudization, 
and raising the employees' competency through regulating the obligations of 
the finance companies regarding the training of human resources, improving 
their skills and developing their knowledge. 
4.2.8 Characteristics Corporate Governance Framework: earlier 
phase 1965 - 2012 
The main field of this evaluation in this section135 involves directors’ roles, their 
standing and duties vis-à-vis the company and the other shareholders. In doing so, 
the rights of shareholders will be considered, mainly the monitory thereof, along 
with the earlier disclosure rules contained in the studied documents.   
4.2.8.1 Director’s Roles and Responsibilities  
The duty to run and manage companies is legally assigned to the company 
directors according to the Saudi Companies Law. The directors enjoy wide 
discretion in the strategic planning and running of the company affairs.136 By this 
power, they outline the duties of the executives and other managers in the 
company and influence their works and decisions.137  
 
																																								 																				
135 This evaluation is basically devoted for the current Saudi Companies Law issued by the Royal Decree 
No.6 for the year 1965, and the following corporate governance codes: 
1) The Corporate Governance Regulation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued by the Board of 
Capital Market Authority by the Regulation No. 1/212/2006 on 21/10/1427 H (12/11/2006) (as 
amended on 30/3/1431 H, 16/3/2110) [hereinafter referred to as CM-Code] 
2) The principles of Corporate Governance for Banks Operating in Saudi Arabia, issued by the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency in July 2012 [hereinafter referred to as BO-Code] 
3) The Implementing Regulations of the Law on Supervision of Finance Companies, prepared by the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency [hereinafter referred to as FC- Code] 
	
136 See Articles 24, 66, 73, 152 and 167 of the Saudi Companies Law 1965. 




Despite the huge power concentrated in the directors, the duties given to them are 
not defined in the Companies Law in a way showing in sufficient clarity the nature 
of such powers and the ultimate goals intended thereby. In the same vein, 
directors’ duties are scattered in separate provisions without a specific unity and 
sometimes the duties are presented to be general and without reference to any firm 
standards.   
 
For instance, the duties of loyalty, neutrality and avoidance of conflict of interest138 
of the company are expressed in many places in the Companies Law and other 
corporate governance codes, but they seem missing the general definitive 
structure, which specifies the ceiling of such duties and what constitutes a breach 
thereto.  
 
Moreover, observance of these duties is not firmly required as directors can be 
released from the consequences of their acts by the general assembly of the 
company. 139  In some places in the Companies Law 1965 and other Saudi 
corporate governance codes, the non-competition duty is substantially diluted when 
directors are given the right to hold directorship offices in rival companies.140 This 
exception gives rise to serious concerns on the issue of neutrality in the Saudi 
company structure. 
 
More importantly, basic duties like acting in due diligence and care are rarely found 
in the Saudi Companies Law 1965. Despite the major importance such duties play 
in the theory of directors, it seems that this area is left without any serious 
regulation in the law. In the light of such dilution, some corporate governance 
codes, nevertheless, tried to fill up the gap when some due diligence and good 
care requirements were incorporated into the directors’ general duties141. 
 
																																								 																				
138 See for instance Articles 23, 29, 31, 69, 70, 71 and 72 of the Companies Law. See also CM-Code Article 
10(b)(1), CM-Code Article 12(h), and BO-Code Articles 11, 13, 16, 20, 38 and 48, and FC-Draft Code Article 
2.   
139 See for instance Articles 77 and 168 of the Companies Law 1965. 
140See Articles 31, 69 and 70 in the Companies Law 1965, the BO-Code Article 20 and CM-Code Article 
12(h).  




One of the major consequences for the non-imposition of a duty of care and 
diligence over the directors is the grey area highlighting the nature of the directors’ 
liability under the Saudi Companies Law 1965. In fact, nothing in the Saudi 
corporate legislations showed a fine cut notion detailing on major questions director 
duty relating, specifically, to the nature of the directors’ duties, and the standard of 
breach of director duty. This remains an important area for reform of the Saudi 
corporate governance laws. 
4.2.8.2 The Nature of the Directors’ Duties: The Fault-based Duty v. the 
Fiduciary Duty 
Another flaw tainting the directorship theory in the Saudi corporate legislations in 
the early phase is the nonexistence of any provision showing in sufficient clarity the 
nature of the obligations that directors owe.  Thus, the only available solution under 
the law in this phase is to make recourse to the common rules of liability in the 
general Sharia law of obligations. Sharia would certainly lead to application of the 
ordinary fault based142 liability rules on directors’ acts, regardless the action is 
																																								 																				
142 For indicators in the Companies Law 1965 supporting a fault-based scale of liability, see, for partnerships, 
Article 32, which reads as follows: 
“The manager shall be held accountable for compensating damages inflicted on the Company or the partners, 
or the others due to violation of terms of the company incorporation contract, or due to errors he commits in 
performing his functions; and each agreement on otherwise shall be considered null and void.”  
For the public shareholding companies, see also Articles 76, 77 and 78 in t the Companies Law 1965, which 
respectively read as follows: = 
= Article 76: “Members of the board of directors shall be jointly liable to compensate the company, 
shareholders or others, for damages emanating from their mismanaging the company affairs, or 
violating the provisions of this Law, or the stipulations of the Companies Law; and each condition 
ruling otherwise shall be considered null and void ….” 
Article 77: “The Company shall be entitled to file a liability lawsuit against the board of directors’ 
members due to errors that cause damages to all shareholders…..” 
Article 78: “Each shareholder shall be entitled to file the liability lawsuit prescribed by the company 
against the board of directors’ members if the error committed by them shall cause a special damage 
to him …” 
For the limited liability companies, see also Article 168, which reads as follows: 
“…. The managers shall be jointly held liable for compensating the damage inflicted on the 
company, partners or others because of violating the provisions of this law, the company 
incorporation contract, or due to errors committed in performing their duties. Any condition ruling 
otherwise shall be considered null and void.” 
For the public shareholding companies, see also Articles 76, 77 and 78 in t the Companies Law 1965, which 
respectively read as follows:  
Article 76: “Members of the board of directors shall be jointly liable to compensate the company, 
shareholders or others, for damages emanating from their mismanaging the company affairs, or 
violating the provisions of this Law, or the stipulations of the Companies Law; and each condition 
ruling otherwise shall be considered null and void ….” 
Article 77: “The Company shall be entitled to file a liability lawsuit against the board of directors’ 




tortious or contractual. The actionable fault will, therefore, be the one deviating 
from the reasonable directorship norms and the standard conduct in doing the 
duties imposed over directors by the law. Under these Saudi corporate legislations, 
avoiding recourse to the fault based rules is legally impossible. This is basically 
because such rules apply in default by virtue of law. 
 
Under such default law rules, the director duties would be defined and judged with 
reference to the standard conduct of ordinary (average) man (director) and thus 
directors will only fall foul of the law and be liable towards the company or 
shareholders when they knowingly fail honouring their duties. The burden of proof 
will lie over the company to show such deviation and this will be a second difficulty 
to face on the side of application. 
 
Moreover, under such fault based level, it would be very difficult to monitor and 
legally act the varied duties imposed by the modern corporate governance 
theories, especially those imposing a duty over the directors to consider other 
stakeholders’ legitimate interests143 and to put the company on the proper long 
term track144.  
 
In light of the shortfall of the fault-based theory in monitoring directors’ works, 
modern laws of companies usually impose a fiduciary duty over the directors in a 
way benefiting the company itself and the shareholders. The relation would be 
considered in fiduciary when the law imposes more duties over the parties – or one 
of the parties – in a relation involving an element of trust or reliance such as in 
cases of agency contracts, employer-employee relations and contracts of advisory 
service. The liability is somehow strict and the party owing a fiduciary obligation will 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																								
Article 78: “Each shareholder shall be entitled to file the liability lawsuit prescribed by the company 
against the board of directors’ members if the error committed by them shall cause a special damage 
to him …” 
For the limited liability companies, see also Article 168, which reads as follows: 
“…. The managers shall be jointly held liable for compensating the damage inflicted on the 
company, partners or others because of violating the provisions of this law, the company 
incorporation contract, or due to errors committed in performing their duties. Any condition ruling 
otherwise shall be considered null and void.” 
	
143 For the directors’ duty to consider the legitimate interests of the company stakeholders, see the CM-Code 
Article 10(e) and the BO-Code Articles 1, 8(d), 9, 10(d), 38 and 82.  
144 For the director’s duty to achieve the company strategic planning and performance of the long run 




always be under the obligation to act honestly and achieve the interests of the 
other party in the relation.145 
 
In corporate law terms, the fiduciary duty is the obligation to act honestly and in 
good faith in achieving the best interests of the company (represented in the 
members’ interest) and to use the granted powers solely for the purposes for which 
they were granted. 
 
Adoption of fiduciary standards over the directors in any proposed reform of the 
Saudi Companies Law will solve the insufficiency of the earlier fault-based 
standard of liability. There are, however, three important notes that need to be 
mentioned in this regard: 
1) The Saudi Companies Law 1965 directorship liability looks absolutely rigid; 
parties’ attempts to adapt or amend the liability rules by way of an agreement or a 
special clause in the company memorandum of association will fail and be 
unenforceable as the law states that agreements to the otherwise of the law-
imposed liability pattern will be considered null and void. 
 
2) For the same reasons above, the fiduciary-oriented rules and obligations 
scattered in the Saudi corporate governance in this phase looked merely 
suggestive and lacked any law enforcement ability under the complicated classical 
fault-based liability style; and  
3) Incorporation of fiduciary obligations over directors needs a substantive 
reform for the Saudi Companies Law 1965. 
4.2.8.3 The Standard of Breach 
The standard of breach remains, for the fault based case style, the deviation from 
the reasonable man conduct; the fiduciary duty adopts a higher standard of liability 
being the honest skilled man. Additionally, honesty is a direct application for good 
																																								 																				
145 This can be compared to the ‘Business Judgment Rule’ indicating the presumption that, in making business 
decisions, the directors of a corporation  acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interest of the company and its stockholders. The rule implies that Directors’ 
actions will be upheld if it can be attributed to any rational business purpose. The presumption may, however, 
be overcome only if a plaintiff pleads facts showing that a board has acted: 1) Disloyally, 2) in bad faith, or 3) 






faith rules, and it does not import difficulty in implementation or in court monitoring. 
As a matter of fact, honesty will be judged with reference to the fiduciary duties the 
directors are subjected to.  
 
As for the ‘skill’ requirement, the matter is usually tested with reference to the so 
called the ‘business judgment rule’. Under such a rule, directors are taken as 
making decisions based on their business skills and full awareness of the varied 
facts and information involving the market and the company status. They are 
presumed to have collected and considered all relevant data and sought all 
necessary consultations. In this sense, the process of making decision will be the 
core element, not necessarily the result (product) of such decision. 
 
Directors have to identify the risks of the company business and try to minimize it 
through proper management and decisions. They have, in some industries, a duty 
to outline and define the risk element in order to safeguard the company. The more 
the type of business involves risk, the harder is the directors’ liability. 
 
Also, the standard of liability differs depending on the executive level of the 
directors. Non-executive directors are deemed to benefit from their lack of 
information and market facts when their liability is judged. Executive directions will 
not simply be in the same position as they are expected to be fully aware of the 
same. 
 
Unfortunately, none of these standards is available in the Saudi Companies Law 
1965 although some Saudi corporate legislation imposes duties of skill, knowledge 
and information awareness on directors.146  Under the earlier company style, none 
of the above practical considerations is likely to be judged when directors’ liability 
becomes under court revision. A reform for the earlier law is seriously needed in 
this place so that the fiduciary nature of directors’ obligations is recognized and the 
modern corporate governance duties are enforced.  
																																								 																				




4.2.8.4 Director’s Duties and Responsibilities: The Best Practice in the 
Field 
The international practice for directorship came as a response to the serious 
demand in the practical field for outlining directors’ duties, responsibilities and the 
fiduciary duty they owe to the company. Below is an illustration for the duties that 
the best practice usually requires to all types of companies. 
4.2.8.4.1 The Duty to Act within Powers 
This is a traditional fiduciary duty pursuant where directors are required to use their 
powers to achieve the goals intended thereby. Also, they should not act in violation 
or in excess to such powers. The sources of powers remain the law of the 
company, the company Articles, the bylaws and the assembly decisions. 
4.2.8.4.2  The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company 
Under such an obligation, directors are required to devote their skills, expertise and 
knowledge to achieve and promote the success of the company. The law defines 
the success of the company by reference to the ‘benefit of the company members 
– shareholders.’ This is quite interesting as the fiduciary duties are legally owed to 
the company. The standard thereof will be the shareholders receivable benefit.  
4.2.8.4.3 The Duty to Exercise Independent Judgment  
This implies that directors should be free of any external effects while making their 
judgments and decisions. The obligation does not ban directors from seeking 
independent opinions from consultants and other management members as long 
as the final decision will be theirs.  
4.2.8.4.4 The Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care and Diligence 
Under such a duty, directors are required to exert due diligence and care in 
managing the company’s affairs and making their varied decisions. This implies 
some subjective character as when questions of the special background, 
qualifications and personal awareness of a given director are considered by courts 
while deciding what does and what does not constitute a reasonable care and 
diligence conduct. On the other hand, the duty implies that directors must have a 
minimum amount of knowledge and diligence as a requirement for them to hold the 
office. A director is not, therefore, excused merely because he lacks the basic 




4.2.8.4.5 The Duty to Avoid Conflict of Interest 
This duty implies an obligation over the director not to have a private interest that is 
likely to conflict with the interests of the company. The practical effect of the rule is 
that when directors are into any situation where their own personal interests conflict 
or may conflict with the interests of the company they represent, the interests of the 
company must prevail. 
4.2.8.4.6 The Duty not to Accept Benefits from Third Parties  
This duty applies when the benefit is likely to raise conflict of interest issue the 
interests of the company.  In other words, the director must not accept any benefit 
that is conferred upon him for the mere reason of being a director. The benefit can 
be anything of a beneficial value, or even a benefit of a social or political character.  
4.2.8.4.7 The Duty to Declare Interest in Proposed Transactions or 
Arrangements  
Under this duty, directors are obliged to properly report in good time the interests 
they have in any proposed transaction(s) for the company. The time of reporting 
should be before the conclusion of the arrangement, not thereafter. This is in fact a 
variant for the general duty not to have a conflicting interest with the interests of the 
company.  
4.2.8.4.8 Adopting a Wider Definition: Shadow Directors and De Facto 
Directors   
It might be beneficial for the corporate governance efficiency that governance 
principles enjoy a kind of flexibility in practice beyond the law-drawn ‘board 
member’ – ‘non-board member’ classification. As a matter of fact, addressing 
persons and executives not to have a directorship capacity by governance rules 
originally designed for board members might appear a desired fruit at the practical 
side, especially when such persons do appear to be very effective in the company 
decision-making process (shadow directors according to some Companies Law 
terminology). The extension of rules might also be beneficial to persons, regardless 
the titles they have, usually appearing before third parties as having a directorship 
capacity (the so-called a de facto director). 
 
By this extension, a wider room for governance application will be allowed. 
Executives and other management officers will fall under the same duties imposed 




management officers will have concentrated powers similar to the ones vested in 
the board of directors itself.  
 
It is highly recommended that the Companies Regulation and the local corporate 
governance policies follow this functional-oriented classification when a 
directorship theory is drawn and addressed, especially when it comes to the 
privately owned companies which do not appear to usually have a clear allocation 
for duties within its structure and – a fortiori – its appearance before third parties.  
4.2.8.5 Rights of Shareholders 
With the exception of some flaws in the earlier body of law,147 shareholders – taken 
collectively – are enjoying fair standing regarding their general rights. Some of 
these rights are rights of participating in the company’s management, the right to 
receive and get access to information, the right to suggest issues and vote at the 
general meetings of the company, and the right to receive dividends and participate 
in the company’s assets in case of winding up.148   
 
What basically matters is the standing of the monitory shareholders being the 
shareholders holding an amount of shares that does not confer upon them any 
controlling or voting power comparing the ones enjoyed by the rest of 
shareholders.149  
 
It is good to mention that company affairs, basically the strategic planning, 
management and voting, should not necessarily be seen as a ‘democratic’ process 
by which the ‘minority’ should always adhere to the views of the ‘majority’ through a 
democratic voting vehicle. Rather, contemporary views see the issue as ‘every 
investor’s right to monitor and seek the good of its investment – represented in the 
shares it holds – no matter the volume thereof’. If this view is to prevail, the minority 
																																								 																				
147 See for example the following Articles in the KSA Companies Regulation 1992: 18 (restrictions against 
exit right – Partnerships), 83 (restrictions against attending general meetings – Public Shareholding 
Companies), 101 (restrictions against dealing in shares – Public Sharing Companies), 104 (shares redemption 
– Public Shareholding Companies), 165 (restrictions against exit right – Limited Liability Companies), 168 
(restrictions against board member recusal – Limited Liability Companies).  
148 On the KSA corporate governance code level, see CM-Code Articles 3 to 7 and BO-Code Articles 78 to 
81.  




shareholding issue will be an interesting challenge for any law reform process in 
the KSA. 
 
The law regarding the minority’s shareholding is basically a ‘policy’ issue. To a 
great extent, there is no room for a radical replacement for the earlier classical 
voting and decision-making process styles. However, the ‘policy’ may only take 
measures to dilute the potential negative effects of the idea of the majority controls 
and influences the decision-making of the company.   
Nothing in the Companies Regulations suggests any special regulation for the 
minority shareholding safeguarding measures. Moreover, the BO-Code and the 
CM-Code involvement in this matter are also groundless and ineffective.150  
4.2.8.6 The Fiduciary Duty Owed by the Directors 
The directors’ duty of fiduciary is basically attributed to the company, not to the 
shareholders.151 Directors are under the general duty not to cause harm to the 
shareholders. Any board action favouring any segment of shareholders without a 
special law support will be taken as falling short of the neutrality obligation of the 
directors. The minority shareholders’ issue is not, therefore, a board general 
competence. As said, the matter is mainly a law intervention policy, which aims at 
finding solutions in favour of this less-favoured fraction of shareholders.152  
4.2.8.7 Minority Shareholding Safeguarding Measures 
 The minority shareholders may desire to have representative(s) in the company 
board of directors. This is quite important as this will mainly be seen as a good tool 
for them to raise issues at board and vote thereon. It will be also a good tool for 
information gathering regarding many detailed aspects of the business and the 
company general affairs.  
 
Board appointment is basically unavailable to minority shareholders electing under 
the earlier KSA Companies Regulation. This is because the majority will be already 
occupying all available offices.  
																																								 																				
150 The FC-Draft Code does not regulate the minority shareholding issue in any sense!  
151 In fact, nothing in the KSA Companies Regulations (1992) suggests any direct relation between directors 
(or the board) and the rest of shareholders. Even thoughts on the existence of an assumed agency linkage 
between directors and shareholders are legally groundless and look highly artificial!   





The suggested solutions should focus on how the minority votes can be heard 
when directors’ election takes place.   
 
The cumulative voting  
Under this mechanism, the number which represents shares held by each 
shareholder, is multiplied by the number of directors available for the office. The 
shareholder can cast all his votes to one, or more, of the directors.  
 
Actually, the vote accumulation technique was recommended by some KSA 
corporate governance instruments, because it is more equitable for addressing 
minor shareholders’ needs.153 However, the imminent question is whether this is a 
sufficient remedy for the question of minority rights.  This cumulative election mode 
is usually seen as a useful tool enabling the minority shareholders to have a 
representative at the board. However, the tool does not come with a guarantee for 
the following reasons: 
 
1. The other shareholders (the majority) will also be given the same right of 
multiplying and concentration. This will eliminate most of the advantages which the 
cumulative system achieves;  
2. The system would be ineffective if the number of board offices is small; and  
3. (Most importantly) the question of the minority shareholders’ unity and 
loyalty in supporting one nominee is also a serious obstacle against making a 
representative for them in the board. Usually, the minority shareholders’ votes are 
scattered amongst several nominees without any effective load in favour of any of 
them.  
 
 The share class system 
One of the good solutions suggested to overcome the question of the majority 
dominating the board election is the adoption of the share class system. According 
to such system, the voting capital of the company should be divided into many 
categories of shares where each category will be entitled to appoint and elect a 
director, or directors, on its own.  
																																								 																				




By recognizing the (minority shares) as one of the voting capital share classes, the 
holders of such shares will be certainly entitled to nominate candidates for the 
board and get their law-fixed number of directors to be amongst the board. Cross 
voting amongst the different share classes will be disallowed, and thus the obstacle 
of the minority shareholders’ un-loyalty will be minimized to a great extent. 
 
Unfortunately, neither the KSA Companies Regulations nor any of the earlier KSA 
corporate governance codes support the notion of share classification. Therefore, 
reform is needed in this respect.   
4.2.8.8 General meeting rights  
These are basically the rights vested in the minority shareholders to effectively 
appear and act before the general assembly of the company. It is widely agreed 
that minority shareholders are entitled to attend and vote at general meetings of the 
company. The main concern, nevertheless, should be the effectiveness of their 
attendance and casted votes.  
 
The threshold of calling general meetings 
The earlier KSA Companies Law rules on calling for general meetings are 
disfavouring the minority shareholders by requiring a high threshold for such 
calling. For the public shareholding companies, the required threshold is 5 percent 
of the capital shares.154 For the limited liability companies, a bigger threshold is 
required, being 50 per cent of the share capital.155       
 
It is obvious that the earlier trend of the law does not support any minority involving 
in the calling of the general meetings of the company. In order to guarantee a 
better participation by the minority shareholders, a lower threshold should be 
adopted by the law. The suggested percentage is somewhere between 1 and 2 per 
cent for the public shareholding companies and something around 15 per cent for 
the rest of company types. 
 
The required quorum 
																																								 																				
154 See Article 87. 




The quorum earlier required by the KSA Companies Regulations for duly organized 
general meetings is also disfavouring the minority shareholders interest. For the 
public shareholding companies, the quorum required is simple the attendance of 
shareholders who represent 50 of the company issued capital. This applies equally 
to ordinary and extraordinary general assembly meetings.156  
 
More dramatically, adjourned general assembly meetings will be duly organized 
regardless the actual number of attendees, unless the meeting is of an extra 
ordinary nature where the attendance of shareholders representing 25 per cent of 
the share capital of the company is required.157 
 
The proper minority shareholders’ treatment for representation in the general 
meetings of companies is the imposition of a super majority quorum for such 
meetings. When the company shares are classified into different classes of shares, 
the quorum (or the super quorum in case thus imposed by the law) should be 
present in each class of shares.  
 
The required decision reaching majority 
The last remedial action that can be taken to rectify the minority shareholders 
weaker position is majority-oriented. The earlier situation for the decision-making 
majority is absolutely disfavouring the minority shareholders. By requiring that most 
decisions are taken at a 50 simple majority158 the minority shareholders will not 
have any chance to be heard in any general meeting sessions. 159   
 
As is the case in the quorum issue, the solution is always taking the form of raising 
the required decision making majority. It would be highly beneficial, especially for 
the privately owned companies, that a super-majority rule is imposed instead of the 
earlier existing simple majority rule. In addition to a super-majority rule imposition, 
																																								 																				
156 The KSA Companies Regulation 1992, Articles 91 and 92 
157 The KSA Companies Regulation 1992, Articles 91 and 92 
158  See the KSA Companies Regulations (1992) Articles 25 (partnerships), 27 (partnerships), 28 
(partnerships), 92 (public sharing companies) and 172 (limited liability companies).	
159 Some exceptions do however exist:  the unanimity required for extraordinary decisions in partnerships 
(Article 30) and the two-third majority required in Article 92 for some extraordinary decisions at the public 




the minority shareholders may also be given a right of rejection (veto) in some very 
critical situations seriously affecting their investment and corporate standing.160 
4.2.8.9 The Rules on Disclosure and Information Dissemination 
Another important aspect of corporate governance discussed in this study is the 
rules concerning disclosure of information related to the company and its business. 
Disclosure is the tool by which the shareholders and the related stakeholders are 
given access to timely and efficient information related to all aspects of the 
company and its business. The information is important basically because they 
enable shareholders to better monitor their business, make decisions and even 
make their informed choices whether or not to keep-in or exit-from the business 
envisaged in the company. It is also an important tool to enable evaluation for the 
board and the executive employees’ efficiency in running the business.  
 
Equally, disclosure is important to the stakeholders as it relates to their general 
standing towards the company, its objectives and transactions, and reflect whether 
or not the company observe their acquired interests as persons addressed under 
the modern ‘enlightened’ approach of governance.161 
 
To go straightforward, rules concerning disclosure in the earlier Companies 
Regulations are mainly financial162 in nature addressing the company’s financial 
results and standing in the market. This is primarily envisaged in the rules giving 
																																								 																				
160 The veto should always be seen as exceptional; it can only be imposed on seriously extra ordinary matters 
such like the following:  
- amending the charter or the bylaw of the company; 
- entering into a merger transaction; or acquiring a third party company; 
- the sale or lease of a substantive part of the company assets; 
- filing a voluntary bankruptcy application; 
- appointing external auditors;  
- extending a loan to a third party; 
- creating or implementing a mortgage against the company assets;  
- increasing/decreasing the issued/authorized capital of the company.  
161The matter is also important for potential investors making decisions on their future investment and is also 
important for the different regulatory sectors planning, and setting paces, for the markets (such as the 
competition authorities). 
162 With the minor exception of the rules concerning the directors’ duty to report conflict of interest issues; see 




shareholders/partners rights to get access to the company’s records and other 
documents showing its financial standing and general transactional activities.163  
 
With the exception of the requirement of a general statements about the company’s 
activities and the requirement of disclosing the income, salaries, allowances, 
expenses, service fee and dividends paid (or payable) by the company to the board 
members,164 the scope required for the annual reports remains primarily ‘financial’ 
to a great extent having to do with the budget, loss/profit statements, the financial 
standing of the company and a suggested profit (dividends) distribution plan.165 
 
The earlier Companies Regulations state nothing about a duty to disclose 
information needed by the stakeholders. The company is generally under no duty 
to provide such information.  
 
On the governance-codes side, the matter is quite clearer and wider as companies 
are required to make timely and sufficient disclosures to cover not only the financial 
status thereof but also the following important aspects missed by the Companies 
Regulations: 
 
1. Scope of compliance with the applicable governance code principles, the 
unimplemented aspects thereof, and the reasons of such un-
implementation166; 
2. the entities and parties with share ownership in the reporting company167, and 
the names of the listed companies the board vacancies of which are held by 
any board member in the reporting company168; 
																																								 																				
163 For the Companies Law see Articles 24 (partnerships), 108 (public sharing companies) and 175 (limited 
liability companies) giving the company members the right to get access to the company’s general business, 
records and financial standing. For the BO-Code see Articles 83 and 84. For the CM-Code See Article 9.     
164 See Articles 74, 89, and 123 of the Companies Law (1992).  
165 See the following Articles in the Companies Law (1992): 89 (public sharing companies), 128 (public 
sharing companies), 132 (public sharing companies), 175 (limited liability companies) and 223 (a general 
provision for companies under liquidation). 
166 CM-Code Article 9(a) and BO-Code Article 84(i) 
167 BO-Code Article 84(a) 




3. information about reporting of the company’s board of directors, its 
committees (including their roles and heads) and directors classifications as 
executives, non-executives and independents169;  
4. information about allowance, incentives and remuneration systems 170 , 
including those  extended to the board members and the executives171;  
5. the internal control framework 172  and reports on the effectiveness of the 
internal control system adopted by the reporting company173; 
6. penalties and remedies imposed against the reporting company by any 
competent regulatory174; 
7. the ethical and professional principles observed at the reporting company175; 
8. the conflict of interest policy and the conflict of interest related transactions at 
the reporting company176; 
9. the strategic plan of the reporting company (including for the future take-
overs, mergers and subsidiary making)177; 
10. the business risks and the international rating of the reporting company178. 
 
Unlike the situation under the Companies Regulations, disclosure policy under the 
CM-Code and the BO-Code addresses the stakeholders’ needs and requires the 
disclosure to be designed in a way satisfying their right to information.179  
 
Despite the considerable advancement provided by the governance codes working 
side-by-side with the Companies Regulations in the KSA, the divergence 
separating between the proper practice of disclosure and the earlier practice under 
the Companies Regulations and its ancillary governance codes is still vast.  
 
On the financial side, despite the concentration in the Companies Regulations, 
some vital aspects are still missing, namely disclosures regarding the accounting 
																																								 																				
169 CM-Code Articles 9(c) and (d) and BO-Code Article 84(b) 
170 BO-Code Article 84(d) 
171 CM-Code Article 9(e) and BO-Code Article 84(c) 
172 BO-Code Article 84(e) 
173 CM-Code Article 9(g) 
174 CM-Code Article 9(f) 
175 BO-Code Article 84(f) 
176 BO-Code Article 84(g) 
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system followed in the company and the decision making process on electing and 
communicating with the external auditors and their scope of works, responsibilities 
and duration.  
 
On the ownership structure and voting power of the company, nothing in the 
Regulations or the Codes gives specification on important matters like changes in 
the shareholders and ownership structure, control (voting) rights and structure and 
the general meetings processes and agendas.  
 
The major deficiency in reporting and information dissemination requirements 
remains for the board and management sector. Nothing in the Regulations or 
Codes requires that reporting and information dissemination should include 
detailed data on the roles and functions of the board and other senior executives of 
the company and on their qualifications and duration at the service. Likewise, 
nothing gives any obligation on giving information about the varied processes and 
precautions adopted by the company for supporting the independence and loyalty 
of the board and the senior management (including procedures for board related 
transactions and how the same is internally reported, considered and cleared). 
There is also no obligation on giving information about the internal rules governing 
transactions of an extraordinary nature, risk management, and on the internal 
processes and manners followed in evaluating performance of the board and the 
senior management.  
 
Finally, the stakeholder side in the obligatory reporting is still minor. There is no 
specific requirement for reporting about the internal mechanisms and precautions 
followed to safeguard the stakeholder interests and their right in timely information. 
Moreover, nothing supports reporting on the company policy adopted for dealing 
with the different types of stakeholders, including competitors, environment, 
employees and the society as a whole (including consumers).   
 
4.3 Recent Phase: Statutory reforms 2015 - 2017 
To complete the discussion and analysis of the Saudi statutory framework of 




have recently been introduced into the legal framework in Saudi Arabia. These are 
namely the new Companies Law 2015 the new Corporate Governance Regulations 
2017.  
 
A number of economic and policy considerations can be regarded as the motives 
behind the reform resulting in the new Companies law. On one hand, it is a 
reflection of the evolution of the Saudi economy in the years since the Companies 
Law 1965 and other regulations were enacted. On the other hand, the Law 
culminates the efforts needed to establish a new framework compatible with a 
more complex business environment. The factors that affecting the Saudi Arabian 
economy and necessitated the more robust legal regime include the following: 
1. Saudi Arabia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2004, and the 
precipitous growth of foreign direct investment. 
2. Growth of the Saudi Arabian stock market, including the recent opening of 
the stock market to foreign investment and the development of a vibrant 
sukuk market. 
3. Diversification of the Saudi Arabian economy into new industries beyond the 
traditional hydrocarbon based economy. 
4. The larger role small and medium enterprises play in the economy, which 
requires a more efficient regulatory environment for their success.  
5. The need for the private sector to play a larger role in the Kingdom’s 
economic development. 
 
The full impact of the new companies law and the new Corporate Governance 
Regulations on the Saudi corporate framework can more appropriately be 
assessed when the law is fully implemented in the post 2017 period. However, the 
main driving factors of the new laws and the regulatory innovations they brings 
about can be described comparatively in the following two subsections. 
4.3.1 Impact of the new Companies Law 2015 
The Companies Law (1437H/2015G) was published by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (MOCI) on 9 November 2015, and in the Saudi Gazette (Um Al-Qura) 
on 4 December 2015, and was stated to come into effect on 2 May 2016. The new 




provides existing companies with a period of 12 months from its effective date to 
make such changes as are necessary to comply fully with the new Companies 
Law, subject to any new rules set in respect of such existing companies by the 
competent regulatory authorities. 
As it already transpired from the above discussion, the Companies Law 2015 can 
be described as a new era in the Saudi framework of corporate governance. In 
particular, the law determines more clearly the functions and jurisdictions of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Investment) and the Capital Market Authority. 
Moreover, there are several novel issues in the context of corporate governance 
which Companies Law that has dealt with for the first time. There are a number of 
points in terms of corporate governance which characterise the Companies Law 
2015 and these can be summarised as follows: 
4.3.1.1 Audit committees 
The new law has introduced an audit committee to monitor the business of JSC.180 
Moreover, a whole Chapter (4) has been dedicated to dealing with this essential 
issue as an important tool of corporate governance. Article 101 states that the 
formation of this committee must be by a resolution of the General Assembly and 
contain non-executive members of the board of directors, whether shareholders or 
others; the number of this committee’s members shall not be less than three and 
no more than five, and the decision must include determining the tasks, functions 
and the rewards of the committee members. For the meeting of the committee, 
Article 102 states that the majority of the committee must attend the meeting for it 
to be valid, and the decisions to be issued must gain the majority vote. However, in 
the case of a draw of votes, the side where the meeting chairman votes will be 
taken. Article 103 clarifies the specialisation and power of the committee as 
monitoring the company's activities. Even more so, the committee has the power to 
call for a general assembly if the committee is facing obstacles from the board of 
directors, or if the company has suffered damage or serious crisis. Finally, the 
Audit Committee must review the company's financial statements, reports and 
observations provided by the auditor; the committee must provide a report about 
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their opinion and the adequacy of the internal control system in the company and 
other work within its competence, as detailed in Article 104.181 Around ten years 
ago, Article 14 of Corporate governance regulations dealt in more detail with the 
audit committee, which was made a mandatory Article in 
2009.182 
4.3.1.2 Cumulative voting 
The new law also introduced cumulative voting in the election of the Board of 
Directors. Accordingly, Article 95 states that cumulative voting must be used in the 
election of the board of directors, so that individuals may not use the right to vote 
more than once per share. 183  It is worth mentioning in this context that the 
corporate governance regulations mention cumulative voting for the election of the 
Board of Directors in Article 6 paragraph B. Cumulative Voting is a voting method 
that is used to select the members of the board of directors. It should be mentioned 
in this context that cumulative voting is a US idea that is not used in English 
Law.184 CMA has explained this method as follows: ‘Each shareholder can cast a 
vote in proportion to the number of shares he owns. So he can use this power to 
vote for one candidate, or divide it on a number of candidates without repetition’.185 
The importance of this method is based on increasing the opportunity of the 
minority shareholders to have representation to be in the board of directors.186 
4.3.1.3 Prohibition on combing the post of Board Chairman with an 
Executive position 
The third point is that the Companies Law 2015 prohibits combining the post of 
Chairman of the Board of directors and any other executive position in the 
company in Article 81 paragraph 1.  On the other hand, Article 12 paragraph D of 
the CGR mention the prohibition of combining the post of Chairman of the Board of 
directors and any executive position in the company. However, paragraph D of 
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182 Corporate governance regulations 2006.	
183	CL 2015.	
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(2015) 12 European Company and Financial Law Review 79.	
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Article 12 is still not mandatory in the corporate governance regulations, which 
means that from April 2016, the prohibition of combining the post of Chairman of 
the Board of directors and any other executive position in the company will be in 
force according to Article 81 paragraph 1 of the Companies Law 2015. 
4.3.1.4 Types of Companies  
The old Companies Law involved three rarely used forms of corporate entity under 
which are no longer permitted by the new Law. These are – namely - Cooperative 
Companies, partnerships limited by shares and Variable Capital Companies 
(Article 3). Accordingly, the main forms of corporate entity used will continue to be 
the Limited Liability Company (LLC) or Joint Stock Company (JSC). 
Additionally, Articles 182-186 contain specific provisions introduced to govern the 
establishment of a holding company (either by way of LLC or JSC) for controlling 
other JSCs or LLCs by holding more than 50% of their capital or through board 
control.  Any such new holding company will have to include the word “holding” in 
their name and produce annual consolidated financial accounts. 
One of the most significant changes in practice is Article 154 providing that LLCs 
can be formed under the new law with a single shareholder, replacing the 
requirement pursuant to the old law for a minimum of two shareholders. Moreover, 
JSCs can presently be formed with two shareholders reduced from the earlier 
requirement of a minimum of five shareholders.  Also in certain cases (JSCs 
formed by the Government or Government owned entities or formed by entities 
with a minimum of SAR 5 million) closed JSCs may be formed with a single 
shareholder (Articles 2 and 55). 
Pursuant to Article 54, the minimum share capital requirement for JSCs is reduced 
from SAR 2 million to SAR 500,000. There continues to be no minimum capital 
requirement for LLCs, although in practice if the LLC or JSC is foreign invested the 
Saudi Arabian General Investment Agency (SAGIA) may impose a higher minimum 
capital requirement. Additionally, Article 61 provides that in-kind share contributions 
for both LLCs and JSCs must now be independently valued. 
 
Another major change is the removal of the provision contained in the earlier 
Companies Law which makes shareholders in LLCs jointly liable for the debts of an 




decision to recapitalize or liquidate the company and the company continues to 
trade.  Instead a new provision provides for termination of the company by 
operation of law if either the managers of the LLC take no steps to call a 
shareholder meeting or the shareholders take no action (Article 181).  There are 
also analogous revisions around the process for termination where a JSC’s losses 
exceed 50% of its share capital (Article 150).  
 
There continues to be a requirement for LLCs and JSCs to set aside 10% of net 
profits as a statutory reserve, but this is no longer needed once the reserve attains 
30% of the share capital.  This is a reduction from the earlier requirement of 50% of 
share capital (Articles 129 and 130 for JSC and Article 176 for LLCs). An LLC will 
be required to undertake a conversion to a JSC if the number of its shareholders 
increases beyond 50 (Article 151). 
4.3.1.5 Absence of a general duty of loyalty 
It was argued in section (4.2.8.2), that the fact that the old Companies Law did not 
explicitly impose a general duty of loyalty on directors to their company needs to be 
considered in potential corporate reforms. The new Companies Law does not, 
however, change the substance of the situation which prevailed under the old law. 
While, on the one hand, a general duty of loyalty appears to be founded in the 
more concrete duties bestowed on directors by the Companies Law such as 
Articles 71 and 72 of the Companies Law, Article 75 (1), on the other hand 
provides for the principle regulation on the powers of directors only to the extent 
that directors must have the "widest authority" to manage the company and does 
not limit such powers to the objective of the company.  
 
Moreover, as discussed in section (5.3.2), a general duty of loyalty in the Saudi 
legal system is derived from Sharia law. This duty may be derived from the 
director's classification as an agent of the company's shareholders or as trustee of 
the shareholders' assets. Regardless which understanding of the director's position 
is applied, the doctrine generally accepts that Sharia law compels a director to act 




4.3.1.6 Liability under Companies Law 
The issue of management liability is regulated for both JSCs and LLCs in individual 
sections of the new Companies Law. LLC managers responsibilities are governed 
by Article 165 (2), while JSC directors' liability is regulated by Article 78 (1) of the 
Companies Law. However, both provisions stipulate that persons engaged in the 
management of a company will be individually and jointly liable towards the 
company, its shareholders and third parties for the following acts: 
- violations of their duties under the Companies Law; 
- breaches of the company's articles; and 
- errors of management. 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that the above Articles (78 (1) and 165 (2)) do not 
expressly mention Directors liability for fraudulent acts. Nonetheless, since both 
articles stipulated extended statutes of limitation for fraudulent acts (Articles 78(3) 
and 165(4) of the Companies Law), it is clear that they both establish management 
liability for fraudulent acts. 
 
Moreover, where any misconduct that would prompt liability of JSC directors under 
Article 78 (1) of the Companies Law is based on a unanimous decision of the board 
of directors, all board members will be held liable. As for majority decisions, those 
directors who opposes a majority decision cannot be held accountable, provided 
that their objection was recorded in the minutes of the relevant board meeting. A 
director that was absent from the board meeting during which a decision prompting 
management liability was made will not be released from liability under Article 78(1) 
of the Companies Law, unless he or she can establish that he or she was unaware 
of the decision or unable to object to the decision after becoming aware of it (Article 
78 (2) of the Companies Law).187  
4.3.1.7 Infringement of Director duties 
The duties of a manager of an LLC are not explicitly regulated by the Companies 
Law. However, based on the generally accepted conventional wisdom that the 
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duties of JSC directors in the old Saudi Arabian Companies Law (Royal Decree 
M/6 of 1385 Hijri) applied analogously to LLC managers it could be argued that the 
same understanding will be applied to the new Companies Law, and the articles of 
the Companies Law governing the liability of JSC directors will be applied to LLC 
management particularly because the management liability regime was not 
changed within the new Companies Law.188 This interpretation is, however, subject 
to confirmation by the Saudi Arabian courts when the law is fully applied. It is 
should be recalled though that even if the courts were to change their position with 
the new Companies Law, the duties imposed on JSC directors by the Companies 
Law are founded in Sharia law. Therefore, the same duties imposed on JSC 
directors under the Companies Law would apply to LLC managers under Sharia 
law, which remains applicable due to the priority of Sharia law over codifications of 
Saudi Arabian law.  
4.3.1.8 Infringement of company's articles 
The Companies Law does not explicitly state that the duties of a director may be 
expended in the company's articles. However, this follows indirectly from the fact 
that the articles of association of a company may deviate from the Companies Law, 
insofar as the articles do not conflict with any binding provisions of the Companies 
Law. Thus, the company's articles may not relieve the director from any duties 
imposed by the Companies Law though they may introduce additional duties. 
Considering the existing ambiguity regarding the analogous application of the 
provisions governing the duties of JSC directors to LLC managers, it is, for the 
sake of clarity, advisable to include these duties in the articles of an LLC 
incorporated in Saudi Arabia. In addition, foreign investors frequently choose to 
impose further duties and restriction of authority on directors and managers 
through the company's articles or other agreements to extend control over local 
management. As Articles 78(1) and 165(2) of the Companies Law refer only to the 
company's articles, their wording suggests that a breach of an obligation imposed 
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on a director in an agreement other than the company's articles will not prompt 
management liability therein. If this were the case, the relevant director(s) may be 
held responsible under contractual or possibly tortious liability.(19) 
Error of management 
 
Neither Article 78(1) nor Article 165(2) of the Companies Law define what 
constitutes an 'error of management' that would prompt liability of management 
under these provisions. Thus, even minor mistakes could produce management 
liability according to Articles 78(1) and 165(2) of the Companies Law. Since this 
would significantly hinder the operation of a company, economic considerations 
suggest that an error of management within the meaning of Articles 78(1) and 
165(2) should be interpreted more restrictively. Nonetheless, since no relevant 
jurisprudence is available from the Saudi Arabian courts, it is unclear whether the 
courts would follow this interpretation. 
4.3.1.9 Prohibition of competition 
Pursuant to Article 72 of the new Companies Law, a director may not engage in 
any commercial activity that is in competition with a business activity carried out by 
the company or conduct business in any branch of the activities carried out by the 
company, unless with the permission of the company. Permission must be issued 
by resolution of the general assembly and renewed every year. Notably, Article 72 
of the Companies Law does not address the issue of a director competing with the 
company for third-party accounts. However, such a duty is established by Islamic 
law.(15) Considering the priority of Sharia law over the Companies Law, it is 
immaterial whether Article 72 of the Companies Law prohibits directors from 
competing with the company for third-party accounts. Where a director infringes 
this obligation, the company may choose to seek compensation under Article 78(1) 
of the Companies Law or consider the relevant transaction to be executed in its 
name and for its benefit (Article 72 of the Companies Law). Considering that the 
non-competition obligation is, among other things, founded in Sharia law, the 
manager of an LLC is bound to it regardless of whether Article 72 of the 




4.3.1.10 Prohibition of self-dealing 
Article 71 of the Companies Law prohibits directors from having a direct or indirect 
interest in any transaction or contract concluded for the account of the company. 
Where a director contravenes this ban, he or she will be liable for any damage or 
loss caused to the company, its shareholders or third parties in this regard (Articles 
71 and 78(1) of the Companies Law). Directors will typically be released by a 
resolution of the general assembly, which must be renewed annually. Whether 
Article 71 of the Companies Law can be applied analogously to managers of an 
LLC is irrelevant, since the same obligation exists under Islamic law as applied in 
Saudi Arabia. 
4.3.1.11 Duty to call extraordinary meeting of general assembly 
Article 181 of the Companies Law If the losses of an LLC reach 50% of its capital – 
thus, its liabilities amount to the value of its assets, plus 50% of its capital – the 
manager(s) must, within 90 days of becoming aware of such losses, convene an 
extraordinary meeting of the general assembly to consider whether to continue or 
dissolve the LLC. Where the shareholders resolve to continue the company, they 
must cover the losses of the company so that the company's assets amount to 
100% of its capital. 
A similar requirement exists for JSCs. Article 150 of the Companies Law requires 
the directors of a JSC to convene an extraordinary meeting of the company's 
general assembly within 45 days of discovering that the losses of the company 
reached 50% of its capital in order to decide whether the company will be dissolved 
or its capital increased. Where managers or directors fail to comply with this duty, 
they may not only be held liable under Articles 78(1) and 165(2) of the Companies 
Law, but also may face punitive penalties pursuant to Article 211(d) of the 
Companies Law. 
4.3.1.12 Lack of statutory definition of fraudulent act and abuse of 
authority 
The liability of JSC directors and LLC managers for damages or loss caused by 
their fraudulent actions is provided for by Articles 78(1), 78(3), 165(2) and 164(4) of 
the Companies Law. However, what constitutes a fraudulent act is not defined by 




– as a fact – of something untrue by someone who does not believe his or her 
statement to be true; or the suppression of that which is true by someone with 
knowledge of that fact. 
Similarly, Directors' liability for abuse of their authority is also not mentioned in 
Articles 78(1) and 165(2) of the Companies Law. Further, a duty not to exploit 
managerial powers is not expressly mentioned in the Companies Law. 
Nevertheless, management liability for abuse of authority is generally considered to 
be established by Sharia rules. 
4.3.1.13 Penalties and punitive measures 
Chapter 11 of the new Companies law deals with penalties. Accordingly, directors 
may be subject to legal penalties pursuant to Article 212 and following of the 
Companies Law. The most severe penalties are provided for in Article 211 of the 
Companies Law, which stipulates that a director may be punished by incarceration 
for up to five years or a fine of up to Sr5 million for conduct (eg, misuse of funds 
and forgery of a company's financial records) listed in Articles 211(a) through 
211(e) of the Companies Law. Notably, Article 211(d) of the Companies Law 
penalises directors for failing to call for an extraordinary meeting of the general 
assembly pursuant to Articles 150 and 181 of the Companies Law. Somewhat less 
severe punishments for misconducted are provided for in Article 212 of the 
Companies Law, which penalises making misrepresentations regarding the 
company to the public with imprisonment of up to one year and/or fines of up to Sr1 
million. Finally, certain lesser offenses may be punishable by fines of up to 
SR500,000 pursuant to Article 213 of the Companies Law. These include, among 
other things, not calling for the regular annual general assembly or preventing a 
shareholder from participating in a general assembly. 
 
While penalties under Articles 211 and 212 of the Companies Law will be imposed 
by public prosecution, fines according to Article 213 of the Companies Law will be 
imposed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Investment) or the Capital 
Market Authority. 
Some examples of criminal acts that give rise to fines of up to 500,000 Riyals 




1. deciding, distributing or collecting, with bad intention, profits or revenues in 
breach of the provisions of the New Companies Law or the company's 
articles of association; 
2. intentionally causing the delay of the invitation or meeting of the general 
assembly; 
3. obtaining a benefit or a guarantee or a promise of a benefit or guarantee for 
voting in a certain way; and 
4. failing to prepare meeting minutes as per the New Companies Law. 
 
Some examples of criminal acts that give rise to fines of up to SAR 1,000,000 
and/or imprisonment of up to one year under the New Companies Law include: 
1. declaring, publishing, or announcing the incorporation of a company before 
completion of its incorporation procedures; 
2. intentionally making false statements against the provisions of the law or the 
company's articles of association in any documents of the company, in the 
application for licensing, or in the documents attached with the incorporation 
application; 
3. exaggerating or attributing to shareholders or third parties false 
acknowledgments regarding the evaluation of in-kind shares, distribution of 
dividends among shareholders, or payment of their values; and 
4. using the company for a purpose other than the purpose for which the 
company is licensed. 
 
Some examples of criminal acts that give rise to fines of up to SAR 5,000,000 
and/or imprisonment of up to five years under the New Companies Law include: 
1. Registering false or misleading information in the financial statements or in 
the reports prepared for the shareholders or the general assembly. 
2. Using company funds, or using one's powers or votes in a way that one 
knows would affect the company's interests in order to achieve a personal 
gain for oneself or any other person or company. 
3. Failing to hold the general assembly of the company or shareholders 
meeting when one becomes aware that the losses of the company have 
reached the limits established in the New Companies law, or failing to 




becoming aware of the losses; the actor does not need to know that failure 
to hold the meeting is a breach of the law in order to become liable). 
4.3.2 The new Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 
In addition to the New Companies Law 2015 discussed above, another milestone 
development in the Saudi legislative framework of corporate governance is the 
issuance of the new Corporate Governance Regulations pursuant to the resolution 
of CMA board dated 16/5/1438H corresponding to 13/2/2017. The new Regulations 
replace the earlier Corporate Governance Regulation of 2006. They have formally 
come into effect on 22 April 2017, although some provisions, such as those 
requiring corporate governance policies to be drafted and published, will only come 
into force on 31 December 2017.   
 
Pursuant to Article 3, the main objectives of the new Regulations include the 
following:  
1) enhancing the role of the company’s shareholders and facilitating the 
exercise of their rights; 
2) Stating the competencies and responsibilities of the Board and the 
Executive Management; 
3) enhancing the role of the Board and the committees and developing their 
capabilities to enhance the Company’s decision making mechanisms; 
4) achieving transparency, impartiality and equity in the Exchange, its 
transactions, and the business environment and enhance disclosure therein; 
5) providing effective and balanced tools to deal with conflicts of interest; 
6) enhancing accountability and control mechanisms for the Company’s 
employees; 
7) establishing the general framework for dealing with Stakeholders and 
protecting their rights;  
8) supporting the effectiveness of the system for overseeing Companies and 
the tools thereof; and  
9) raising the awareness of Companies in respect of the concept of 
professional conduct and encouraging them to adopt and develop such 





Arguably, both the new Companies Law 2015 and CG Regulations 2017 reflect 
inspiration partly by corporate governance models and standards from other 
jurisdictions. In particular, in the drafting process both the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry and the CMA took into account, amongst other things, the corporate 
governance recommendations articulated by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development189, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision190, 
the International Corporate Governance Network191, the Institute of International 
Finance192, the Financial Reporting Council193, other Gulf Cooperation Council 
member states, and by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency in respect of banking 
institutions194 and insurance companies.195 
 
In comparison to the old Corporate Governance Regulations (2006), the main 
characteristics of the new Corporate Governance Regulations can be summarised 
in the following subsections.  
4.3.2.1 The mandatory nature of the new Regulations 2017 
The new Corporate Governance Regulations (2017) depart significantly from the 
voluntary mode of application which characterised the old Regulations.196 Rather 
than being merely ‘guiding principles’ Article 2 (b) states that the new Regulations 
‘are mandatory to companies except the provisions that contain a reference of 
being guiding’.197 Thus, the new Regulation can be characterised as principally 




190 See: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf 










196 Article 1 (b) of the old Regulations states that: ’These Regulations constitute guiding principles ..’. 
197 There are a few Articles and paragraphs defined as ‘guiding’ in the new Regulations including the 
following: - Art 18 on the Conditions of the membership of the Boards; paragraph (b) of Art. 32 providing 
that ‘The Board shall convene no less than four meetings per year and no less than one meeting every three 
months’; Art 38 on Qualifications of the Secretary; Art 39 on Training and Art 41 on Assessment of Board 
members; paragraph (b) of Art 54 stating: ‘The chairman of the audit committee shall be an Independent 





The new Regulations provide shareholders and board members with improved 
rights, greater clarity and more transparency as to their respective roles and 
responsibilities. In addition, they envisage shared regulatory jurisdiction to oversee 
their implementation. Accordingly, the MoCI shall be responsible for the 
implementation of the Regulations by closed joint stock companies, while the CMA 
shall be responsible for their implementation by public joint stock companies. 
 
Evidently, the new Regulations demonstrate the desire to renew, emphasize and 
prioritize corporate governance regulations in a more practical manner in Saudi 
Arabia. In particular they emphasize the importance of corporate governance in 
ensuring the proper investment of a company's resources, with a clear statement of 
the objectives and of the rights and obligations of Stakeholders.  
 
The issuing authorities stated that the rewards reaped from the implementation of 
proper corporate governance would extend beyond individual companies and 
would benefit the Saudi Arabian society and economy as a whole. Moreover, the 
regulations also stress the importance for companies to encourage fluid and 
regular interactions internally at all levels in order to achieve their best interests. 
Recognizing that Shareholders ordinarily do not follow a company' day-to-day 
activities, the regulations underline the need to regulate the relationship between, 
on one hand, the company's Shareholders and Board of Directors and, on the 
other, between its Board of Directors and its Executives. The regulations further 
emphasize the need to regulate individual conduct at all levels to ensure the 
application of high professional and moral discipline. 
4.3.2.2 A new regime of greater transparency 
Furthermore, the Regulations reiterate the importance for companies to adopt 
clear, efficient and sound decision-making processes. First and foremost, these 
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processes help protect shareholders and stakeholders. In addition, however, they 
also serve to advance companies' competitiveness and transparency on capital 
markets. According to the regulatory authorities, imposing greater transparency 
requirements on corporate managerial bodies would enhance companies' 
performance since they will be left accountable to all capital market participants, 
including investors, brokers and market analysts. 
4.3.2.3 Shareholder Rights 
Key rights are set out in Articles 4 to 15 of the Regulations and include: fair and 
equal treatment among shareholders, non-discrimination among shareholders of 
the same class, fair distributions, equal rights related to access of corporate 
information and communications, rights to attend and vote in general assemblies 
and board and audit member selections. The Regulation also provide for clear 
mechanisms for the distribution of dividends and insolvency pay-outs. 
 
In particular, fair treatment of shareholders requires the following: 
a) The Board is obliged to seek shareholders' rights protection to ensure fairness 
and equality among them.  
b) The Board and the Executive Management of the Company is obliged not to 
discriminate among shareholders who own the same class of shares nor prevent 
them from accessing any of their rights.  
c) The Company shall specify in its internal policies the procedures that are 
necessary to guarantee that all shareholders exercise their rights. 
4.3.2.4 Board of Directors 
Detailed rules and principles governing board of directors (which also include that 
of the chairman, independent directors and the secretary of the board) (together, 
the Board) are set out Articles 16 to 41 of the Regulations and cover matters 
including: board formation, composition, appointment, conditions of membership, 
termination, responsibilities, main functions, independence, distribution of 
competencies and duties (including vis-à-vis those in executive management 
positions), agenda setting, meeting procedures, auditing, and training. 
Furthermore, the Regulations enshrine the fiduciary duties to adhere to the 




4.3.2.5 Conflicts of Interest 
The Regulations also cover the Board’s avoidance, assessment and disclosure of 
(and dealings with) conflict of interest situations. There is a need to establish 
policies and procedures in relation to related party transactions, conflicts scenarios 
(with or for the company or its competitors), conflicted persons, accepting gifts, and 
complying with the authorization, renewal and termination of the board and its 
members, as per the Companies Law. 
4.3.2.6 Committees 
Provisions dealing with the formation, composition, membership, powers, 
procedures, responsibilities, policies, meetings and announcements of committees 
for remuneration, risk management, audit, corporate governance and nomination 
are set out in Articles 83 to 88 of the Regulations.  
4.3.2.7 Audit and Internal Control 
Also outlined are the requirements as to the composition, appointment, roles and 
responsibilities of internal and external auditors. Listed companies should have 
internal control systems in place, along with audit plans and regular published 
reports. Listed companies must also maintain policies on effective corporate 
governance, and have an internal corporate governance committee regularly 
review compliance. 
4.3.2.8 Stakeholder rights 
Boards of listed companies are now required to produce policies on their dealings 
with various stakeholders, including employees and incentives given to them. 
These drafted policies should describe how to protect their respective rights, deal 
with complaints, confidentiality of information, professional conduct, social 
contributions, treatment of employees, and dealing with non-compliance with these 
policies and procedures. Employee incentive schemes and payouts must be 
documented. Separate policies governing professional and ethical corporate 





4.3.2.9 General Disclosures and Transparency 
There is a general requirement to disclose and make available up-to-date and 
accurate information to the company’s various stakeholders. The board must 
maintain policies on information disclosure, and provide a regular board report 
along with that of the audit committee’s report and regularly maintain information 
on the company’s website. Remuneration of board members and the executive 
management must be disclosed pursuant to a standard template, as set out in the 
Regulations. All records of the company must be maintained for a period of ten 
years, or longer if, any potential claims are pending.  
4.3.3 Summary of findings 
As already mentioned above, the practical implementation of the new Companies 
Law and the Corporate Regulations 2017 will doubtless have to cascade through 
other relevant agencies such as SAGIA and it will take some time for custom and 
practice to adjust.  However, by trimming the length of the primary law and 
enabling more detail to be addressed through subordinate regulation, it is 
envisaged that in future the corporate legal framework will be more responsive to 
wider global trends in regulation.  
 
1. Despite the fact that many issues remain unresolved, it is fair to say that 
Companies Law 2015 has provided a more suitable legal framework for 
corporate governance that contributes towards more practical, effective, fair 
and sound corporate governance principles. 
2. It could be argued that the Companies Law 2015 reform has reinforced 
some of the corporate governance issues that are already included in 2006 
corporate governance regulations.  
3. Without touching on the broader institutional issues and challenges of the 
Saudi framework of corporate governance discussed in section (3.1.1), the 
new Companies Law has solved the issue of a clash between Companies 
Law 1965 and Capital Market Law 2003 by determining the respective 
authorities and competence of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and 




4. The new Companies Law has encouraged institutional work in order to 
achieve sustainability and growth for companies by facilitating the 
requirements for establishing a joint stock company by reducing the 
minimum capital to 500,000 Saudi Riyal instead of 2000.000, thereby 
reducing the minimum number of partners to two instead of five, and 
introducing the one person company.  
5. The new Companies Law enhanced the fair treatment for all partners, and 
promoting the rights of parties involved with the companies, and providing 
them with the necessary protection through the prohibition of combining the 
post of chairman of the board and any executive position of the company, 
and making cumulative voting in the election of the Board of Directors 
compulsory.  
6. The new Companies Law included a number of improvements to minority 
shareholder protection including: (1) only permitting shareholders to 
nominate board members in accordance with the shareholder’s share 
percentage; (2) mandating cumulative voting for board appointments; (3) 
requiring each JSC to have a general assembly-appointed audit committee 
separate from the JSC’s board of directors; and (4) further empowering 
shareholders to bring actions against the board of directors, including the 
right of shareholders representing at least 5% of the shareholding in a JSC 
to require an investigation by a competent authority.  
7. Compared to the old Corporate Governance Regulations 2006, the New 
Corporate Governance Regulations (2017) constitute a paradigmatic shift 
from a voluntary toward mandatory character of the regulations. Rather than 
being merely ‘guiding principles’ Article 2 (b) states that the new Regulations 
‘are mandatory to companies except the provisions that contain a reference 
of being guiding’. This also constitutes a shift from ‘comply-or-explain’ 
approach adopted in the old Corporate Governance Regulations 2006. 
8. The new Companies Law does not, however, change the substance of the 
situation which prevailed under the old law with regard to the question of a 
Directors duty of loyalty. While, on the one hand, a general duty of loyalty 
appears to be founded in the more concrete duties bestowed on directors by 
the Companies Law such as Articles 71 and 72 of the Companies Law, 




powers of directors only to the extent that directors must have the "widest 
authority" to manage the company and does not limit such powers to the 
objective of the company. As recommended in Chapter (8), this shortcoming 
could be rectified through the adoption of a Saudi Code of Sharia Principles 
of Corporate Governance to complement and reinforce the existing laws and 
regulations. 
9. The new Companies Law enhanced the penalties to improve transparency 
and disclosure; it has increased penalties for this to 5,000,000 Saudi Riyal, 
and prison sentences can reach up to five years, whereas penalties used to 
not exceed 20,000 Saudi Riyal and no more than one year in prison for the 





5. Chapter Five: Islamic Principles and Good Corporate 
Governances 
 
The study of corporate governance within the context of the Saudi legal system 
raises a number of theoretical and practical challenges. On the one hand, and as 
already discussed in chapter 1 (section 1.1.2), the foundations of the Saudi legal 
system are deeply rooted in traditional Islamic Shari’a principles. In turn, Shari’a 
represents the Muslim religious law with historical foundations dating to the 7th 
century CE. Comparatively, on the other hand, and as already discussed in chapter 
2, corporate governance is a modern phenomenon and a feature of contemporary 
societies. It has relatively recently gained widespread international attention and 
acceptance, particularly from the 1960s onwards. Thus, the juxtaposition of these 
two in the Saudi context raises the following questions: is the legal foundation of 
Saudi Arabia, i.e. traditional Islamic law, compatible with modern corporate 
governance? And to what extent are the two compatible? In other words are they 
reconcilable? Additionally, if Islamic law is theoretically compatible with the tenets 
of modern corporate governance how can this compatibility be practically 
implemented in the Saudi legal frameworks of corporate governance? 
In response to such questions some authors maintain that there is inevitably a 
dichotomy between Islamic law and modern principles of corporate governance. 
This position is based on the view that Islamic law has for centuries been rigidified 
into of ‘fixed corpus of doctrines considered divine and unchangeable’198 and has 
thus been progressively overtaken by social and economic developments. 
Consequently, Islamic law is, for such authors, not merely incompatible with 
corporate governance but is irreconcilable with the modern way of life more 
generally.  
In contrast, a growing number of both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars 
increasingly dispute the view that there is an inherent dichotomy between Islamic 
law and modern corporate governance. These latter authors maintain that, when 
correctly construed, Islamic law is essentially compatible with modernity including 
																																								 																				




compatibility with good corporate governance. 199  As we shall see from the 
discussion and analysis in this chapter this approach departs from commonly 
uninformed readings of Islam and elaborates arguments based on meticulous 
consideration of the essence of Islamic religious and legal principles. 
Hence, this chapter will be particularly dedicated to the analysis of the Islamic 
theory of corporate governance and its compatibility or otherwise with modern 
corporate governance. This discussion will be developed gradually. Section 5.1 
provides introductory background to the sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence. 
Section 5.2 analyses the Islamic concept and protection of private ownership rights 
particularly because their fundamental role in the conceptual edifice of corporate 
governance.  
Section 5.3 provides in-depth analysis of the Islamic theory of corporate 
governance. It starts in section 5.3.1 with a discussion of the basis of corporate 
governance in Islam and a discussion of specifically Islamic concepts of Wakala 
(fiduciary), accountability and Trust and Wakf, disclosure rules and Gharar or 
uncertainty in subsections 5.3.2 – 5.3.4 
5.1 Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 
The Islamic rules and principle pertaining to legal matters are collectively known as 
Shari’a which forms a central part of the Islamic tradition.200 According to Islamic 
jurisprudence, Shari’a derives its rules and principles from four sources: The 
Quran, the Sunnah, Qiyas and Ijma. 
The Quran is the holly book of the Muslim religion and the primary source of 
Shari’a rules and principles. Muslims believe that it contains the actual and final 
words of God which the prophet Mohammad transmitted to all mankind thus 
forming the basic and eternal teachings of the Islamic faith. God’s words speak in 
the Quran as follows: 
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“Today I have perfected your religious law (din) for you, and have 
bestowed upon you the full measure of My blessings, and willed 
that self-surrender (al-islam) unto Me shall be your religion (din).” 
[5:3]201 
“Unto every [community] of you have We appointed a law [shari’a] 
and a way of life …” [5:48] 
“But for people (of) certainty, who could be a better law-giver than 
God (ahsanu min allahi hukman)..” [5:50] 
The Quran was revealed verbally and gradually to the Prophet Mohamed in the 
period between 609 to 632 CE, the year of the Prophet’s death. During his life-time, 
the Prophet’s companions served as scribes and wrote down the Quranic 
revelations in Arabic. The Caliph Uthman, the third successor of the Prophet 
Mohammad, collected the various written parts into the standard version which has 
since been regarded as the authentic version. The text of the Quran is divided into 
chapters each of which is known in Arabic as surah, and each surah is divided into 
verses known as ayah.  
The Quran also commands mankind to obey the prophet Mohammad.  
“O you who have attained to faith! Pay heed unto God, and pay heed unto the 
Apostle and unto those from among you who have been entrusted with 
authority …”[4.59] 
 
Accordingly, the Sunnah (authentic hadith) which is the verbally transmitted record 
of the teachings, deeds and sayings, silent permissions (or disapprovals) of the 
prophet Muhammad is regarded by Muslim as the second source of Shari’a.  The 
Sunnah is also defined as "a path, a way, a manner of life"; "all the traditional and 
practical, of the prophet that "have become models to be followed" by Muslims. 




201 Translation of Quaranic verses in this thesis are based on Muhammad Asad’s The Message Of The Quran, 
(Dar Al-Andalus Ltd, 1980). The first of the numbers in the square brackets refers to the number of surah and 




While being fundamental and primary sources, the Quran and the Sunnah may not 
be readily applicable to some novel situations which may arise in practical life. For 
this reason qiyas (analogical reasoning) is introduced to derive religious or legal 
solution to such novel situations. Accordingly, qiyas is basically a process of 
deductive analogy in which the teachings of the Sunnah are compared and 
contrasted with those of the Qur'an, in order to apply a known injunction (nass) to a 
new circumstance and create a new injunction. Here the ruling of the Sunnah and 
the Qur'an may be used as a means to solve or provide a response to a new 
problem that may arise. This, however, is only the case providing that the set 
precedent or paradigm and the new problem that has come about will share 
operative causes. 
 
The final source of Shari’a rules is ijma (juridical consensus) which refers to the 
consensus or agreement of the Muslim scholars basically on religious issues. 
Various schools of thought within Islamic jurisprudence202 (madhahib) may define 
this consensus to be that of the first generation of Muslims only; or the consensus 
of the first three generations of Muslims; or the consensus of the jurists and 
scholars of the Muslim world, or scholarly consensus; or the consensus of all the 
Muslim world, both scholars and laymen. 
 
5.2 The Concept and Protection of Private Ownership in Islam 
As discussed in chapter (2), the concept of corporate governance emerged and 
developed within the liberal capitalist economic system. It is interesting to note that 
it has, nonetheless, attracted attention and application also in socialist or 
centralized economies as well post-socialist systems.203 Naturally, however, the 
application of corporate governance in the capitalist and socialist systems 
engendered approaches and challenges pertaining to their respective conceptual 
and structural differences and constraints. Notably, social and political coercion 
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coupled with the concentration of decision-making power and allocation of 
resources within vigorously selected elite played an important role in impeding the 
development of corporate governance in socialist systems. But the most important 
impeding factor has been the lack of transparency within the authority relations in 
political and managerial levels which allowed ample opportunity for abuse of power 
at all levels. Consequently, the socialist systems severely lacked the notion of 
economic rationality which is fundamental to corporate governance; it became an 
alien concept, or a second rate objective, the first one being political discipline.  
 
As we shall see in the following discussion, the Islamic socio-economic precepts 
involve both socialist and capitalist doctrines. However, the Islamic concept of 
ownership and rights can more largely be approximated to a liberal, free market 
approach.204 Commercial investment is an economic activity that Islam particularly 
encourages, and personal ownership is fully protected; therefore, economic 
freedom in an Islamic society necessitates that the Islamic government adopts 
policies and passes laws that enable all members of the Islamic society to engage 
in free economic activities. Consequently, the stringent socialist constraints on 
private ownership and social coercion are neither prescribed nor practised 
pursuant to Islam. According to Islamic law everyone is entitled to engage in free 
economic activities and to work and earn their living as Islam invariably encourages 
trade and commerce as long as it is conducted within the framework of Islamic 
law.205 
5.2.1 Regulation of corporations in Islam 
Moreover, Islam has also laid down rules for ownership and designated various 
rules to govern the relation of individuals when they intend to join efforts and 
resources together and distribute the resulting profits amongst themselves. In 
Islam, a company (i.e. Sharikah) is essentially regarded as a contract where people 
come to work together and eventually distribute the resulting profit between 
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them.206 Thus, a company is conceived in Islam as a contractual relationship, and 
Islam has laid out detailed rules for contracts; some notes might be needed to shed 
light on the law of companies from this prospective of Islamic law.  
As conceived Islamic law, a contract is fundamentally the results from the 
exchange of offer and acceptance between given parties with the view of 
establishing or transferring a right (e.g. over certain thing in course of trade). Thus, 
there are two or more parties in the formation of a company (i.e. partners); there is 
the work which one or more of them assumes, the business of the company, and 
the profit to be distributed, all forming the subject matter of the contract. 
Accordingly, a company contract as per Islamic law can be defined as follows: The 
Sharika (Company) is an agreement between two or more people to do some type 
of work in order to make profit and then to distribute the profit ratio according to 
what is agreed in the contract.207 
5.2.2 The protection of private rights in Islam 
A corollary to the Islamic recognition of private property is the principle of property 
rights in Islam which provides a comprehensive framework to identify, recognize, 
respect and protect the interests and rights of every individual, community, state, 
and corporation. It is worth noting that ownership rights including acquisition, usage 
and disposition of the property itself are considered as property (al-mal) which is a 
generic Islamic law term that refers to whatever has beneficial use and value in 
dealing. In terms of the rights of ownership, Islam declares that Allah is the sole 
owner of property, and the human being is merely a trustee and custodian in whom 
it implies the recognition to use and manage the properties in accordance with the 
Islamic Law rules.208 
Being the principal source of Islamic law, Al-Quran emphasizes the principle of 
property rights in various verses. For example, Allah says: 
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“BELIEVE in God and His Apostle, and spend on others out of that of which 
He has made you trustees ….” (57:7). 
The implied meaning of this verse lays down the principle of property’s ownership, 
where mankind is regarded merely as a trustee of God in the things over which he 
enjoys temporal ownership. Islam recognizes private, society or state ownership.209 
The same concept of ownership also applies to the recognition of individual 
ownership of shares in corporations. At the same time, Islamic law rules provide 
intensive guidelines to individuals, corporations and the state on how to deal with 
the property ownership. Therefore, it can be fairly said that the concept of property 
rights in Islam is based on these fundamental principles. For instance, rights on 
property are subject to stipulations laid down by Islamic law; the enjoyment of 
rights on property is balanced with the rights of society, the state, and individual.  
The society and the state are stakeholders and the recognition of rights of 
stakeholders are granted in Islamic law.210 
Thus, in corporate governance terms, Islam recognizes and legitimizes both 
shareholder and stakeholder rights. On the one hand, increasing the wealth of 
shareholders (owners) and their investments value is recognized as a legitimate 
objective. Investors provide their subscription to the capital of a company for the 
sake of receiving the eligible dividend, and they expect the stock price to increase. 
Equally, the rights of stakeholders are recognized and legitimized. Corporate 
activity is required to take into account other considerations just as good 
governance should strike the optimal balance between this consideration 
(shareholder value) 211 and the need to guard the interests of other stakeholders 
who also have interests in the business of the company (stakeholder value). 212  
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5.3 The Islamic Theory of Corporate Governance 
As mentioned above, some authors advance the thesis that Islam is inconsistent 
with modern corporate governance. They suggest the existence of an unbridgeable 
gap between Islam and modern economic concepts which have been developed in 
the West. For example, E. Sivan in his book Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and 
Modern Politics asserts that Islamic revival‑while activist and militant‑ is thus 
essentially defensive; a sort of holding operation against modernity” and 
accordingly concludes that: [W]estern investment means the integration of the 
Islamic world into the system of the multinationals, which is totally alien to Muslim 
concepts of interests, insurance, taxation, and so on’.213  
 
William M. Watt 214  is another author who argues that the traditional Islamic 
worldview is incompatible with the conditions and demands of Western modernity. 
He asserts that the modern Muslim thinking remains determined by the 
epistemological rules of the early, i.e. pre-modern, phase of Islam which was 
formed against the background of the Qur'an, hadith and consensus.  
Contrarily, Choudhary Slahudin215 represents authors216 who advance the thesis 
that Islam is essentially consistent with modernity. He maintains that “Islam 
strongly advocates all forms of positive governance.” Arguable, this positive 
governance includes both political and economic governance because the Islamic 
values expressed in ethical conduct are an integral part of the obligations laid upon 
the individual and the community.  
5.3.1 The basis of good corporate governance in Islam 
Concerning the Islamic recognition particularly of good corporate governance, it 
can be said that "[W]hile there may not be an Islamic official juristic recognition of 
the concept of corporate governance as such, an examination of the principal legal 
sources of the Qur’an and Sunna reveals clear guidelines about decision-making 
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processes in an Islamic context."217 Thus, the absence of an appellation does not 
necessarily imply the absence of Islamic values and principles corresponding in 
essence to those underlying the modern concept of corporate governance. As the 
discussion in subsequent sections will show, the Islamic values and principles, 
when taken with certain values of ethical conduct, are largely comprehensive, 
extensive, and flexible so as to lay down the basis of what can be considered a 
distinctive theory for corporate governance in Islam. In particular, two dominant 
factors shape the nature of Islamic corporate governance. The first is that Islamic 
Law claims sovereignty over all aspects of conduct, individual and collective, and it 
encompasses civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. In addition to what is true, fair 
and just, its rulings define the nature of corporate responsibilities, the priorities for 
society and some specific governance standards. The second factor provides a set 
of business ethics; the law includes certain economic and financial principles 
(zakat, prohibition of riba and of speculation etc.) that have a direct bearing on 
corporate practices and policies.218 
Islamic values expressed in ethical conduct are an integral part of the obligations 
laid upon the individual and the community. Rules of corporate governance are 
derived from the underlying principle of assuring the economic well-being of the 
whole community on the basis of universal brotherhood, justice, mutual 
accountability, truthfulness and transparency, protection of minorities, adequate 
disclosure and equitable distribution of wealth.219 Islamic corporate governance 
includes obligations extending beyond shareholders, financiers and management 
to suppliers, customers, competitors and employees, embracing the spiritual as 
well as the temporal needs of the Islamic community. Specifically, the concepts of 
shura, hisba and the shari’a supervisory process and religious audit establish the 
basic building blocks of a system of Islamic corporate governance and business 
organization.220 
This should not mean that the matter is entirely left for the willingness or the 
conscience of the parties of the transaction in question. Islam also lays down a 
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system for certain institutions in support of insuring the application of such 
principles. In Islam, the authority must ensure the fulfilment of contracts and 
respect of property rights, and instil in the people qualities that are necessary for 
social harmony and development with justice.221 
 
Rooting this to the Quran, the following two verses are relevant: 
 
“And consult them on affairs, then, when you have taken a decision, put your 
trust in Allah.”(3:159). 
 
“Those who respond to their Lord, and establish regular prayers; who their 
affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what we bestow on them for 
sustenance.” (42:38) 
The above verses, which form the source of corporate governance in Islam, 
emphasize the necessity of consultation with stakeholders at the time of decision-
making and giving equal importance to all stakeholders, including minority 
shareholders.  
Protection of shareholders rights is surely a major objective for corporate 
governance; sufficiently emphasized by the OECD principles that states: “The 
corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders' rights”. According to Islamic corporate governance model, all rights 
of stakeholders (including shareholders) should be protected and guaranteed, and 
this stems from the Islamic emphasis on property rights. It is important to mention 
that the difference between the Islamic corporate governance model and modern 
relevant principles is that accountability should be to God, not only to the 
shareholders.222 Participating in the stakeholder welfare, according to the Islamic 
concepts of zakat (special alms levy), the Shari’a board is expected to oversee the 
collection of zakat and its distribution to the relevant parties. This ensures the 
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equitable distribution of wealth to all stakeholders and disadvantaged members in 
the Muslim society.223 
As is cleared above, Islam perceives company as a contractual relationship, which 
adds too much to the enforceability of the corporate governance theory in Islam. 
Contractual framework is also very unique in Islam. In the Holy Quran, Allah clearly 
reminds Muslims of the principle of fulfilling each of their contractual obligations 
where He says: 
 “O YOU who have attained to faith! Be true to your covenants!” (5:1). 
 This verse sets a basic foundation for the notion of contract. Every individual, 
society, corporation or state is all bound by their contracts, which define the rights 
and obligations of the parties.  
Projecting this into the Islamic theory of corporate governance, each stakeholder 
has a duty to perform his/her contractual obligations in accordance with the terms 
stipulated in the contract whether directly or indirectly. For example, shareholders 
have the duty to provide business capital, the management to manage and run the 
business, the employees to perform their respective duties and the state to ensure 
enforceability of the contracts in case of violation by any party.224All of these duties 
arise through contractual framework, and they are subject to the rules of Islamic 
law. In short, the principle of contract in Islam establishes guidelines to identify and 
qualify who is the rightful stakeholder.225 Further, the board of directors, acting on 
behalf of the shareholders, has a duty to monitor and oversee overall business 
activities, and the managers have fiduciary duty to manage the firm as a trust for all 
the stakeholders, not for the shareholders alone. The other stakeholders such as 
employees, depositors, and customers have the duty to perform all of their 
contractual obligations. In addition, the state as a stakeholder will be the external 
institution to provide regulatory framework and its enforcement.226 
Therefore, it can be fairly said that, as regard ensuring the rights of stakeholder, 
Islamic corporate governance model ensures all related stakeholders who are 
participating in corporate governance with full rights and responsibilities. The 
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Islamic corporate governance model adds more value to the concept of corporate 
governance by including the aspect of reward and punishment by God.227 
5.3.2 The Islamic Concept of Fiduciary (Wakalah) and Agency 
Theory 
The separation of shareholder and management of corporation entails that these 
roles are assumed by different persons. In shareholding companies, the members 
of the board of directors are appointed or elected by the shareholders. The board 
has a legal obligation to ensure that the company is operated in a proper, legal and 
good-corporate style.228 A member of the board of directors must meet certain 
qualifications before he/she can act as such. For example, persons who are 
undercharged bankrupts or who have been convicted of a criminal act or a security 
violation may not be allowed to serve as members of the board of directors. 
Particularly important for the context of this thesis, members owe a fiduciary duty to 
both the company and all shareholders and as such must act in the interests of all 
shareholders. They must act in accordance with any applicable legislation. 
Being appointed by the shareholders’ assembly, it is logical that such board of 
directors answers, reports, and is questionable towards the shareholders. Although 
this matter was tackled in detail in the first chapter of this research, there should be 
some reiteration as to the nature of the relationship between the board of directors 
and the shareholders. 
The fiduciary duty of board members reflects mainly two duties: the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires board members to act on a fully 
informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care.229 The duty of loyalty 
underpins effective implementation of corporate governance principles. For 
example, it includes the equitable treatment of shareholders, monitoring of related 
party transactions and the establishment of remuneration policy for key executives 
and board members.230 
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5.3.2.1 Agency Theory 
As discussed earlier in this thesis (see section ), the agency theory is one of the 
theories that aimed at defining the relation between the shareholders and the board 
of directors. In this context, an agency is defined as: “A relationship between the 
principals, such as shareholders and agents-such as the company executives and 
managers.” Thus, it perceives owners as principals and managers as agents and 
consequently offers a legal basis of the relationship between the ownership 
(shareholders) who hires the gents to perform work (the management).231 
 
According to the agency theory, the board of directors provides a monitoring of 
managerial actions on behalf of shareholders, and this will be the major structural 
mechanism to curtail managerial opportunism.232 The model is predicated upon the 
notion of an in-built conflict of interests between the owner and manager following 
the separation of ownership and control, and this is how the principal can ensure 
that his agents serve shareholders’ interests, rather than their own. 
 
As a risk vested in any other principle-agent relationship, the agent may be 
succumbed to self-interest, opportunistic behaviour and falling short of congruence 
between the aspirations of the principal and agent. 233  Lack of attention to 
maximizing shareholder returns, or in terms of ‘self-interested opportunism’ 
(accruing wealth to themselves rather than shareholders) could be an example of 
self-interest, opportunistic behaviour.234 
 
The remedies to this conception of the agency problems within corporate 
governance involve the acceptance of certain ‘agency costs’ involved either in 
creating incentives/sanctions, which will align executive self-interest with the 
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interests of shareholders, or monitoring executive conduct in order to constrain 
their opportunism.235 It is noted that the board is to perform a monitoring role 
against the company’s management as well as a role of setting the company’s 
strategy,236 so it is in situation that can be abused; therefore, there are three main 
techniques that are usually adopted in order to ensure that the board of directors 
will serve the shareholders’ interests. These techniques are 237 : 
 
1- Giving shareholders appointment and/or dismissal rights in respect of the 
directors, being the most obvious way to make the board accountable to the 
shareholders forming the general assembly of the company; this could be 
achieved by making it easy for the shareholders to dismiss all or any of the 
board members if they did not find the member serves their interests.238 
2- Subjecting directors to legal duties, which require them to exercise their 
discretion in the interests of the shareholders as a class. Imposing liability 
upon directors who act incompetently or disloyally would seem to be an 
obvious legal strategy to deal with the principal/agent problem between 
management and shareholders as a class. All systems in principle have 
provisions, which could be invoked to impose liability on directors who act 
incompetently.239 
3- Structuring the incentives of the members of the board so as to induce them 
to promote the interests of the shareholders as a class.240 
 
Beside the above mechanisms and stemming from the general fiduciary duty that 
board members will voluntarily be observing good governance, board members 
should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities. It is very 
important to improve board practices and the performance of its members. This 
could be achieved by engaging in board training and voluntary self-evaluation that 
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meet the needs of the individual company. This might include that board members 
acquire appropriate skills upon appointment and thereafter remain abreast of 
relevant new laws, regulations, and changing commercial risks through in-house 
training and external courses.241 
 
Members of the board should enjoy legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of 
shareholders. Achieving legitimacy would also be facilitated by the publication of 
attendance records for individual board members (e.g. whether they have missed a 
significant number of meetings) and any other work undertaken on behalf of the 
board and the associated remuneration.242 
5.3.2.2 The Fiduciary (Wakalah) 
Wakalah in Islamic law can be identified as an authorization from one person to 
another to do on behalf thereof a specified permissible action.243 In the holy Quran, 
it is mentioned that: 
 
“Let, then, one of you go with these silver coins to the town, and let him find 
out what food is purest there, and bring you thereof [some] provisions.” 
(18:18). 
 
According to the above verse, the people in the story delegated one of them to buy 
the food they needed. Islamic scholars concluded from the above text that the 
Wakalah is permissible244 and have accordingly identified four components for 
fiduciary or Wakalah in Islamic law. These are:245 
1. Principal: the person who gives the authorization. 
2. The agent: the one who acts on behalf of the principal. 
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3. The consent forming the contract: This is expressed by the exchange of 
offer and acceptance between the parties.  
4. The contract's subject matter: the action to be taken by the agent for which 
the same is authorised by the principle. 
 
The Islamic law laid down certain conditions that need to be available as regard to 
the principal, the agent and the subject matter of the Wakalah contract which are 
further illustrated below:246 
i. Conditions pertaining to the principal:247 
1. The principal should have the legal capacity and standing to act; i.e., to the 
action which is being delegated to the agent according to Islamic law. This 
condition refers, in particular, to the requirements of being an adult as well 
as of being in a healthy mental status without having any issues could 
prevent this ability. 
2. The principal himself should be allowed to do the action of fiduciary, i.e., 
which is the subject matter of the Wakalah contract. 
 
ii. Conditions pertaining to the agent:248 
1. The identity of the agent should be identified in course of formatting the 
contract sufficiently clear. 
2. The agent needs to be able to act according to Islamic law.  
3. The agent should be allowed to do the act that is the subject matter of the 
contract. 
4. The agent needs to approve the act that is the subject matter of the contract.  
 
iii. Conditions pertaining to the subject matter:249 
1. The subject matter, i.e. the act for the doing of which the agent is delegated 
should be identified in sufficient clarity for all the parties of the contract. 
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Though the above illustration is a conventional analysis to the agent- principal 
relationship, as tackled by the Islamic law in the regulation of Wakalah contract, the 
same can fairly be projected to qualify as an equivalent to the agency theory in 
course of establishing an Islamic law theory for corporate governance. The above 
conditions can be applied on the relationship between the shareholders and the 
members of the board of directors. According to this, such Wakalah given by the 
shareholders to the board members can be seen as follows: 
 
1- Shareholders are the owners of the company. For various considerations 
such as the lack of time or the experience needed to manage the company, 
they approach a number of persons to assume such responsibility; with the 
stipulation that the members of the board of directors act on the interest of the 
company, in accordance with the law and good practices, in order to raise the 
profit thereof. 
2- The members of the board of directors offer to assume such responsibility in 
return of the incentives and remunerations set in the company's bylaw or 
other equivalent documents; and the members of the board of directors so 
accept.  
3- The shareholders give their authorization to the board of members to manage 
the company on behalf of them. 
 
Therefore, it can be fairly said that all of the conditions of the fiduciary in Islamic 
law are found in the scenario above, and as follows:  
- Shareholders are the principals: they have the ability to act according to 
Islamic law and they own the company; therefore, they are allowed to manage 
it.250 
- Members of the board are elected by the shareholders, and they have the 
ability to act according to Islamic law. They are identified in a clear way. 
Moreover, they are usually amongst the owners, therefore they are allowed to 
manage the company by themselves. The nomination and election process 
can be truly seen as the contract formation, i.e. the exchange of offer and 
acceptance, Nomination is an offer and election is acceptance. The board of 
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directors can be considered as the agents, the shareholders as the principals, 
and the management of the company as the subject matter of the fiduciary 
contract. Therefore, it can be truly concluded that the Islamic law sets the 
same principles of the agency theory in the application of fiduciary (Wakalah), 
as the same is regulated in Islamic Jurisprudence. However, it is noteworthy to 
say that this prospective of agency theory according to Islamic law is 
supplemented with accountability values being an alternate for the agency 
theory methods relevant to the agency theory.  
5.3.2.3 Agency Theory and the Islamic conception of Accountability 
As indicated above, according to Islamic law, all resources are given by Allah, and 
only Allah is the owner of all the wealth. Individuals are only trustees and that 
accountability is ultimately due to Allah. 251 Therefore, Islam regulates and 
influences all spheres of life, including governing the conduct of business and 
commerce. Muslims ought to conduct their business activities in accordance with 
the requirement of their religion to be fair, honest and just toward others. Business 
activity, in consequence, must be broadly inspired and guided by the concepts of 
Islamic law. The Islamic legal framework is committed to values such as justice and 
the ban of malpractices. Many verses in the Holy Qur'an encourage trade and 
commerce, and the attitude of Islam is that there should be no impediment to 
honest and legitimate trade and business, so that people earn a living, support their 
families and give charity to those less fortunate.252 
 
Furthermore, the accountability in roles and responsibilities is not limited to 
business people only, but it applies to the whole of life.253 Islamic law requires the 
honest fulfilment of all contracts and from all persons, and it prohibits the betrayal 
of trusts. The Qur’anic verses and Prophetic Ahadith are clear principles 
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commanding accountability in roles and responsibilities. The moral values needed 
are clearly set out in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.254 
 
“O YOU who have attained to faith! Be ever steadfast in upholding equity, 
bearing witness to the truth for the sake of God, even though it be against 
your own selves or your parents and kinsfolk. Whether the person concerned 
be rich or poor, God's claim takes precedence over [the claims of] either of 
them. Do not, then, follow your own desires, lest you swerve from justice: for 
if you distort [the truth], behold, God is indeed aware of all that you do!” 
(4:135).  
 
“O YOU who have attained to faith! Do not devour one another's possessions 
wrongfully – not even by way of trade based on mutual agreement - and do 
not destroy one another: for, behold, God is indeed a dispenser of grace unto 
you!” (4:29). 
 
"AND DEVOUR NOT one another's possessions wrongfully, and neither 
employ legal artifices with a view to devouring sinfully, and knowingly, 
anything that by right belongs to others".(2:188) 
 
“O you who have attained to faith! Pay heed unto God, and pay heed unto the 
Apostle and unto those from among you76 who have been entrusted with 
authority; and if you are at variance over any matter, refer it unto God and the 
Apostle, if you [truly] believe in God and the Last Day. This is the best [for 
you], and best in the end”. (4:59) 
 
The Prophet Mohammad made it abundantly clear in the Sunna that “whoever 
cheats is ‘not one of us’ (i.e. not a Muslim). He also said:  
“The hypocrite has three signs: when he speaks he tells lies, when he makes 
a promise he does not fulfil it, and when he is entrusted with something he 
commits a breach of trust”. And he said: “honest and trustworthy 
																																								 																				




businessmen will be with the Prophets, the truthful ones and the martyrs on 
the Day of Judgment”.255 
 
As mentioned above, and as can be seen in any relation of agency, the agent may 
be succumbed to self-interest, opportunistic behaviour and falling short of 
congruence between the aspirations of the principal and agent.256 Therefore, in 
order to prevent or eliminate that kind of action, agency theory sets the remedies 
illustrated above to prevent that behaviour.257 Wakalah contract in Islamic law gives 
the principal the ability to dismiss the agent when misbehaving.258 The issue of 
subjecting directors to legal duties and structuring the incentives of the members of 
the board of directors is harmonious with the reward and Islamic punishment 
theory259 which is well rooted in various verses of the holy Quran, such as the 
following:  
 
"But [remember that an attempt at] requiting evil may, too, become an evil:" 
(42:40) 
 
“On that Day will all men come forward, cut off from one another, to be 
shown their [past] deeds. And so, he who shall have done an atom's weight 
of good, shall behold it; and he who shall have done an atom's weight of evil, 
shall behold it..” (99:7-8) 
 
“[But,] behold, as for those who attain to faith and do righteous deeds - 
verily, We do not fail to requite any who persevere in doing good:” (18:30). 
 
“But [since] good and evil cannot be equal, repel thou [evil) with something 
that is better - and lo! he between whom and thyself was enmity [may then 
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“Whoever does what is just and right, does so for his own good; and 
whoever does evil, does so to his own hurt; and in the end unto your 
Sustainer you all will be brought back.” (45:15). 
 
“[but] every human being will be held in pledge for whatever he has earned.” 
(52:21). 
 
The corporate governance system in Islam entails implementation of a rule-based 
incentive system. Compliance with the rules ensures an efficient governance 
system to preserve social justice and order among all members of society.260 
 
The concept of accountability is consistent with the remedies and methods of the 
agency theory, and the Islamic law adds an important value to these methods by 
making responsible people accountable not only to stakeholders, but also to God – 
the Ultimate Authority.261 
5.3.3 Trust in Western Jurisdictions and Islamic Law 
Trust system provides a good example for fiduciary applications. This could 
obviously be noticed in the relation between the settlor and trustee, on the one 
hand, and between the settlor and beneficiary and the duties and responsibilities of 
the trustee, on the other hand. In this context of exploring the Islamic root of 
corporate governance, it would be useful to examine the fiduciary applications in 
trust system and tackle trust origins in Islamic law. 
 
Trust is a legal system concerning property, assets and realty in countries utilizing 
English common law, which basically depends on the trusting one (The trustee) in 









The geneses of such system date back to the Middle Ages that witnessed the 
struggle against feudalism, and the contraction of feudalists' possessions and 
proprietary in Britain. Feudalists transferred some of their properties to other 
owners against pledge of those new owners to reserve and manage such monies 
for the interest of the feudalists’ owners. 
 
Countering such a trend, the English courts of law have negated to enforce such 
contractual pledges on the back of the argument that sham property is 
unrecognized under a law which seeks to annihilate feudalism. Courts, which 
derives its legislation directly from religion (Courts of Equity or Chancellor Courts), 
have ratified that a contract concluded in such a way may be contrary to the 
(temporal) legal rules. Justice as an abstract religious concept grants the 
conceding owners equitable right manifesting in allocating all returns and interests 
of the monies to them or to the segments determined thereby, thus giving the new 
owners limited rights only in terms of the function.262 
 
In this context, and in light of the rules of equity (a system paralleled to the ancient 
ages law in England), a property law of special type has emerged based on two 
essential issues. The first is the validity of the effectiveness of property transfer 
contracts in terms of such money discharge from the assignor's covenant and 
transfer to the assignee (which is nothing but a direct application of the non-
provision of a valid "cause" in contracts). The second manifests in commissioning 
the new owner (assignee) with managing and reserving such monies and 
optimizing the same in favour of the segments determined by the assignor 
owner.263 
5.3.3.1 Definition of Trust 
Trust is a legal relationship in which one party holds property for the benefit of 
another. There are three participants in every trust relationship: a “settlor” or 
“trustor” who establishes the trust and provides the property to be held in trust; a 
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“trustee” who is charged by the settlor with the responsibility of managing the trust 
in keeping with the settlor’s instructions; and a “beneficiary” who receives the 
benefits from the property held in trust.264 
 
The essence of a trust is the imposition of an equitable obligation on a person who 
is the legal owner of property (settlor), which requires that person to act in good 
conscience when dealing with that property in favour of any person (the 
beneficiary) who has a beneficial interest recognized by equity in the property.  
 
In order to establish a trust, three elements are necessary: first, there must be a 
manifestation of intent to create a trust by the settlor. Second, there must be 
property that is held by the trustee (the trust “corpus” or trust “res”). Third, there 
must be an identified beneficiary or charitable public purpose for which the property 
is held in trust. Perhaps the most critical of these requirements is the manifestation 
of intent to create a trust or, stated differently, the intent to create a relationship that 
encompasses the essential elements of a trust.  
 
In this regard, the settlor’s intent to create a trust must be “clear and unequivocal” 
or “definite and particular.” In other words, the language used in the documents or 
conveyance creating the trust (known as the trust instrument) must indicate the 
settlor’s intent to create the relationship to some reasonable level of certainty.265 
 
Some of the significant features of the trust are:266 
 
• Once a trust is created, the settlor ceases to have any property rights in the 
trust or any control over the trust in his/her capacity as settlor. 
• The instant that the trust is declared (or deemed to have been created in the 
case of a constructive or resulting trust) the legal title in the trust property is 
owned by the trustee(s) and the equitable interest is owned by the 
beneficiary. 
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• The trustee(s) hold the legal title in the trust property. 
• The trustee(s) owe equitable obligations to the beneficiaries to obey the 
terms of the trust. The trustee(s) obligations are fiduciary in nature. 
• The beneficiaries own equitable proprietary rights in the trust fund. 
There can be an infinite number of beneficiaries in theory, or there may be only one 
beneficiary. 
5.3.3.2 The Legal Nature of the Trust System 
The trust system in general law countries is contractual-originated corporeal-
effective system. Establishing a trust relationship in favour of the beneficiaries that 
does not incorporate independent legal entity. 
 
The trust property emerges in a contractual form between the trust creator or 
settlor, and the trustee, under which transferring a certain property from the 
assignor to the trustee against the trustee's pledge to reserve, manage, and have 
dispose of such property or monies benefiting a certain entity is determined under 
the contract. Such a contract may be explicit or implicit, through which the court 
transpires the tendency of each party's intent for contracting based on trust (as in 
the case of transferring the property against a small monetary recompense or 
without). 
Such a contract requires no writing (except for cases of property transfer where the 
law requires constituting a certain modality for conclusion thereof as in the case of 
transferring realties or companies' deed instruments).267 
The law postulates no immediate conclusion of the contract in one session, where 
the assignee may express his desire to create such trust system at his sole 
discretion (through declaration) or in a will, while slacking with the approval as long 
as such offer is not withdrawn or the will being nullified before death. Furthermore, 
such a system may originate under judicial ruling; as such case is more often 
where agreements on the trust are ambiguous or implicit (unwritten).  
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For the arising agreement to fall under the trust system, it must contain, in addition 
to the preceding contract provisions, a defined and legitimate "subject matter" and 
an "objective" just like any other legal contract.  
The subject matter of the contract is the property assigned to the trustee, which 
could be a real estate or an amount of money or other unsubstantial right 
(intellectual property right or good will), company deed instruments or a leverage 
voucher of government land or any other properties that may be leveraged of a 
substantial traded value.268 
The agreement of property transfer does not constitute trust as mentioned without 
defining the beneficiaries thereof precisely, which is known as the "objective" 
requirement, where the contract must clearly and precisely define beneficiaries of 
the emerging trust. Further, the trustee himself may be assigned as the beneficiary 
of the assignor's property, while a beneficiary may be one or more of the third 
parties determined under the contract.269 
 It is left for the contracting parties to determine the other contract terms as desired, 
while trust contract usually includes stipulations addressing the following matters 
and issues:  
• Determine the pecuniary recompense payable to the beneficiary against 
management and control of the property;270 and 
• Define the frameworks and public policies under which the property is 
invested and operated;271 
• Indicate whether the contract is revocable or perpetual in terms of period; 
• Indicate the modality of disposal of the property subject of the trust upon the 
expiration of the trust (in the case of revocable contracts); 
• Define the policies governing issues of maintaining the property and 
insurance against loss;272 
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• Define the fate and the modality of disposal with yields and returns of the 
property;273 
• Illustrate the rules of book keeping and submitting statements to the 
beneficiaries; 
• Submitting the necessary disclosures by the trustee to the beneficiary 
(Governance rules) as well as beneficiaries and assignor rights in 
commissioning audit bodies (Auditors and such) in order to review the 
vouchers and accounts of the trustee; 
• Define the grounds of de-positioning the trustee and reassign the contract to 
other trustees; 
• Define litigation proceedings related to the property subject of the contract; 
• Indicate the beneficiaries accruals and its maturity dates (in the case of 
regular pays); 
• Define the consultant bodies the trustee is ought to transact with while 
managing and utilizing the property subject of the trust (especially when 
such property takes the form of commercial venture); 
• Clarify the decision-making mechanism and the majority needed for the 
management works and actions (in case of multiple trustees); and etc…. 
5.3.3.3 The Rights of Beneficiaries 
The law commonly grants the beneficiaries the right to claim their substantial and 
pecuniary accruals arising out of the trust, not in the capacity of personal 
beneficiaries (indebtedness) or a provision of their interest in establishing the trust 
contract, but as owners of the property subject of the trust as equitable 
ownership.274 
Beneficiaries under such capacity may litigate the trustee in order to collect their 
rights granted under the instrument constituting the trust directly. Moreover, the 
beneficiaries' right to waive their accruals granted under the contract constituting 
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the trust to third parties is dubious unless such is provided for under the trust 
contract initially.275 
5.3.3.4 Nature of Trust 
The trust system is a hybrid system of personal and substantial rights, which has 
long been perceived as an independent law as "trust law" establishing a legal 
institution (legal position) between the concerned parties. 
Such a legal position does not mean that the institution is an independent legal 
entity, but, on the contrary, it is a legal position that is not manifested in a company 
or a legal entity (unincorporated entity). Therefore, the trustee personally owns the 
trusted property, with the right to conduct all respective actions under his own 
name, including cases of litigation with third parties. 
However, there are no impediments to establishing a non-profit institution (such as 
limited companies by guarantee under the English public law) or a non-commercial 
association (charitable) to take on ownership and management of the property 
subject of the trust, and to have disposal of yields and returns thereof for 
beneficiaries. In such a case, the transfer of the property subject of the trust takes 
one of the following forms:276 
• Subscription in the quota constituting the company or the association, thus 
making such a property into an operative capital of the company/association 
(to the extent admissible under the law); and 
• Transfer the property immediately to the company/association upon 
establishment, thus transferring such property into assets (whether cash or 
fixed as per the situation) for the company/association. 
• The modality of employing and managing the trusted property or any yields 
thereof may also be stipulated under the memorandum of association of 
such company/association, as well as providing for establishing a 
management, investment, or trustees commission for the managing and 
disposing of the property and any yields thereof in realization of the initial 
purpose of such trust. 
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In this context, it is essential to distinguish between the company/association as an 
independent legal entity and the company/association in its capacity as the legal 
owner (trustee) of the assigned or subscribed monies. This is important to maintain 
trust ownership constantly contractual without creating an independent legal 
person of the owner company/association. 
5.3.3.5 The Trustees 
The trustee owner can be defined as the (legal or actual) person or group of 
individuals to whom the ownership of the property is transferred, for the purpose of 
bare ownership, reservation, management, and development thereof in realization 
of the interests defined under the trust deed. The owner trustee in such capacity is 
an owner from a legal aspect. However such ownership is limited to compliance 
with obligations assigned to the trustee and achieving interests of beneficiaries.277 
The owner trustee may be an actual person or a specialized investment body. Also, 
owner trustees may be form a general management commission (commissioners' 
council or consultants), which may employ and invest the owned monies according 
to clearly defined fiscal rules with explicit purposes. Such a situation is often where 
the owned property is great in value or operatively complex such as commercial 
ventures. 
The owner trustee may also be trusted to multiple properties, where each property 
is allocated for the interest of a certain group of beneficiaries, and he/she could 
also be assigned exclusively to specialize in one property (or a collection of 
properties) attributed to one group of beneficiaries. 
5.3.3.5.1 Legal Obligations 
The owner trustee's obligations are basically derived from the contract establishing 
the "trust ownership" as well as from the law governing such a type of ownership 
(Trust Law). Such ownership imposes duty of care on the part of the owner trustee 
in reservation and employment of the owned monies, as well as fiduciary duty, 
manifesting in taking care of the beneficiaries interests. 
																																								 																				






Therefore, the law binds the owner trustees to optimize their efforts towards 
achieving the purpose for which the trust ownership was established. That is why 
owner trustees are allowed to take any action they may deem necessary for 
achieving the same to the extent admissible by law, subject to legal accountability 
and indemnity in case a failure on the part of any owner trustee in performing 
duties was proven. 
5.3.3.5.2 Powers and Duties of Trustees and Others 
Trustees’ duties and powers are the paradigm of fiduciary duties and powers. 
‘Fiduciary’ refers to those duties and powers which a person must exercise in the 
best interest of another, not himself.278 
Thus, the trustees’ duties must be discharged and their powers exercised only with 
the interests of the beneficiaries in mind, and in particular, not to serve their own 
interests or the interests of non-beneficiaries such as their own friends and 
relatives whom they might otherwise be prone to favour.279 
5.3.3.5.3 Fiduciary Duties of the Trustee 
Trustees are charged with a series of fiduciary duties, which can be either express 
or implied, to the beneficiary of the trust. The most important of these are: 
• To manage the trust in accordance with the instructions of the settlor. 
• A duty of good faith, which requires the trustee to put the best interests of 
the trust ahead of his own. 
• A duty of prudence, which requires the trustee to manage the trust property 
with the same degree of skill that a prudent person would exercise in his or 
her own affairs; and 
• A duty to preserve and protect the trust assets, or trust corpus, to satisfy 
both present and future claims against the trust.280 
Manage the Trust in Accordance with the Instructions of the Settlor 
The trustee is normally required to follow the instructions of the settlor in 
administering the assets of a trust. As a general matter, no trust can exist where 
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the trustee has absolute and unqualified discretion in managing the trust assets. 
However, depending on the level of details associated with the restrictions 
established by the settlor, the trustee may have broad discretion in the trust’s 
administration and may enjoy great flexibility in the management of trust assets, as 
long as this discretion is exercised in furtherance of the purposes of the trust. 
The relationship between trustees and beneficiaries is generally viewed as the 
archetype of a fiduciary relationship. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is 
the obligation of loyalty.281 
The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core 
liability has several aspects. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a 
profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his 
interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third 
person without the informed consent of his principal.282 
Therefore, trustees have a duty to act honestly and in good faith, and deal with the 
trust property with integrity for the beneficiaries. Fiduciary duties are imposed to 
prevent persons acting in representative capacities with limited access to assets 
(such as trustees) from misusing their positions for their own advantage.283 
In terms of what peculiarly fiduciary duties are, two are widely recognized: first, 
there is the principle that prohibits a fiduciary from acting in a situation where there 
is a conflict between the duties to his principal and his personal interests. Second, 
there is the principle that prohibits a fiduciary from receiving any unauthorized profit 
as a result of the fiduciary position.284 
The Duty of Good Faith 
This duty requires that the trustee act honestly and with fidelity in the interests of 
the beneficiaries. This means that the trustee cannot put his own interests 
(frequently referred to as self-dealing), or the interests of third parties, ahead of the 
interests of the trust. Common examples of violations of the duty of loyalty are 
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where the trustee attempts to secure a material advantage for himself, to a relative, 
or to a third party in a transaction on behalf of the trust. 285 
This duty of good faith, in turn, encompasses a myriad of sub-categories of 
fiduciary duties such as the duty to act in good faith, the duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest and the duty not to make an unauthorized profit.  Other sub-categories that 
are important for our purposes are the general duty of care in administering the 
trust, the duty to take personal responsibility for the administration of the trust, the 
duty to treat all beneficiaries fairly and the duty to keep accounts and provide 
information to the beneficiaries.286 
(i) Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest  
The fundamental duty of exclusive loyalty operates to reduce the risk of trustees 
abusing their position by using their powers of management in their own interests. 
As could be very difficult to always determine the true motives of trustees, equity 
laid down the strict rule that they must not place themselves in a position where 
their duty and their own interests or the interests of a third party may conflict.287 
(ii)  Duty not to Make an Unauthorized Profit 
The core duty of exclusive loyalty also operates to reduce the danger of trustees 
taking advantage of their position in order to make a personal profit.288 
(iii) Duty to Take Personal Responsibility for the Administration of the Trust  
Trustees are under a duty to take personal responsibility for administrative 
decisions. The rationale underpinning this duty stems from the fact that the office is 
viewed as one where confidence is placed in the abilities of the particular individual 
and it is, therefore, expected that he should personally look after the interests of 
the Beneficiaries.289 
(iv)  Duty to Treat all Beneficiaries Fairly 
In addition to their duties to adhere to the terms of the trust instrument, it is well-
established that trustees are also under a duty to be impartial in the exercise of 
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their functions. The general principle is that trustees are bound to hold an even 
hand among their beneficiaries and not to favour one as against another.290 
The Duty of Prudence 
The trustee’s duty of prudence descends in part from the duty of good faith, 
requiring that the trustee act with due care, diligence and skill in managing the 
trust.  
The standard or measure of care, diligence and skill required of a trustee in the 
administration of a trust is that of an ordinarily prudent person in the conduct of his 
or her private affairs under similar circumstances, and with a similar object in 
view.291 
The Duty to Preserve the Trust  
The duty to preserve and protect the assets of the trust is closely related to the 
duty of prudence. In essence, it requires the trustee to manage the corpus of the 
trust in a manner that takes a long-term perspective and ensures that the trust can 
satisfy both the present and future needs of the trust beneficiary in accordance with 
the instructions of the settlor. In the context of a perpetual trust, this generally 
requires the trustee to manage the trust corpus in a manner that will ensure that 
the trust will remain undiminished to serve the needs of future beneficiaries in 
perpetuity.292 
In this regard, there is a duty to keep accounts and provide information to 
beneficiaries, therefore, trustees have a duty to keep clear and accurate accounts 
of the trust property, and a beneficiary is entitled to inspect these accounts.293 
Furthermore, trustees have a duty to provide beneficiaries with certain 
information.294 
In cases of breach of trust, the beneficiaries will also have personal rights against 
the errant trustee. The trustee can be sued personally to make good loss to the 
trust which has occurred because of the breach. 
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It is important to say that the essence of the owner trustee is not contractual (as 
beneficiaries are not associated therewith under a direct contract, where 
beneficiaries are not considered "others of conditional interest" under the contract 
establishing the trust ownership). It is also important to clarify that the 
responsibility, and capacity, of the owner trustee is not determined on the basis of 
the legal, contractual, or proxy commission on behalf of others. This is because the 
assigned money is owned fully by the trustee from a subjective legal aspect (it is 
not possible to visualize a person as the owner and agent in his own money).295 
In fact, the owner trustee’s responsibility base comes by virtue of law and it is 
nothing more than the equitable title, which is legally recognized for the 
beneficiaries in regards to the entrusted money. Therefore, the owner trustee’s 
responsibility takes the form of "Liability in tort" based on "missive responsibility" or 
"tortuous liability", which is measured by failure to perform the duties of care and 
fiduciary legally approved for the interest of the beneficiaries.296 
5.3.3.6 Trust in Islam 
The concept of Islamic trust requires a person entrusted with such trust to look 
after the trust property just as he would look after and protect his own property. The 
creation of Islamic trust as one of the instruments for estate planning generally 
involves the appointment of trustee whose duty is to look after and manage the 
trust property according to the terms and conditions as stipulated by the person 
who creates the trust (the settlor).297 This is evident in the following verses of the 
Qur’an: 
 
• “BEHOLD, God bids you to deliver all that you have been entrusted 
with unto those who are entitled thereto, and whenever you judge 
between people, to judge with justice. Verily, most excellent is what 
God exhorts you to do: verily, God is all-hearing, all-seeing!” (4:58).  
• “O you who have attained to faith, do not be false to God and the 
Apostle, and do not knowingly be false to the trust that has been 
reposed in you” (8:27).  
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• “if you trust one another, then let him who is trusted fulfil his trust, and 
let him be conscious of God,” (2:283)  
 
As discussed before, Islam has laid down rules for ownership and designated 
various rules for when individuals come together and distribute profits amongst 
themselves.  
In Islam, the appointment of a trustee normally exists in the form of wakãlah or 
agency which arises when one person authorizes another to replace him in the 
exercise of his civil rights. It is, therefore, submitted that in Islam, once a trust is 
created, the property is no longer the settlor’s, and the entrusted person will 
administer and manage the trust property according to the terms and conditions of 
the trust even in cases of self-appointment as trustee. The trustee is charged with a 
great responsibility to guard the interest of the person on whose behalf he holds 
the trust and to render back the property and accounts when required according to 
the terms of the trust.  
As mentioned before, there are four pillars of fiduciary in Islamic law. These are the 
principal, the agent, the contract formula and the contract object.298 
When we apply the fiduciary conditions on the relationship between the Settlor and 
the Trustee, we find the following: 
11. Settlors are the owners of the property and they appoint the Trustee to 
manage it. 
12. The Settlor gives his/ her authorization to the Trustee to manage the property 
on behalf of him/ her. 
All of the all pillars of the fiduciary in Islamic law are found in the case above as 
follows:  
1. Settlors are the principals: they have the ability to act according to Islamic law 
and they own the property, therefore, they are allowed to manage it.  
2. Trustees are appointed by the Settlor and he/she has the ability to act 
according to Islamic law. They are identified in a clear way.  
																																								 																				




The appointing process can be considered as the contract formula: appointing is an 
offer, and accepting it is accepting. 
Therefore, and based on the above, we can consider the Trustee as the agent, the 
Settlor as the principal, and the management of the property as the object of the 
contract fiduciary. Hence, it could be said that the Islamic law considers the same 
principles of the trust law regarding the fiduciary relationship between the Settlor 
and the Trustee. 
The Key Parties in Wakf 299 
 
(i) The Settlor: This person establishes the Wakif by transferring assets 
to the trustees. The settlor must completely constitute the Wakif and 
do everything in his power to transfer the assets to the trustees.  
 
(ii) The Trustee: The trustee is an individual or company who receives 
assets from the settlor and who has the SHARI’A LAW responsibility 
of administering them for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The trustee 
becomes the legal owner of the assets, but he cannot use them for 
his own benefit. The trustee is obliged to perform certain duties as 
laid down in the trust document or by the terms of the trust, and in 
accordance with the law.  
(iii) The Wakif Deed: The terms and conditions on which the trustee is to 
hold the assets will generally be set out in a written document 
commonly known as a Wakif deed. In many instances, they are 
lengthy documents with extensive provisions to ensure that the 
trustees have the power to carry out the wishes of the settlor and to 
safeguard the interests of the beneficiaries.  
(iv) The Beneficiaries: The beneficiaries of a Wakif may be individuals 
(including the settlor), classes of persons or corporate bodies who 
will or may become entitled to the income and capital of the Wakif. 
They need not to be named, but they must be identifiable or 
ascertainable. It is not necessary to make a list of all beneficiaries, 
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but certainty as to what the settlor intended the qualifications to 
benefit to be is essential. Where the trustees have discretion as to 
which group of persons is to benefit, no one beneficiary has a right 
to any of the trust assets. 
5.3.3.7 Similarities between Trust and a Waqf 
Some academics have suggested that the concept of a trust was brought back 
from the Middle East by the Crusaders.300 
The creation of a trust and a waqf has several similarities. In particular, there is a 
similarity in the transfer of assets by the settlor or wakif to the trustees or mutawalli, 
and these assets are administered for the benefit of others. Many awqaf (plural of 
waqf) have been established for philanthropic purposes, which have parallels in the 
establishment of charitable trusts, whilst many family awaqf (commonly known as 
waqf ahli, or waqf dhurri) were established to preserve a family business as a 
single unit for the benefit of the family as a whole.301 
5.3.3.8 Differences between Trust and a Waqf 
In fact, there are many differences between the two concepts. The major 
differences are that in a trust the assets are owned by trustees, and they may 
transact with the assets as they deem appropriate. In a waqf, the mutawalli 
administers the assets, but he will not generally be able to sell the assets without 
express permission from a Shari‟a court.302 
It follows that a waqf will normally continue to exist indefinitely. However, for a trust, 
the “rule against perpetuities” or trust Law will require that the assets must vest 
within a certain period. Moreover, wakif does not have the power to revoke a waqf, 
whereas trust law permits the reservation of a power to revoke by the settlor.303 
 
There are restrictions on the nature of assets that can be transferred to a waqf, 
e.g., usufruct, TRUSTS and SHARI’A LAW, whereas such assets can be owned 
through a trust. Most importantly, a wakif is generally prevented from having an 
																																								 																				







interest in the assets of the waqf, whilst a settlor may be appointed as a beneficiary 
of trust.304 
5.3.4 Disclosure Rules and the Concept of Gharar 
In the basic and simple sense of the word, disclosure refers to the act of making 
information or data readily accessible and available to all interested individuals and 
institutions.305 
A company's board of directors is under the duty of publishing and making 
available certain information relevant to the company. The most crucial information 
that needs to be disclosed is usually that is related to the financial standing of the 
company such as balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and reports on the 
financial status of the company. Critical and important occurring in the lifetime of 
the company should also be disclosed transparently. It is noteworthy to mention in 
this regard that a vast spectrum of matters is also the subject of an obligation of 
disclosure, or at least the disclosure of which is highly recommended. Such 
information may include information on major share ownership and voting rights, 
roles and functions of the members of the board and key executives, information 
about remuneration policies, and issues regarding employees and other 
stakeholders.306 
 
The duty to disclose financial and operating results of the company is a response 
to  one of the major responsibilities of the board of directors. That is to ensure that 
shareholders and other stakeholders are provided with high-quality disclosures on 
the financial and operating results of the entity that the board of directors have 
entrusted with governance.307 
The value of disclosure depends on the value of information being disclosed. In 
general, information being disclosed is comprised of two kinds: accounting and 
non-accounting information. When ownership is spread out, dispersed investors 
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face the collective action problem; therefore, the disclosure system is more 
valuable and more effective where investors are dispersed. 308  The quality of 
financial disclosure depends significantly on the robustness of the financial 
reporting standards on the basis of which the financial information is prepared and 
reported (in most circumstances).309 
 
Though many shareholders and stakeholders would be interested in information 
that would help them to determine that management is running the enterprise with 
the best interest of all shareholders and stakeholders, they could find it useful in 
providing an additional level of comfort regarding the fact that the financial 
statements accurately represent the situation of the company. 310  Company 
objectives are a further important subject matter for the duty of disclosure. What 
would company objectives be? A broad line answer to this question can be the 
maximization of the profit of shareholders and the values of their investment. This 
refers us back to the values that corporate governance is likely, or supposed, to 
realise, i.e. the shareholders or more generally the stakeholders interest, or a 
hybrid of the two interests as the enlightened shareholder theory promotes. 
However, when it comes to the duty of disclosure, there stands a need that, beside 
the detailed goals themselves, the methods of achieving such goals should be 
adequately made clear to shareholders, either in terms of the objective itself or in 
terms of the methods to be applied towards the realization of such objectives. This 
is important for the shareholders to verify that managers are not deviating from the 
objectives that shareholders set for the company and to monitor the managers’ 
efforts for the realization thereof. It is also important for the shareholders to take 
informed decisions as regard to their intentions to change or add to the objectives 
of the company, or exercise their exit option when the objectives set by the majority 
are no longer what certain shareholders wanted. 
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Disclosure also plays a role in enabling the regulatory and the auditing official 
authorities from doing their works. It was, therefore, truly said that disclosure 
regime is a pivotal feature of market-based monitoring of corporate conduct, and it 
is central to the ability of shareholders to exercise their voting rights effectively. 
Disclosure can also be a powerful tool for influencing the behaviour of companies 
and protecting investors. A strong disclosure regime can help to attract capital and 
maintain confidence in capital markets. Shareholders and potential investors 
require access to regular, reliable, and comparable information in sufficient detail 
for them to assess the stewardship of management and make informed decisions 
about the value, ownership, and voting of shares.311 
Disclosure also helps improve public understanding of the structure and activities 
of companies, their policies, and performance with respect to environmental and 
ethical standards and their relationships with the communities in which they 
operate.312 
Emphasizing more the value of disclosure for the protection of investors, it is said 
that capital markets are operating in a highly regulated environment. Highly 
organized securities markets on stock exchanges also operate in a highly regulated 
environment. In order to protect public investors against manipulative and 
deceptive activities by securities brokers and others, securities law in most 
jurisdictions have emerged and centred upon the idea of investor protection. It 
could be noticed that securities laws provide a detailed and complex disclosure 
system for large public companies.313 
There have been repeated attempts in economics literature to establish a body of 
"principles of orderly capital market information.”314 Such principles generally aim 
at insuring that information is provided in sufficient clarity in order to participate in 
the decision making process by the shareholder. 
According to such principles, information should be provided in a material, clear, 
standardised, and forward looking. "Information is "material" if it is capable of 
																																								 																				
311 Corporate Governance Disclosure in Annual Reports, A Guide to Current Requirements and 
Recommendations for Enhancement (Hong Kong society of accounting 2001), 5 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hksa.pdf> accessed on 30/01/2011. 
312ibid. 
313 Kanda (n 308). 
314Fiammetta Borgia, ‘Corporate Governance & Transparency Role of Disclosure, How to prevent New 
Financial Scandals and Crimes?’(American University, 1 June 




causing a reasonable investor to take a different decision than he/she would have 
made in the absence of the information. At least three policy considerations arise in 
connection with material information:  
• All material information should be disclosed in its entirety to the capital 
markets;  
• Exceptions to this rule of disclosure should be strictly limited, as the same 
way for the protection of trade secrets;  
• Immaterial information should not be disclosed to the capital markets. 
Optimum disclosure, not maximum disclosure, is the goal. Publication of 
immaterial information is not only expensive and unnecessary, but can even 
be counterproductive if it works to distract interested persons from material 
information."315 
 
Such disclosure should be clear; disclosures need to be analysable, 
comprehensible and standardized; i.e. they must present the required information 
in the same format. Like the prospectus, the balance sheet and income statement 
must follow a standard format, which reduces the costs incurred by interested 
persons in obtaining corporation data. Standardization also presents another 
characteristic. Because investors are interested in making comparisons between 
various corporations, it could be advisable under certain circumstances to disclose 
a negative piece of information that would not reach the threshold of materiality if 
the corporation were viewed in isolation.316 
Information subject to disclosure should be forward looking. If the occurrence of 
specific events is expected, but has not occurred yet, this must be clearly stated. 
Investors are also particularly interested in knowing how the management 
assesses future earnings and risks of the corporation.317 
What do all these principles have in common? They all highly evaluate the 
consideration of clarity in order that an investor takes his/her investing decision 








consideration is almost identical to one of the major principles on which the Islamic 
law of transaction depends, which is scrutinised below. 
5.3.4.1 The Concept of Gharar (Uncertainty) in Islamic Law 
“Gharar” refers to any transaction of probable items whose existence or 
characteristics are not certain due to lack of information, ignorance of essential 
elements in the transaction to either party, or uncertainty of the ability of one party 
to honour the contract.318 
 
“Gharar” can be defined as any act characterized by an unknown outcome, or an 
act a person cannot warrant whether it will materialize or not. In other words, 
“Gharar” is implicated in any action or deal, which a person undertakes without 
knowing its aftermath. “Gharar” can also be invoked in a situation involving 
uncertainty such as lack of knowledge as to the nature of the subject matter of 
contract.319 
 
The term “Gharar” is not directly mentioned in Quran, but a number of 
etymologically related words are mentioned such as delusion and deception. 
“Gharar” is also a concept that is controversial among various Islamic schools of 
thought.320 
The meaning of “Gharar” includes deception, delusion, hazard or risk, and, within 
the financial industry, it can be defined as uncertainty and risk.321 
The rationale behind the prohibition of “Gharar” is the need to ensure full consent 
and satisfaction of the parties in a contract. Without full consent, a contract may not 
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be valid. Full consent can only be achieved through certainty, full knowledge, full 
disclosure and transparency.322 
Gharar or uncertainty can take various forms that render the transaction to be 
nullified in case the party affected thereby so decides after being informed with the 
particulars that were uncertain enough. The major forms of forbidden “Gharar” can 
be summarized in the following:323 
 
i. Uncertainty of Ownership and Possession  
A clear example of this case can be the sale of an item that could not exist, or that 
is not in the possession of the seller. Also, there exists uncertainty as regard on 
whether the same will be available in the possession of the buyer in future, or when 
the buyer has not yet acquired ownership over the item, or that the ownership 
thereof is incomplete. 
 
ii. Inadequacy and Inaccuracy of Information  
The absence of information for either party may be due to deliberate action of the 
counter-party that can take the form of hiding important information or 
misrepresenting such information. It is also perceivable that parties enter into the 
contract voluntarily go under a situation of uncertainty with mutual consent. In both 
cases, the contract becomes susceptible to prohibition.  
 
iii. Interdependent and Conditional Contracts  
Islamic law does not permit interdependent contracts, which could take, for 
example, the form of combining two sales in one contract, or linking two sales 
jointly. “Gharar” exists if the sale price is unknown at the time of contract formation. 
However, it is dependent on a specific event. It also exists in the case when the 
parties are not sure if the sale may or may not take place.  
 
iv. Pure Games of Chance (Al-Qimar and Al-Maysir)  
Islamic law prohibits contracting under conditions of uncertainty and gambling. 
 
																																								 																				





As mentioned above, the reason for the prohibition of “Gharar” is the risk or 
uncertainty, which casts doubts on the delivery of the item and settlement of the 
contract. The rationale behind the prohibition of “Gharar” is to ensure full consent 
and satisfaction of the parties in a contract. Full consent can only be achieved in 
full disclosure and transparency and through perfect knowledge from contracting 
parties of the counter values intended to be exchanged. The prohibition of “Gharar” 
protects against unexpected losses and the possible disagreements regarding 
quality or incompleteness of information.324 
Information is central to the Islamic system of contracting. All parties of contract 
must make accurate and adequate disclosure of all relevant information enough to 
make reasonable estimates of the outcomes. Lack of knowledge (jahl, or jahala) 
could be with regard to the price of the item, the characteristics of the price or of 
the item, the quantum of the price or the quantity of the item, or the date of future 
performance.325 
 
All Islamic financial and business transactions must be based on transparency, 
accuracy, and disclosure of all necessary information, so that no one party has 
advantages over the other party. Islam has clearly forbidden all business 
transactions, which cause injustice in any form to any of the parties. Injustice may 
be in the form of hazard leading to uncertainty in any business, or deceit, fraud or 
undue advantage.326 
 
Islamic law is seeking to protect the different parties from deceit and ignorance by 
forbidding “Gharar” in any commercial exchange contracts that are not free from 
hazard, risk, or speculation about the essential elements in the transaction to either 
party, or uncertainty of the ability of one party to honour its rights and 
obligations.327The holy Quran gave clear guidance for disclosure and transparency.  
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“O YOU who have attained to faith! Whenever you give or take credit for a 
stated term, set it down in writing. And let a scribe write it down equitably 
between you;” (2:282). 
 
This verse emphasizes the making records of each aspect of transaction so that 
there is full clear disclosure for all parties, which prevents misunderstanding and 
conflict.328 
 
Coming to the application of the "Gharar" concept on corporate governance 
principles, it was clarified above that making the needed information available to 
the investors of a company is an important factor to give a representation of the 
status and the business of such a company to enable investors to make informed 
decisions. For example, the decision of selling or buying the stocks in question, or 
the decision of enforcing any of the accountability methods that the shareholders 
have to encounter the misbehaviour of the directors. Islamic law gives great 
importance for the availability of information when in course of making transactions. 
Therefore, the Islamic laws require that people declare all the important information 
pertaining to the contract in course of being formed, including all the relevant 
documents. 
 
Disclosure rules as major basis for corporate governance share the same aim of 
the prevention of Gharar under Islamic Law. That is the prevention of hiding 















6. Chapter Six: International Standards of Corporate 
Governance 
This chapter will be devoted to the discussion of a range of significant international 
standards of good corporate governance which evolved in the last few decades. As 
it has already been discussed in previous chapters, a number of world-famous 
economic crises and corporate scandals have stimulated ardent pursuit, both on 
the national and international level, of standards and framework of good corporate 
governance. Corporate governance is a broad area and presents numerous 
challenges in order to create a comprehensive framework of conduct wherein all 
elements and players are consistent with the rule of law, ethics and the wise 
economic and managerial practices. Consequently, any suggested framework of 
corporate governance should be designed with the aim of including and regulating 
the overall economic activities, performance, and even benefits to be gained by all 
parties in the field. While the Principles of Corporate Governance issued by the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (the OECD Principles 
for short) discussed below are widely renowned and enjoy global appeal and 
acceptance, the discussion here is focused on some reports of corporate 
governance committees published in the UK, including the Cadbury, the 
Greenbury, and the Humpell reports and the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance which paved the way for the evolution of the OECD principles.   
6.1 The Cadbury Committees report 
The Cadbury Committee has become the short name for the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, owing to chairmanship of the 
committee by Sir Adrian Cadbury. This Committee was set up by the Financial 
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession in 
the United Kingdom in May 1991 following a number of incidents of corporate 
failure including the Maxwell Empire, BCCI and Polly Peck. Hence, there was a 
perceived low level of confidence both in financial reporting by companies and in 
the ability of auditors to provide the safeguards required by the various users of 
company reports. The underlying factors of this situation were attributed to the 




that directors kept under review the controls in their business, and competitive 
pressures both on companies and on auditors which made it difficult for auditors to 
stand up to demanding boards.  
Accordingly, the committee was charged with examining aspects of corporate 
governance including boards of directors and boards, executives, auditors and 
shareholders relationships. The committee laboured for 18 month and published 
the first draft of its report in the middle of 1992 and the final report on December of 
the same year.329 One of the findings of Cadbury Committee was the massive 
incidence of lack of essential corporate disclosures in the UK corporate sector. As 
a result, the Cadbury Committee report stirred up a wide public debate in the UK 
on how to ensure ethical conduct and monitoring the activities of executives and 
directors of companies. 
The report dealt with, and produced recommendations on, reviewing the structure 
and responsibilities of boards of directors; the role of auditors and the accountancy 
profession, and the rights and responsibilities of shareholders. By careful 
examination, the Cadbury Committee introduced various professional standards to 
improve corporate behaviour of listed companies, but also others not listed, on the 
stock exchange in London. In addition, the report also introduced a Code of Best 
Practice for companies consisting of principles on accountability, integrity and 
openness regarding boards of directors and their liability.330 These included the 
following four main principles: 
First: a principle, to ensure the balance between authority and power, at the head 
of the company, there must be a clear division of responsibilities.  
Second: a sufficient number and calibre of non-executive directors should be 
included in the board in order to make important decisions.  
Third: a positive interest in the composition of boards of directors should be taken 
by institutional investors.  
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Fourth: clear recognition should be ensured by the board structure with help of an 
Audit Committee to secure the significance of the function of the finance.  
Thus, the Cadbury Committee in conclusion could be seen as concerned with the 
freedom of boards to work and compete in favour of their companies, while 
ensuring that the work is carried out within the accountability framework. The 
Cadbury committee was succeeded by the formation by two more committees, the 
Greenbury and Hampel committee, and the publication of the Combined Code and 
its revision. 
6.2 The Greenbury and Hampel committees 
The Greenbury Committee, named after its chairman Sir Richard Greenbury, was 
established in January 1995 by the initiative of the Council for British Industry (CBI) 
to examine the excessive remuneration packages in the corporate sector. The 
express remit of the Committee was “to identify good practices in determining 
Directors’ remuneration and a Code of such practice for use by the UK PLCs”.331 
In July 1995 the Greenbury Committee published its report and a Code of Best 
Practice on directors’ remuneration, which included the main recommendations: 
First: the formation of an independent remuneration committee consisting 
exclusively of non-executive directors to determine the directors’ remuneration. 
Such committee should help avoid any potential conflict of interests and should 
prepare annual report. 
Second: information about the named directors’ salaries with full disclosure. The 
committee annual reports should contain details of the remuneration policy 
including directors’ level and salary scales. 
Third: the requirement of disclosure and explanation if the contract period of the 
directors’ service is more than one year. 
Fourth: directors are encouraged to hold onto shares, and shares should not be 
vested.  
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Fifth: instead of capital gains on disposal, it recommends the taxation of executive 
share option gains as income 
Following the Cadbury and Greenbury committees, and recommended by them, 
there was a need for a new Committee to review and revise their findings and to 
check the implementation of their recommendations. For this reason Committee on 
Corporate Governance, known as the Hampel Committee owing to its chairman Sir 
Ronald Campel, was established in November 1995. Unlike Cadbury and 
Greenbury, the establishment of the Hampel Committee contained several players 
in terms of initiative, which were the chairman of the Financial Reporting Council 
and six sponsors: the LSE, the CBI, the Institute of Directors, the Consultative 
Committee of Accountancy Bodies, the Association of British Insurers, and the 
National Association of Pension Funds. There was an obvious difference between 
Hampel and the previous Committees, as the Hampel Committee shifted from the 
restricted remits of ‘Cadbury and Greenbury’ to cover the whole field of corporate 
governance. 
The committee’s final report was published in January 1998 332  with a large 
endorsement of the Cadbury and Greenbury committees’ conclusions. Moreover, 
the Hampel Committee’s endorsement of the previous committees’ conclusions 
about the remuneration of the directors to be put to a shareholder vote at the 
annual general meeting could be described as controversial at the time. 
The Hampel Committee reports included two significant conclusions. First: instead 
of explicit rules, good corporate governance is a matter of behaviour and an issue 
of principles that aim to ease the regulatory burden on companies with flexibility 
that should meet the company's specific needs. Second: there was a concern that, 
in the work of the previous committees, the emphasis on accountability had 
neglected, to some extent, the major responsibility of the board regarding the issue 
of acting in the best interests of the shareholders.  
Moreover, the Hampel report promotes the involvement of the shareholder in 
issues of governance. Remarkably, the principle of stakeholders who have an 
interest in the company's success, such as governments, local communities, 
																																								 																				





customers, suppliers and employees, was later put into a statutory footing in the 
Companies Act 2006. 
Additionally, unlike the Cadbury and Greenbury reports, the Hampel Committee 
report goes beyond being entirely focused on the UK to be distinguished by having 
experts’ advice in corporate governance practice from the United States and 
Germany as well. The importance of the previous three Committees, Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel, is due to the fact that the Combined Code is based on 
their reports and the Cadbury Committee's Code of Best Practice. 
6.3 The Combined Code of Best Practice 
Following the Hampel report, the Combined Code of Corporate Governance in 
June 1998.333 Accordingly, as of 31 December 1998, all listed companies in the UK 
have been subject to the 1998 Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best 
Practice. 
The importance of the Combined Code is that it followed the work of three 
important committees- Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel- covering the main 
elements of corporate governance. Generally speaking, the Combined Code 
covers many issues, with a mix of principles and provisions regarding the board's 
structure and operations, for example the remuneration of directors; accountability, 
and the issue of institutional shareholders in regard to its relations and its 
responsibilities. To date, the Combined Code has witnessed a series of revisions, 
in 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014, and the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) is anticipating an update of the Combined Code every two years. 
 In 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code was published as the new name for 
the Combined Code while retaining its principles to a large extent. Since the start of 
the Combined Code in 1992, ‘comply or explain’ has gained the support of both 
shareholders and companies. It is fact that the scope of corporate governance 
code covers listed companies; however, private and unlisted companies are still 
encouraged to adopt the code’s principles. Unlike hard law, there are several 
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advantages to the Corporate Governance Code being a soft law, including 
flexibility, the ability of fast modification, the ability to adapt according to the 
company’s circumstances, and lastly, it is less costly. In relation to the corporate 
management performance, it can be seen nowadays that the courts when handing 
down judgment they are progressively referring to corporate governance practices. 
Therefore, the following paragraphs are an attempt to shed light on the 
development of the Combined Code since 1998, with more focus on the latest UK 
corporate governance code. 
To start with, the Combined Code 1998 operates on the basis of the well-known 
concept of ‘comply or explain’, as mentioned earlier. There are two main sections 
that aim at covering these two issues- companies and institutional investors. The 
Combined 
Code 1998 could be described as the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports 
combined. In 2003, the new revision of the Combined Code was published with the 
incorporation of the Higgs 2003 and Smith 2003 reviews. The chairman and the 
senior independent director’s role are clarified in the 2003 code, and independent 
nonexecutive directors must make up at least half of the larger listed companies 
boards. 
Three years later, the Combined Code’s new revision was published in June 2006, 
with three central changes, including, the allowance of the chairman of the 
company to serve only on the remuneration committee- not to chair- where he or 
she is considered as independent, providing the option of ‘vote withheld’, and 
publishing the recommendation of proxies lodged at general meetings on the 
company’s websites. 
Two years later, the new revised Combined Code was published in June 2008 
following the FRC’s review of the impact of Combined Code. The 2007 FRC review 
found that there was general support from the 2006 Combined Code and the FRC 
would focus on practical application. The FRC published the UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2010, retaining the well-known ‘comply or explain’ approach and 
incorporating some of the Walker recommendations, as well as following the 
effectiveness of the combined code progress report of 2009. Notably, in the 2010 




revised version of the UK Corporate Governance Code was issued in 2012, which 
included changes to section B.2.4 and B6. 
Moving to the current version of the UK corporate governance code which was 
issued in September 2014; like the 2012 version, the last version has the same five 
main sections, including: leadership, effectiveness, accountability, remuneration 
and relations with shareholders. 
First of all, the FRC has adopted changes to some of the Code’s provisions, such 
as the requirement of making two separate statements, including the going concern 
statement ‘Provision C.1.3’ and a viability statement ‘Provision C.2.2’. Thus, 
companies should make a statement about whether they take into account the 
appropriateness of adopting the going concern basis of accounting. Concerning 
risk management, the Code assures the risk assessment of the company's 
principal risks and explains how they deal with it or mitigate it, as well as stating 
whether the company believes it has the ability to continue working and achieve 
their liabilities under the main risks and current position; moreover, a minimum of 
one review of the company’s effectiveness annually and reporting it in the annual 
report. In terms of remuneration, the key change was about adding more emphasis 
to ensuring the company's long-term success by designing remuneration policies, 
which is the remuneration committee’s responsibility. Furthermore, arrangements 
should be made to enable the recovery or withholding of variable pay when 
needed. Moving on to shareholder engagement, in the case of a significant 
percentage of shareholders having voted against any resolution, during the 
publishing of the general meeting results, the company should explain the way in 
which it is intending to engage with shareholders. 
6.4 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
Established in 1961, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) is an inter-governmental organization based in Paris. It 
currently includes 35 Member States and has a broad range of collaboration with 
non-Member states and international organisations. The OECD provides a forum 
for governments and other international organizations to work together to share 
experiences and seek solutions to common problems. The OECD works with 




economic, social, and environmental change and sets international standards for 
many industries.  
Corporate governance has been one of the areas in which the OECD has engaged 
in an active pursuit to establish international standards. These standards are 
intended to help policy makers in various states to evaluate and improve the legal, 
regulatory, and institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view to 
supporting economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability.  
The first OECD set of standard principles of corporate governance was released in 
1999.334  They focused on publicly traded companies, both financial and non-
financial. However, to the extent that they are deemed applicable, they might also 
be a useful tool to improve corporate governance in non-traded companies, for 
example, privately held and state-owned enterprises.  
The principles were developed and endorsed by the ministers of OECD member 
countries in order to help OECD and Non-OECD governments in their efforts to 
create legal and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance in their countries. 
The OECD principles have been reviewed and re-published in revised versions in 
2004335 and 2015.336 These principles have greatly advanced the global corporate 
governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory 
initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries worldwide. 
Historically, the foundation of the OECD principles can be traced back the 
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel committees' reports in the United Kingdom which 
were discussed in the preceding sections.337 Since they were first published the 
OECD corporate governance principles gained global acceptance have been 
adopted, inter alia, by the Financial Stability Board as one of its Key Standards for 
Sound Financial Systems338 and form the basis for the World Bank Reports on the 
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Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 339  in the area of corporate 
governance.  
The OECD principles are six in number and they will be analysed in the remainder 
of this section. The following discussion is based on the latest version published in 
2015 following the review of the 2004 edition. The six OECD principles as follows: 
Principle One: Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework. 
This principle concerns the role of corporate governance framework in promoting 
transparent and fair markets, and the efficient allocation of resources. It is focused 
on the quality and consistency the different elements of regulations that influence 
corporate governance practices and the division of responsibilities between 
authorities. In particular, in the 2015 edition of the principles emphasis is placed on 
the quality of supervision and enforcement, and new principle on the role of stock 
markets in supporting good corporate governance. 
Principle Two: The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key 
ownership functions.  
This principle relates to basic shareholder rights, including the right to information 
and participation through the shareholder meeting in key company decisions. The 
scope of the principle also deals with disclosure of control structures, such as 
different voting rights, and the procedures for approval of related party transactions 
and shareholder participation in decisions on executive remuneration. 
Principle Three: Institutional investors, stock markets and other 
intermediaries. 
This principle addresses the need for sound economic incentives throughout the 
investment chain, with a particular focus on institutional investors acting in a 
fiduciary capacity. It also highlights the need to disclose and minimize conflicts of 
interest that may compromise the integrity of proxy advisors, analysts, brokers, 
rating agencies and others that provide analysis and advice that is relevant to 
																																								 																				





investors. It also deals with standards regarding cross border listings and the 
importance of fair and effective price discovery in stock markets. 
Principle Four: The role of stakeholders in corporate governance. 
This Principle is designed to encourage active co-operation between corporations 
and stakeholders and underline the importance of recognising the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements. It is also related to 
stakeholders’ access to information on a timely and regular basis and their rights to 
obtain redress for violations of their rights.  
Principle Five: Disclosure and transparency. 
This principle relates to a number of key disclosure areas, such as the financial and 
operating results, company objectives, major share ownership, remuneration, 
related party transactions, risk factors, board members, etc. New related issues in 
this regard include the recognition of recent trends with respect to items of non-
financial information that companies on a voluntary basis may include, for example 
in their management reports. 
Principle Six: The responsibilities of the board. 
The sixth and last principle is intended to provide guidance with respect to key 
functions of the board of directors, including the review of corporate strategy, 
selecting and compensating management, overseeing major corporate acquisitions 
and divestitures, and ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and 
financial reporting systems. New related issues in this respect  include the role of 
the board of directors in risk management, tax planning and internal audit. In 
addition, there is also a new standard recommending board training and evaluation 
and a recommendation on considering the establishment of specialized board 
committees in areas such as remuneration, audit and risk management. 
The following sub-sections 6.4.1– 6.4.6 are devoted to detailed discussion and 




6.4.1 Principle One: Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate 
governance framework 
The first OECD principle requires that the framework of corporate governance 
“should promote transparent and fair markets, and the efficient allocation of 
resources. It should be consistent with the rule of law and support effective 
supervision and enforcement”.340 It is worthwhile that this principle envisages a 
broad conception of corporate governance framework typically comprising 
elements of legislation, regulation, self-regulatory arrangements, voluntary 
commitments and business practices that are the result of a country’s specific 
circumstances, history and tradition. Additionally, the legislative and regulatory 
elements of the corporate governance framework in any country can profitably be 
complemented by soft law elements based on the “comply or explain” principle 
such as corporate governance codes in order to allow for flexibility and address 
specificities of individual companies. 
Thus, any country interested in applying the first OECD principle it should monitor 
its national corporate governance framework, including the regulatory and listing 
requirements and business practices, with the objective of maintaining and 
strengthening its contribution to market integrity and economic performance. It 
should also take into account the interactions and complementarity between 
different elements of the corporate governance framework and its overall ability to 
promote ethical, responsible and transparent corporate governance practices. 
Evidently, this requires an analysis of the overall corporate framework and such 
analysis should imperatively be viewed as an important tool in the process of 
developing an effective corporate governance framework for the country. 
To operationalize this principle, a set of requirements or subsidiary principles must 
be observed, including:341 
A. The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view 
to its impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and 
the incentives it creates for market participants and the promotion of 
transparent and well-functioning markets. 
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It should be recognized that the regulatory and legal environment within which 
corporations operate is central to the overall economic outcomes in the country. 
This implies a set of requirements on national policy makers. Accordingly, policy 
makers have a responsibility to put in place a framework that is proportionate and 
flexible enough to meet the needs of a range of corporations operating in widely 
different circumstances, facilitating their development of new opportunities to 
create value and to determine the most efficient deployment of resources. 
Additionally, policy makers should focus on ultimate economic outcomes and policy 
options must be complemented by analysis of the impact on key variables that 
affect the functioning of markets, for example in terms of incentive structures, the 
efficiency of self-regulatory systems and dealing with systemic conflicts of interest. 
Enhanced transparency and orderly functioning markets serve to discipline market 
participants and to promote accountability and responsibility. 
B. The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate 
governance practices should be consistent with the rule of law, 
transparent and enforceable. 
Any new laws and regulations needed to enhance the efficiency of the corporate 
governance framework should be designed to be implemented and enforced in an 
efficient and even handed manner covering all parties. Thus, consultation by 
government and other regulatory authorities with corporations, their representative 
organisations and other stakeholders should be conducted for the parties to protect 
their rights. In order to avoid over-regulation, unenforceable laws, and unintended 
consequences that may impede or distort business dynamics, policy measures 
should be designed with a view to their overall costs and benefits. Additionally, 
public authorities should have effective enforcement and sanctioning powers to 
deter dishonest behaviour and provide for sound corporate governance practices. 
Noting that corporate governance objectives are also formulated in voluntary codes 
which do not have the status of law or regulation, such codes play might leave 
shareholders and other stakeholders with uncertainty concerning their status and 
implementation. When codes and principles are used as a national standard or as 
a complement to legal or regulatory provisions, market credibility requires that their 





C. The division of responsibilities among different authorities should be 
clearly articulated and designed to serve the public interest. 
The regulatory scope of corporate governance in any country is relatively broad 
and includes requirements and practices typically influenced various legal domains, 
such as company law, securities regulation, accounting and auditing standards, 
insolvency law, contract law, labour law and tax law. Corporate governance 
practices of individual companies are also often influenced by a wide range of 
considerations such as standards of corporate social responsibility, human rights 
and environmental laws. Accordingly, there is a risk that the variety of legal 
influences may cause unintentional overlaps and even conflicts, which may 
frustrate the ability to pursue key corporate governance objectives. Therefore, 
policy makers must be particularly aware of this risk and take measures to mitigate 
and limit its effects.  
Effective enforcement of corporate standards requires appropriate allocation of 
responsibilities for supervision, and implementation and enforcement among by 
authorities should be clearly defined to avoid conflict of competencies of 
complementary bodies and agencies. Overlapping or contradictory regulations 
between jurisdictions is also an issue that should be monitored so that no 
regulatory vacuum is allowed to develop (i.e. issues slipping through in which no 
authority has explicit responsibility) and to minimise the cost of compliance with 
multiple systems by corporations. Additionally, delegation of regulatory 
responsibilities or oversight to non-public bodies should be cautiously exercised 
and measured, and with oversight over implementation. 
D. Stock market regulation should support effective corporate 
governance. 
It should be noted that stock markets have the potential to play an important role in 
enhancing corporate governance by establishing and enforcing requirements that 
promote effective corporate governance by their listed issuers. Also, stock markets 
provide facilities by which investors can express interest or disinterest in a 
particular issuer’s governance by allowing them to buy or sell the issuer’s 




Accordingly, the quality of the stock market’s rules and regulations that establish 
listing criteria for issuers and that govern trading on its facilities is therefore an 
important element of the corporate governance framework. The traditional “stock 
exchanges” nowadays have a variety of shapes and forms. Regardless of the 
particular structure of the stock market, policy makers and regulators should 
assess the proper role of stock exchanges and trading venues in terms of standard 
setting, supervision and enforcement of corporate governance rules. This requires 
from policy makers and regulators an analysis of how the particular business 
models of stock exchanges affect the incentives and ability to carry out these 
functions 
E. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the 
authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional 
and objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, 
transparent and fully explained. 
Evidently, the supervisory, regulatory and enforcement responsibilities in any 
country should be vested with operationally independent and accountable bodies 
which have adequate powers, proper resources, and the capacity to perform their 
functions and exercise their powers, including with respect to corporate 
governance. Experience from many countries shows that political independence of 
the securities supervisor were addressed through the creation of a formal 
governing body (a board, council, or commission) whose members are given fixed 
terms of appointment. These bodies should be able to pursue their functions 
without conflicts of interest and their decisions should be subject to judicial or 
administrative review. Equally, they should be staffed with properly qualified 
personnel to carry out their responsibilities. 
F. Cross-border co-operation should be enhanced, including through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements for exchange of information. 
High levels of cross-border ownership and trading require strong international co-
operation among regulators, including through bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements for exchange of information. International co-operation is becoming 
increasingly relevant for corporate governance, notably where companies are 
active in many jurisdictions through both listed and unlisted entities, and seek 




6.4.2 Principle Two: The rights and equitable treatment of 
shareholders and key ownership functions. 
Corporate governance, as a universal idea, mainly aims at the proper vindication of 
shareholders’ rights and interests. In doing so, a well-balanced reference for the 
minimum rights and interests of shareholders must be defined and adopted. The 
corporate governance framework should therefore protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights and ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
The main right of shareholders should be securing that their ownership and dealing 
in shares are decided and practiced according to their free wills and without 
dictation from others. The shareholders will not be able to make informed decisions 
unless all related information is available to them; access to information related to 
the company is therefore a genuine right to all shareholders. Information should be 
served on regular basis and in sufficient clarity.  
The other core matter that needs protection is the voting right vested in 
shareholders, especially when an outstanding matter involves the company (such 
as the increase of capital, merger, acquisition, amendment of the articles/by-laws, 
and even dissolution). In order to enable shareholders to practice their voting right, 
meetings should be conveyed properly and held with sufficient quorum and voting 
procedures should be well-informed to all attendees. Release of comprehensive 
information related to the voting subject matter is very important in order to enable 
shareholders to practice their voting rights in a correct manner. Information should 
be clear, comprehensive and provided in good time. In order to guarantee 
flexibility, the voting system should be practical; shareholders should be able to 
vote in person or by proxy when they are not available for meetings. Votes in 
person or by proxy should be of equal legal value.   
Shareholders should be fully enabled to freely elect and decide (as the case may 
be) the recusal of the board members. In addition, shareholders should have the 
opportunity to monitor management activities and the varied board acts. This 
includes their official entitlement to ask the boards the queries they have, including 




and the major deals thereon.  Shareholders should be given the chance, in some 
instances, to give advices, and even make necessary decisions in respect of 
essential matters of the company such as the appointment of auditors and the 
selection of the control committee members.  
Central to the discourse of this matter, shareholders should be able to make rules 
for the board and senior executives’ remuneration. Personnel retirement and 
compensation schemes should be subject to the shareholders’ review and 
approval. 
Finally, the free exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including founding 
investors, should be encouraged and facilitated. Shareholders should be allowed to 
consult with each other  and reach the voting agreements/arrangements they deem 
appropriate. The law will not generally be supposed to suspect voting agreements 
or nullify the same because of breaching public order. To sum up, the requirements 
to protect shareholder rights in relation to Principle Two could be summarised as 
follows: 
A. Basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 1) secure methods of 
ownership registration; 2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant and 
material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) 
participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; 5) elect and remove 
members of the board; and 6) share in the profits of the corporation.  
B. Shareholders should be sufficiently informed about, and have the right to 
approve or participate in, decisions concerning fundamental corporate 
changes such as: 1) amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation 
or similar governing documents of the company; 2) the authorisation of 
additional shares; and 3) extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of 
all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote 
in general shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, 
including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings:  
1. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information 




full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the 
meeting. 
2. Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should 
allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures 
should not make it unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes. 
3. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, 
including questions relating to the annual external audit, to place items 
on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose resolutions, subject 
to reasonable limitations. 
4. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance 
decisions, such as the nomination and election of board members, 
should be facilitated. Shareholders should be able to make their views 
known, including through votes at shareholder meetings, on the 
remuneration of board members and/or key executives, as applicable. 
The equity component of compensation schemes for board members 
and employees should be subject to shareholder approval. 
5. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal 
effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia. 
6. Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated. 
D. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to 
consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights 
as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse. 
E. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally. 
Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to 
obtain a degree of influence or control disproportionate to their equity 
ownership should be disclosed.  
1. Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. All 
investors should be able to obtain information about the rights attached 
to all series and classes of shares before they purchase. Any changes in 
economic or voting rights should be subject to approval by those classes 
of shares which are negatively affected. 





F. Related-party transactions should be approved and conducted in a manner 
that ensures proper management of conflict of interest and protects the 
interest of the company and its shareholders.  
1 Conflicts of interest inherent in related-party transactions should be 
addressed. 
2 Members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose 
to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, 
have a material interest in any transaction or matter directly affecting the 
corporation. 
G. Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the 
interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and 
should have effective means of redress. Abusive self-dealing should be 
prohibited. 
H.  Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient 
and transparent manner.  
1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control 
in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions such as mergers, 
and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should be clearly 
articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their rights and 
recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under fair 
conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders according to their 
class.  
2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and 
the board from accountability. 
6.4.3 Principle Three: Institutional investors, stock markets and 
other intermediaries 
Corporate governance operates in a broad environment of interrelated interests. 
Careful consideration should therefore be placed on the variable elements and 
their peculiar requirements. In particular, the corporate governance framework 
should provide sound incentives throughout the investment chain and provide for 
stock markets to function in a way that contributes to good corporate governance. 




governance must be developed with a view to the economic reality in which it is to 
be implemented. 
A number of recommendations are made under this principle including: 
A. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their 
corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, 
including the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of 
their voting rights. 
B. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in line with the directions of 
the beneficial owner of the shares. 
C. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose how they 
manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of key 
ownership rights regarding their investments. 
D. The corporate governance framework should require that proxy advisors, 
analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others that provide analysis or advice 
relevant to decisions by investors, disclose and minimise conflicts of interest 
that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice. 
E. Insider trading and market manipulation should be prohibited and the 
applicable rules enforced. 
F. For companies who are listed in a jurisdiction other than their jurisdiction of 
incorporation, the applicable corporate governance laws and regulations 
should be clearly disclosed. In the case of cross listings, the criteria and 
procedure for recognising the listing requirements of the primary listing 
should be transparent and documented. 
G. Stock markets should provide fair and efficient price discovery as a means 
to help promote effective corporate governance. 
6.4.4 Principle Four: The role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance. 
Corporate governance should adhere to the legitimate interests of the stakeholders 
and it should stress that stakeholders’ rights should be reasonably respected, and 





One of the main methods to achieve the rights and interests of the stakeholders is 
to encourage meetings and exchange of viewpoints between the company 
(represented by the board or the management as the case may be) and the 
stakeholders. In some companies, an advisory stakeholders committee could be 
found. This is much enhanced institutional body which aims at keeping the relation 
between the company and the stakeholders always active, and, as will be seen 
later  in this research (section 7.1.5), such a practice gained particular importance 
in Germany that it is a statutory requirement.  
Stakeholders should be entitled to receive sufficient and reliable information about 
the company.  Information varies depending on the class of stakeholders 
concerned, but it should generally be in the form of economic information, which is 
usually provided by classification agencies and stock market bulletins. 
The principle of free flow of information may clash with the principle of 
confidentiality of data. The corporate governance does not aim at disclosing 
information of operational or commercial value to others, including stakeholders, 
since this will not benefit the stakeholders in practicing their rights; while at the 
same time is detrimental to the competitiveness of the company. What is meant by 
information disclosure as a corporate governance principle is the disclosure which 
is necessary to enable the players to consider their position and practice their 
rights accordingly, and it is in no way extendable to include information of 
financial/business value of the company.  
Finally, the law should guarantee the possibility to institute claims by stakeholders 
in vindication of their interests and rights vis-à-vis the company.  The lawsuit 
should not always require establishment of contract breach or tort. Additionally, 
lawsuits for precautionary measures should also be allowed.  
Accordingly, this principle recommends a number of requirements that need to be 
observed in relation to the role of stakeholders in respect of corporate governance, 
including: 
A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual 




B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have 
the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
C. Mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop. 
D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they 
should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a 
timely and regular basis. 
E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative 
bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or 
unethical practices to the board and to the competent public authorities and 
their rights should not be compromised for doing this. 
F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an 
effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of 
creditor rights. 
6.4.5 Principle Five: Disclosure and transparency 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the 
financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company. A 
central idea of corporate governance is the information system. It enables all 
players to know and get the reliable information they need so that decisions and 
actions can be enlightened and well-informed.  
The information spectrum claimed by the corporate governance is so wide and 
generally covers the financial and operating results of the company, 
managers/directors conflict of interest issues, company objectives, and the voting 
position prevailing in the company including the majority of shareholders.  
As indicated above, information about the management of the company and the 
board is of key importance to this matter. Remuneration policy for, and other 
benefits granted to, members of the board and executives should be transparent 
and known to shareholders.  
Information should also include disclosure of the general activities of the company, 
the general strategy of the company, the general outline of the marketing plans, the 




risks. The importance of information becomes greater when an extraordinary 
matter faces the company such as expansion into new markets, merger with 
another company, acquisition of another entity and, of course, dissolution.  
The financial record of the company is another area that needs concentration. The 
financial statements and records show in numeric language how the company 
operates in general, its unsettled dues, liability, long-term and short-term 
obligations, loss and profit margins, inventory and stock and the other assets and 
cash the company possesses at different time intervals. Apart from these internal 
financial reporting, external auditing is also of vital importance. The annual audit 
should be conducted by an independent competent qualified auditor in order to 
provide neutral and comprehensive view on the financial standing of the company 
and on whether the internal financial records are accurate, honest and valid. 
Auditing should be made in accordance with the internationally recognized 
accounting and auditing standards.  
As a source of information accreditation, external auditors should be accountable 
to the shareholders and owe a duty to exercise due professional care and diligence 
while working and making their reports. 
Finally, information should be free of charge (or at least against relatively cheap 
value), comprehensive and clear; it should come in the good time, be accurate and 
of high quality. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, 
timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users.  
Accordingly, the recommended requirements pursuant to this principle include: 
A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
1. The financial and operating results of the company. 
2. Company objectives and non-financial information. 
3. Major share ownership, including beneficial owners, and voting rights. 
4. Remuneration of members of the board and key executives. 
5. Information about board members, including their qualifications, the 
selection process, other company directorships and whether they are 




6. Related party transactions. To ensure that the company is being run with 
due regard to the interests of all its investors, it is essential to fully disclose 
all material related party transactions and the terms of such transactions to 
the market individually. In many jurisdictions this is indeed already a legal 
requirement. 
7. Foreseeable risk factors. The Principles envision the disclosure of sufficient 
and comprehensive information to fully inform investors of the material and 
foreseeable risks of the enterprise. Disclosure of risk is most effective when 
it is tailored to the particular company and industry in question. Disclosure 
about the system for monitoring and managing risk is increasingly regarded 
as good practice. 
8. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. Companies are 
encouraged, and in some countries even obliged, to provide information on 
key issues relevant to employees and other stakeholders that may materially 
affect the performance of the company or that may have significant impacts 
upon them. Disclosure may include management/employee relations, 
including remuneration, collective bargaining coverage, and mechanisms for 
employee representation, and relations with other stakeholders such as 
creditors, suppliers, and local communities. 
9. Governance structures and policies, including the content of any corporate 
governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented. 
B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality 
standards of accounting and financial and non-financial reporting. 
C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and 
qualified, auditor in accordance with high-quality auditing standards in order to 
provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the 
financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the 
company in all material respects. 
D. External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to 
the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit. 
E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and 




6.4.6 Principle Six: The responsibilities of the board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure principles of the strategic 
guidance of the company by the board, the effective monitoring of management by 
the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.  
Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due 
diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders.  
The board should exercise continuous monitoring for the management in terms of 
performance, actions, decisions taken and commitment to the company’s general 
business plan decided by the board. The board should regularly report to 
shareholders’ concise reports about management performance, activities and 
efficiency-level.  
The board should give equal attention and care to all shareholders. Where board 
decisions may affect different shareholder groups, the board should treat all 
shareholders within the same class fairly. The board should apply high ethical 
standards when the interests of shareholders/stakeholders are at stake.   
The board should also be skilled enough to fulfil certain key functions. This 
includes drawing and reviewing the company strategic policy and general 
objectives, and monitoring the implantation thereof; drawing and revising, from time 
to time, the company’s plans of action, risk policy, annual estimated budgets and 
business plans, hiring for the company the key executives and managers and 
deciding on their contract nature, compensation and other benefits. The board duty 
also includes monitoring the performance of the hired executives and managers 
and replacing them when deemed necessary. The board should endeavour, 
possibly via choosing the proper contracts and benefits, to align 
executives/managers with the longer-term interests of the company and the 
shareholders. The board should also monitor and manage potential conflict of 
interest issues of its members and executives, and it should take appropriate 
actions in respect of the same (including elimination of transactions arranged via 
biased means or otherwise driven by the self-interests of any 




Another important obligation vested in the board is the duty to ensure the integrity 
of the corporation’s bookkeeping, accounts and the financial reporting systems. 
This also includes the obligation to build all company-related control systems such 
as systems of risk identification, analysis and management; systems of financial 
and operational control; and systems of pricing, quality control and invoicing.   
The board should build a good and intensive nexus with the different stakeholders 
concerned with the company’s work and business, and it should endeavour to 
maintain a long-term relation with the different categories of the stakeholders 
(including the community as a whole).   
Finally, the board should be accountable toward all those interests. There must be 
no obstacles banning the accountability processes, including allegations of non-
existence of direct legal/contractual relation with the board. Board directors are 
fiduciary in nature and are built on principles of good faith and due diligence. 
Stakeholders should not be required to show a duty emerged by contract; they are 
just required to show that they fall under the general duty of care required from the 
board. 
To sum up, the requirements recommended pursuant to this principle include: 
A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due 
diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the 
shareholders. 
B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, 
the board should treat all shareholders fairly. 
C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account 
the interests of stakeholders. 






















E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on 
corporate affairs. 
1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of nonexecutive 
board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks 
where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key 
responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial 
reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board 
members and key executives, and board remuneration. 
2. Boards should consider setting up specialised committees to support the 
full board in performing its functions, particularly in respect to audit, and, 
depending upon the company’s size and risk profile, also in respect to 
risk management and remuneration. When committees of the board are 
established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should 
be well defined and disclosed by the board. 
3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their 
responsibilities. 
4. Boards should regularly carry out evaluations to appraise their 
performance and assess whether they possess the right mix of 
background and competences. 
F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to 
accurate, relevant and timely information. 
G. When employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms 
should be developed to facilitate access to information and training for 




and best contributes to the enhancement of board skills, information and 
independence. 
6.4.7 Motivation and Rationale of OECD 
The subsections above discussed and summarised the main OECD principles of 
corporate governance. This section is devoted to discussing the motivation and 
rationale for employing OECD principles as evaluative standards in this research. It 
will be argued here that these principles have a number of characteristics which 
offer them a peculiar position globally, including: 
1. The OECD principles as intended as benchmarks to policy makers in their 
pursuit to strengthen and enhance the efficiency of their national corporate 
governance systems. In comparison to other international standards, such 
as the Cadbury and Greenbury reports discussed in section 0 the OECD 
principle address the standards which national corporate systems should 
attain whereas those reports contain Best Practice Codes which 
corporations are required or encouraged to comply with. The point is not 
simply the whether the standards are imperative or optional. Rather the 
main point of difference between the OECD and other standards is 
hierarchical in the sense that other standards provide what may be called 
primary obligations whereas the OECD could more appropriately be 
described as met-legal standards in the sense that they do not apply directly 
to corporation; rather they do so through the medium of the national 
legislative and regulative framework of corporate governance. 
2. In addition, the OECD principles have engendered global interest and are 
widely being incorporated into regional and national regulatory framework. 
As it has already been mentioned, these principles have been adopted, inter 
alia, by the Financial Stability Board as one of its Key Standards for Sound 
Financial Systems342 and form the basis for the World Bank Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC)343 in the area of corporate 
governance. 
3. While they are designed to set globally applicable standards, the OECD 
principles are characterised by flexibility and attention to the requirements of 
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particular legislative or regulatory systems of corporate governance. 
Therefore instead of rigid uniform application the principles allow adaptation 
and tailoring to the needs and requirements of various national systems. 
4. The principles are also characterised by being regularly reviewed and 
developed. There are also discursive in the sense that consultation is an 
essential characteristic of their development. In addition to this, the 
principles are characterised by accessibility. For example, there are around 
17 language texts- including Arabic- which can be downloaded from the 
official website of the OECD. 
 
6.5 Islamic and OECD principles: a comparison 
The discussion in the preceding sections in this chapter demonstrates substantial 
comparability between Islamic values and principles pertaining to good corporate 
governance and the international standards codified into the OECD principles 
discussed in section6.4. Yet, there are also some differences. This section will 
accordingly be devoted to a summary comparison between the compatibility and 
the differences between the Islamic and the OECD principles of good corporate 
governance. 
6.5.1 Compatibility between Islamic and OECD Principles 
The issue of compatibility between Islamic and OECD principles has been 
discussed by a number of authors344 albeit with a characteristic focus exclusively 
on the similarities of their respective regulative import, i.e. substantive compatibility. 
In this thesis a distinction is proposed between formal and substantive compatibility 
in order to shed light on another dimension of compatibility between Islamic and 
OECD principles which has not been explicitly noted by previous students of the 
subject. 
6.5.1.1 Formal Compatibility 
As mentioned above, substantive compatibility between Islamic and OECD 
principles has been the dominant trend in comparative efforts of these two sets of 
principles. However, the generic model of corporate governance proposed in 
																																								 																				




section (2.4.1) lends a distinct perspective through which another aspect of 
compatibility emerges, namely a formal compatibility between Islam and OCED 
principles. 
The OECD principles and their underlying pillars of corporate governance are both 
regarded as meta-legal principles as discussed in sections 2.4.2. As such these 
principles designate the basic principles which underlie corporate legal 
frameworks, or upon which national corporate laws are to be formulated. 
This same characteristic also applies to Islamic principles of corporate governance 
since the legal character of these principles should equally constitute the Islamic 
foundation on which national corporate governance frameworks may be 
established. Thus, the Islamic principles may be applied across a broad range of 
national jurisdictions. The ensuing national laws need not necessarily be uniform 
since the operationalization of the Islamic principles can be adapted to the 
conditions and requirements of individual national jurisdiction. 
6.5.1.2 Substantive compatibility 
As already noted above, substantive compatibility relates to similarity of the 
regulative import of Islamic and OECD principles.  These similarities can be 

















Table 2 Substantive similarities between Islamic and OECD Principles 
 
  OECD Principle Islamic Principle 
Principle One: Ensuring the basis for an effective 
corporate governance framework. 
• Promotion of transparent and efficient markets 
with rule of law and division of responsibilities. 
• Promotion of business within ethical 
framework of Shari’a 
• Believes in profit and loss 
• Primacy of Justice and social welfare with 
social and spiritual obligations 
• Prohibition of interest 
Principle Two: The rights and equitable 
treatment of shareholders and key ownership 
functions. 
• Basic shareholder rights  
• Participation in Decision-making at 
the general meetings 
• Structures and arrangements markets 
for corporate control 
• Ownership rights by all shareholders 
including institutional shareholders 
• Consultative process between 
shareholders and institutional 
shareholders 
• Property as trust from God 
• Sole Authority is God 
• Society as stakeholders 
• Accountability not only to stakeholders but 
also to God, the ultimate owner 
Principle Three: Institutional investors, stock 
markets and other intermediaries. 
• Protection to minority and foreign 
shareholders 
 
• Just and fairness of value 
• Equitable distribution of wealth to all 
stakeholders and disadvantages members 
in the form of Zakat and Sadqa 
• Social and individual welfare with both 
spiritual and moral obligation 
• Sensation of Equality 
Principle Four: The role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance. 





• In creating wealth, jobs and 
sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
• Conciouness of permitted and prohibited acts 
• Social and individual welfare from both 
spiritual and material perspectives. 
• Consideration to whole community. 
Principle Five: Disclosure and transparency. 
• Matters regarding corporation  
• Financial situation  
• Socio-economic objectives related to 
firms’ control and accountability to all its 
stakeholders 
• Performance, ownership and governance 
 
• Accountability with Shari’a compliance 
• Justice, equality, truthfulness transparency 
• Wider accountability with written as well 
as oral disclosure. 
 
Principle Six: The responsibilities of the board. 
• Strategic guidance  
• Monitoring of management  
• Accountability to company and stakeholders 
 
• Accountability not only to company or 
board or stakeholders but also to Allah the 
ultimate authority who leads to welfare 
and success. 
• Holistic and integrative guidance 
• Negotiation and co-operation 
• Consultation and consensus seeking for 













7. Models of National Corporate Governance Systems 
 
An important methodology in this thesis is to employ comparative analysis of cross-
country experiences of corporate governance implementation in order to inform and 
enlighten policy options for the reform of the Saudi corporate governance system. 
However, the sheer number of corporate governance application in national jurisdictions 
of Muslim, European, African, American and other countries renders comparison with 
individual countries impracticable for the purpose of this thesis, especially as it has 
already been remarked that there are as many corporate governance systems as there 
are countries.345 Another more reasonable alternative is to restrict comparison to a 
limited set of selected countries. However, this latter option raises the question of the 
appropriate selection criteria of inclusion and exclusion of countries. 
An even more reasonable option is to undertake the comparison not with individual 
jurisdictions but rather between models of national applications of corporate 
governance. This approach is considered more efficient and methodologically more 
sound since each model of corporate governance applies to a considerable number of 
countries. Thus, the experience of a great number of countries worldwide can be 
covered through the discussion and analysis of a handful number of models. 
Naturally, the application of corporate governance standards in national jurisdictions 
varies considerably from one country to another. This is due to differences in history, 
economics considerations but also due to differences in legal and political culture. This 
chapter will be devoted to the discussion of the main and widely discussed national 
application models of corporate governance including the following: 
																																								 																				








- The ‘Legal Origins’ model discussed in section (7.1) 
- The institutional v the legislative (section 7.2) 
- The enabling v the mandatory model (section 7.4) 
- Emerging economies model (section 7.5) 
There are a few remarks about these models worthy noting from the outset. First, there 
is substantial overlap between the various models mentioned above to the extent that 
they me be regarded as different facets of essentially the same argument, varying in 
emphasis or in respect of the supporting evidence. Second, the models are almost 
invariably discussed in binary opposition between alternatives such as e.g. the common 
v the civil law model, etc. Notwithstanding, the matter should not be understood as a 
black- or- white kind of choice, as the characteristics of the opposed models seem to 
overlap in some instances, i.e. jurisdictions of the institutional approach might for certain 
purposes adopt certain treatment that fall classically under the characteristics of the 
legislative approach and vice versa. 
7.1 The Legal Origins Model 
The analysts Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
W. Vishny (known as LLSV for short) argued in a number of articles346 for a model of 
corporate governance defined by what they term as ‘the legal origin’ of the system. The 
authors focus their analysis on the distinction, broadly made, between the ‘common law’ 
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and the civil law. While the ‘legal origins’ thesis discussed in this section overlaps with 
other models discussed subsequently in this chapter, the LLSV approach is defined by 
the following main characteristics: 
First, the LLSV approach is based on the difference in legal culture which underlies the  
common and civil law traditions. Admittedly, the common and civil law may be 
distinguished from varying perspectives with respect to their intrinsic attributes. The 
emphasis of the LLSV in more on the legal tradition and legal culture or ‘origin’ which 
determines certain legal orientation and regulation. 
Second, while other authors tend to rely more on theoretical arguments and evidence, 
the approach of LLSV is characteristically empirical rather being merely theoretical. 
7.1.1 The main thesis of LLSV 
The LLSV thesis is centered on the main argument, supported by empirical evidence, 
that legal rules protecting investors vary systematically among legal traditions or origins 
and that rules originating in English law are more protective of investors than the laws of 
civil law generally and French civil law particularly. While legal tradition and culture may 
extend beyond legal rules347, the LLSV conclusion is evidently based on the assumption 
that legal rules governing investor protection can be measured and coded for many 
countries using national commercial and corporate laws.348 
It is worth noting that while the common is defined as ‘the English’ and the civil law as 
‘the French’, both legal traditions were introduced into various countries around the 
globe through conquest and colonization but also through voluntary adoption,349 these 
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systems are regarded as largely exogenous to the majority to which they currently 
apply. 
Moreover, LLSV adopt a broad conception of legal origin defined as a style of social 
control of economic life. They strongly argue that common law stands for the strategy of 
social control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas the civil law, 
contrarily, seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations. 
The civil law tradition is regarded as historically the oldest, the most influential, and the 
most widely distributed around the world, especially after so many transition economies 
particularly in Eastern Europe have returned to it. It originates in Roman law, uses 
statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material, and 
relies heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate rules. Furthermore, the 
process of dispute resolution in the civil law tends to be inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial.  
In contrast to common law, “French civil law developed as it did because the 
revolutionary generation, and Napoleon after it, wished to use state power to alter 
property rights and attempted to insure that judges did not interfere. Thus, quite apart 
from the substance of legal rules, there is a sharp difference between the ideologies 
underlying common and civil law, with the latter notably more comfortable with the 
centralized and activist government”.350 
																																								 																				
350 Paul G Mahoney, “The Common Law and Eco- nomic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right.” (2001) Journal of Legal 
Studies, 30(2): 503–25. (quoted in LLSV The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, (June 2008) Journal of 










7.1.2 Empirical outcomes of legal origins 
In both the common and the civil law, the links between the underlying legal origins to 
economic outcomes in the real world is not direct but is mediated through particular 
legal rules. Thus, LLSV follow a two stage procedure: they first consider the effect of 
legal origins on particular laws and regulations, and then the effects of these laws and 
regulations on the economic outcomes that they might influence most directly. The 
evidence out of this procedure showed the following: 
1. That legal investor protection is a strong predictor of financial development. The 
authors found that the protection of investors, i.e. shareholders and creditors, is 
not only strongly related with financial development but also that differences can 
be explained by legal origin. Having examined 49 countries, their result was that 
Common Law countries protect shareholders and creditors better than Civil Law 
countries (especially the French ones). 
2. That the influence of legal origins on laws and regulations is not restricted to 
finance. Several studies conducted jointly by LLSV and other revealed that such 
outcomes as government ownership of banks, the burden of entry regulations, 
regulation of labor markets, incidence of military conscription, and government 
ownership of the media vary across legal families.  
3. In all the above spheres, which extend beyond the finance sector, the civil law is 
associated with a heavier hand of government ownership and regulation than 
common law. Many of these indicators of government ownership and regulation 
are associated with adverse impacts on markets, such as greater corruption, 
larger unofficial economy, and higher unemployment.  
4. In other LLSV studies, the evidence shows that common law is associated with 
lower formalism of judicial procedures) and greater judicial independence than 
civil law. The authors further argue that these indicators are in turn associated 








In summary, compared to French civil law, common law is associated with (a) better 
investor protection, which in turn is associated with improved financial development, 
better access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion, (b) lighter government 
ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less corruption, better 
functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and (c) less formalized and 
more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with more secure 
property rights and better contract enforcement. 
Moreover, distinguishing feature of the two systems is articulated as follows: the, civil 
law is “policy implementing,” while common law is “dispute resolving”.351 In the words of 
Katharina Pistor 352 , the French civil law embraces “socially-conditioned private 
contracting,” in contrast to common law’s support for “unconditioned private 
contracting”. The German legal system of corporate gveornance will be discussed in the 
section (7.1.5) as an example of the civil law tradition.353 
7.1.3 Criticism: the legal origins thesis reinterpreted 
The legal origin thesis has generated significant interest, debate and criticism in the 
literature. The major criticism came from a theoretical 354  and an empirical 355 
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perspective. These criticism challenge the categorization of legal families and the legal 
origin belonging of individual countries as well as the outcome of the legal origin thesis.  
7.1.3.1 Challenges  
One of the main theoretical critic came from comparative law comentators. Mathias 
Siems contributed a number of articles challenging and reinterpreting the legal origins 
thesis.  
For modern comparative lawyers, this revival of “legal families” through the “legal 
origins” debate is considered surprising as they increasingly emphasize that law is 
becoming international, transnational, or even global, so that looking at legal families is 
seen as less important one could first of all doubt the explanatory force of legal families. 
Indeed there are scholars who emphasize that other aspects, such as politics, culture, 
religion, and geography, are considerably more important than the belonging to a 
particular legal family. The main criticism of the legal origins can be summarised in the 
following points: 
1. Improper categorization of countries and their legal origin belonging. The legal 
origins thesis is criticised for improper classification of individual countries with 
legal families (Common and civl law). As a result, it appears strange that 
according to legal origins advocates that Latvia and Taiwan as well as Lithuania 
and Syria are, for example, put into the same legal box, but Latvia and Lithuania 
are categorized differently. This insight can also be extended to other Eastern 
European countries because here too there is often a mixture of different 
influencing factors as well as specific features which are dissimilar to the 
established Western European legal families.  
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2. A mere categorization of a system as English Common Law or French Civil Law 
disregards again deeper legal structures, such as the question how courts work 
or how new law, old law and customs interact. Thus, the fundamental question 
how the imposed new legal traditions mixed with chthonic and Islamic legal 
traditions. 
3.  As a result, Mathias Siems concludes that the law and finance categorization of 
legal families which aims to cover most countries of the world, is to a large extent 
just arbitrary.356  
7.1.3.2 Reinterpretation 
It is worth noting, however, that Siems does not dispute the essential contention of the 
legal origins thesis that “a country’s legal heritage shapes its approach to property 
rights, private contracting, investor protection, and hence financial development‘. 
Rather, his criticism is about the categorization of countries and the use of legal families 
as explanatory tools. According, Siems looks for characteristic features which are more 
precise than the use of legal families as such in explaining the outcomes claimed by the 
legal origins thesis.  
It is difficult, Siems claims, to establish commonalities and heritage between legal 
systems. It is difficult to establish in equal terms the Roman Law origin of both the 
French and the German systems. Moreover, even the common law could be argued to 
have some Roman law influence. Equally, laws of different countries categorized within 
the same family are distinctly influenced by local variables such as culture and language 
which influences their legal language vocabulary and concepts differently. 
Thus, Siems suggest alternative variables used to reinterpret the data including: 
countries by “colonization”, “language”, “importance of statutory and case law” and 
“formality and flexibility of legal systems” as proxies for legal origin. 
																																								 																				








7.1.4 Relevance of legal origin to the analysis of the Saudi legal system 
Worldwide expansion of the common and civil law represents voluntary and involuntary 
transmission legal origins or traditions across human populations. One of the 
consequences of this expansion is that some national legal systems are sufficiently 
similar in some critical respects to others to permit classification of national legal 
systems into major families of law characterized be the following criteria: (1) its historical 
background and development, (2) its predominant and characteristic mode of thought in 
legal matters, (3) especially distinctive institutions, (4) the kind of legal sources it 
acknowledges and the way it handles them, and (5) its ideology. 
Notwithstanding the mixed nature of the Saudi legal system indicated in section 
(1.1.2.1), the adoption of some laws from one legal tradition into another with a different 
legal culture is not equivalent but rather leaves a particular tradition (usually the 
indigenous tradition) as the dominant one the country. It is therefore important to pose 
the question of the impact of legal origins debate on the Saudi legal system. In this 
respect, there are a number of factor which need to be taken into account, including: 
1. In principle, there is agreement between the main presupposition of this thesis 
and a basic tenet of the legal origins thesis to the effect that there is a correlation 
between the quality of legal rules and positive economic impact. This thesis 
argues for an enhanced and a robust legal framework of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia to attract investment, increase growth and realize development 
goals. The correlation argued for by LSSV goes much deeper in claiming that the 
quality and economic efficiency of corporate governance rules is determined by 
their legal origin. 
2. The Saudi system is based fundamentally on the Islamic legal system. Thus, 
Islamic principles constitute the foundations of Saudi legal culture which may not 








3. The Saudi legal system has a religious base. This is in contradistinction to the 
mainly secular base of both the common law and civil law, and several sub-
traditions—French, German, socialist, and Scandinavian—within civil law. 
4. Thus, the scope of influence of the legal origin and the French civil law in 
particular on the Saudi legal system can be expected to be confined to the 
commercial sphere. Moreover, even within this limitation, it should be 
remembered, that Islamic law constitutes the background against which 
particular rules and to be interpreted and applied. 
7.1.5 Corporate Governance in Germany: Too Little Room for Change 
Germany was always seen as a very traditional jurisdiction, which holds on certain 
traditions and inherited principles that cannot be eliminated without facing a grave public 
resistance. On the top of such traditions are the principles of co- determination that can 
be simply defined as the legal requirement that employers in a company participate in 
the decision making process, as well as the two-tier control over the company. The 
mentioned traditions, taken with the structure of ownership and control in the German 
market, imposed serious limitations that strongly tied the reform of corporate law and 
adaptation of corporate governance principles and norms. 
This part of the research will start by giving a brief on the structure of ownership in the 
German economy to find out how this structure revealed the shortcomings of the 
system. However, as expected, such structure found many commentators to defend. 
Then, the research will advance to describe the two-tier system as well as the co-
determination systems as legal requirements that give the corporate law in Germany its 
unique character. The research will also highlight the major drivers for reform and report 
on some of the efforts been made, on the top of which is the Corporate Governance 








7.1.5.1 The Structure of Ownership and Control in German Market 
A brief on the structure of ownership and control in Germany at the time reform was 
called for is important and of relevance to this research from two angles. On one hand, 
it shows how different the market is for a country that is well developed with regard to 
other aspects of doing business, and on the other, it shows the extent to which an effort 
for reform was needed. 
The economy of companies limited by shares in Germany was very much concentrated. 
"There were 2,682 Aktiengesellschaften [(Companies limited by shares)] of which 501 
were stock exchange listed. It seems that 90 percent of these listed companies are 
majorly owned by one or more active or controlling shareholders. Only sixty to seventy 
companies are really publicly traded companies, representing the largest German 
corporation. Institutional investors were present in the market; however they preferred 
investing in bonds, particularly governmental bonds over investing on shares."357 
To look for such controllers over companies, it was not a surprise that such control was 
finance driven. Indeed, control was in the hand of banks. "Banks participation in industry 
and bank representatives sitting on supervisory boards happens frequently in 
Germany."358 By this, banks were enjoying importance greater than they enjoyed in 
other countries. Another characteristic of German companies was the existence of 
greater number of large shareholders on the account of minor shareholders’ 
participation, opposed to a small number of corporations. 
Taking the above structure of the market in Germany into consideration, it seems that 
such institutional shareholders are not playing the 'market player' role they usually enjoy 
in a typical financial market. 
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7.1.5.2 Historical Traditions, the Inherited Becoming Inherent 
There are certain aspects relevant to the structure and the method by which German 
companies were established and operated. These aspects are of historical origin and 
have become inherited in the system and conscience of all market players. Those 
factors, some being more important than others, need to be highlighted in the context of 
this research, as they might be a serious challenge for reform. On one hand, some of 
them are participating to some of the weak points of the system, and on the other hand, 
those may not be touched without resistance as they are seen as social necessities and 
sources of national pride.  
Those factors are the obligatory two-tier board, the system of co-determination, and the 
lack of an effective legal treatment for takeovers. 
While, as mentioned above, such factors are considered inherent in the culture of 
German economy, they are perceived by some observers to be "fossils from another 
age."359 However, the bottom line is that such matters, in any effort for reformation, 
should be handled with caution. These factors will be further illustrated below. 
7.1.5.3 The Two-Tier Board 
Company boards in Germany have two organs, the supervisory board, or the 
Aufsichtsrat, and the management board, or the Vorstand. 
The board of management is responsible for conducting the affairs of the corporation 
and representing the corporation in all matters. This is seen necessary to protect the 
shareholders from harmful decisions and to safeguard the interests of shareholders. 
What greatly aids in this is the great authority and control the board enjoys by virtue of 
law, while the supervisory board "has the responsibility of appointing the members of 
the second tier… The supervisory board is statutorily responsible for overseeing the 
																																								 																				








board of management, examining the operation books, reviewing its assets, giving 
approval for certain management decisions and calling shareholders' meetings when 
they are in the corporation's best interest."360  
In what seems to be a projection of the agency theory into the situation in Germany to 
describe the two-tier board system, it was said that "In the German system, the 
shareholders have delegated the day-to-day management to the management board 
and have entrusted the monitoring to the supervisory board."361 
"This separation of tasks between two organs – which is mandatory- is more than a 
hundred years old, and has never been seriously questioned in any reform of corporate 
law in Germany."362 Therefore, it is legitimate to imagine that such a matter may not be 
subject to any reform, and that any relevant effort for reform will need to find a way 
around such a norm without changing the status. 
One of the features that make the above illustrated board structure in Germany unique 
is that it is a statutory requirement in the full sense of the word as per the provisions of 
law which impose the two-tire board, composed of the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand as 
an inevitable requirement. 
The rationale behind such an approach was to give shareholders the opportunity to 
have a representative body (Aufsichtsrat – supervisory board) to look after their rights 
and interests against the management board (Vorstand), with a view, back to the 
projection of the agency theory, to negate the agency problems between investment 
and management.363  
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Unsurprisingly, a great debate has taken place as regard to such a system, but it was 
also said that "According to the overwhelming view in German practice and legal theory 
has clear merits and should not be questioned"364 as it is likely to contribute to a healthy 
relation between employees and investors; thanks to the principle of co-determination. 
7.1.5.4 The Principle of Co-Determination 
The principle of co-determination as known in the German corporate law can be defined 
as the right of employees to participate in the decision making process with regard to 
the companies in which they work. More particularly, it refers to their right to elect their 
representatives in the supervisory boards in certain companies, such as large 
enterprises and enterprises which belong to the coal and steel sectors in specific. 
Therefore, the discussion of such a feature is closely relevant to the above description 
of the system of two-tier boards, "essential to the understanding of the system are the 
rules relating to co determination… half of the Aufsichtsrat members have to be elected 
by the shareholders, the other half by the employees. However, the shareholders 
maintain the last say, whether as a consequence of the chairman's casting vote, or due 
to the rule subjecting major company related decisions to their agreement."365 
Again, such a feature is highly supported and defended in the German society where 
the work force is a great segment of the public, and they have their influence on the 
decisions of a company, perhaps on the account of shareholders who do not enjoy such 
an influence in company’s decision making 
In defending such a norm by German corporate law, as opposed to the applicable 
norms in the UK, it was said that, "the co-determination system means that elected 
workers’ representatives have more far reaching information, consultation, and veto 
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rights on certain issues than those in a country like Britain where there is only one board 
of directors representing the shareholders’ interests.”366 
7.1.5.5 Drivers for Reform 
The reasons that called for corporate law reform in Germany were not a surprise. Some 
of the major drivers for reform are similar to the reasons which call for reform in the 
traditional case, i.e. companies collapsing on the ground of criminal behaviour from the 
part of insiders. There is a greater merit in the competition of regulators, that is, to 
provide an appealing profile for investors to have their companies based in Germany, 
and the desire to greaten the value of assets for the benefit of right holders.367 
Beside the above 'classical' reasons calling for corporate law reform, there are other 
reasons that stem from the locality of the German experience to a great extent. Such 
reasons relate, either directly or indirectly, to the inherited traditional features of 
corporate law system that Germany have had, as was illustrated above. Such reasons 
were best summarized by Theodor Baums in his article 'Company Reform in Germany': 
German companies were expanding and at certain point in time, some German 
companies looked for listing in financial markets of other countries, and at this point in 
time in particular, the German companies realized that they apply different norms from 
those internationally recognized norms, and therefore needed to effort to develop norms 
that are more homogeneous with those applied in the rest of the World. 
Multinational institutional investors based outside Germany were engaged in the 
acquiring shares and interests in German companies, indeed, they "bring their 
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international market expectations into the German market" 368  thus needing to be 
assured and comforted that such rights and participations enjoy no less protection than 
that the same enjoy in other countries in the World.  
Relevant to the reason above, Germany was heading more towards a pension system 
that is based on institutional investors, thus influencing the above illustrated structure of 
capital and ownership in the German market.  
Last but not the least, more harmonization of corporate law is taking place all across the 
continental Europe as regard to the application of the relevant directives. 
7.1.5.6 Acknowledging the Need for Reform, Finding the Elephant in the 
Room 
There were certain shortcomings and areas for improvement that faced less resistance 
when they have been examined for reform. Many commentators admitted the need for 
introducing amendments to the then in force framework. These amendments are the 
following: 
Modest Confidence amongst the Public in the German Financial Market, or More 
Particularly the Market for Shares; and the Less Developed Market. 
In the study of De La Porta and others, there were links between development of the 
financial market and certain factors that indicate the protection of the shareholders; 
Germany did not enjoy an advanced rank. Many of the factors discussed herein 
contributed in such a result. 
This modest confidence is a reflection for the structure of the market. At some point in 
time, there were only 501 limited by shares companies that were listed in the market, 
out of 2682 total number of such companies.369  
																																								 																				








In Germany, share ownership is heavily concentrated with over half of all shares being 
owned by (non-financial) companies, banks and insurance companies. Whether 
companies are financial or non-financial, they are often part of networks of cross 
holdings where the main motive of shareholding is to strengthen long-term relationships 
and business interdependencies, which is a behaviour that involves long-term 
commitment. In Germany, only a minor role is played by the value orientation that 
focuses on return on equity and the value-based behaviour of trading stocks.370  
The Need to Create an Appropriate Framework for Takeovers or for the Market for 
Control 
Companies are being taken over, not on the public market, but because of private 
negotiation between present and future controlling shareholders.371 
The Influence that Banks Had 
The influence that banks have had was illustrated when describing the structure of the 
market in Germany above. In particular, "the critics… find faults with the combination of 
lending, bank participation, chair, and seats on many supervisory boards, and the 
'depository vote', i.e. the banks exercise through their investment company 
subsidiaries."372 
The Dominance of Obligatory Rules  
The scene in Germany was indeed marked with "too much regulation and jurisdiction." 
The corporate governance system in Germany is based heavily on mandatory law that 
was likely to result into the absence of flexibility and "paralysis of initiative and the 
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market forces."373 A clear example of this is the above illustrated two-tier board system, 
which is still obligatory in Germany. 
7.1.5.7 Reform Efforts 
It might be strange that, in the case of Germany, the description of the problem was 
more important than highlighting on the efforts for solution, as the status quo 
represented major challenge that reformers needed to take for granted and find their 
way around it. There were various efforts that took place in Germany to find solutions to 
the above problems. The introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance was an 
important effort, but, with the dominance of the obligatory rules in the system, the 
introduction of such a code might be strange, i.e. as per the above experience of the 
UK. A code is usually introduced to fill the gaps that a less mandatory system leaves. 
This part of the research will give a little brief on the Code and shed light on the efforts 
made to deal with the major problems illustrated above. 
The Corporate Governance Code 
The Corporate Governance Code is the result of the work of a governmental committee 
formed for this purpose; it was adopted on February 26, 2002, and was last amended in 
May 26, 2010. Its major purpose was to govern the issues concerning German listed 
companies and give a considerable deal of attention to the matter of the board and its 
duties. The code contains two categories of provisions; the obligatory provisions that 
apply on comply- or- explain basis, and the recommendations.374 
The code addresses the issue of the need of building confidence in the German stock 
market by providing for the rights of shareholders to vote as well as their rights with 
regard to the general meetings. 
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The code then addresses the issue of the two-tier board. It maintains it with no 
amendment, and provides in Section 3.1 thereof that the two boards shall cooperate 
closely to the benefit of the enterprise. 
The code describes the duties of the two boards as stated above, and it provides that 
the members of the two boards should cooperate, which in general gives the more 
important mandates to the supervisory board. Other than that, the code goes too little 
behind listing ordinary and internationally recognized norms. 
It also provides for the composition of the two boards and the financial entitlements of 
its members, and then it advances to tackle the issue of members of the boards having 
conflicting interests, the transparency and the flow of information, and then the matter of 
auditing financial statements. 
The Co Determination 
As regard to the principle of co-determination, it still survives as it is with commentators 
strongly supporting it. It was even defended by saying that "getting rid of the system will 
do nothing to improve the quality of the supervisory boards that are supposed to monitor 
company performance."375 However, it will remain a matter of deep debate with too little 
to be done. 
The Influence of the Banks 
As regard to the great influence that banks enjoyed, an initiative to dismantle the power 
of banks was rejected by the Parliament. The Takeover Regulation and for the 
regulation of takeovers, Germany introduced some amendments on the ground of the 
need to modernize the law to make available a market for control, as well as to stay in 
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pace with the relevant EC Directives. It, therefore, replaced the non-binding takeover 
code with the takeover act of 2002. 
7.1.5.8 The German Experience: A Note of Assessment 
Germany is a clear example were the resistance for change is high, and the traditions 
and social pressures impose great challenge for any effort for reform. With regard to the 
above illustrated norms that might need to be adjusted with the international best 
practices, many studies were made and recommendations were published, but 
advancement in change was very little. 
An important remark was the high dependence of the German System on the 
mandatory rules. However, when the corporate law reform was an international trend, 
Germany introduced a Code of Corporate Governance that difficultly found its way in 
the obligatory system.  
Taking into consideration all the opinions that favours the traditional approaches, what 
should separate an effective norm from a less effective norm should be the participation 
of such a norm in greatening the value of the company, as per the thesis of De La Porta 
and others. This value needs certain attention in Germany. 
7.2 The Institutional v the Legislative Model 
However, two major approaches can be seen in the international experience in this 
regard; the institutional approach, which is a ‘market-oriented model that relies on 
relatively little mandatory law to protect shareholders …. [and] depends on a host of 
other formal and informal mechanisms, such as incentive-based compensation and 
hostile takeovers, to hold managers and directors accountable’.376 The legal approach 
depends on a mandatory model of corporate law in which the state, as opposed to the 
																																								 																				









marketplace, plays a central role in shoring up shareholder protections by fashioning 
mandatory rules that define shareholder property rights.377  
The institutional model of corporate governance is characterised by its reliance more 
primarily on market institutions and non-official methods than on official statutory laws to 
regulate the conduct of corporate governance. Such methods can be rooted either in 
practices that constitute customs developed over time and recognised by case law, or in 
practices that depend on the moral and conscious determination of the managers and 
directors on what is considered right and wrong, i.e. norms.  Such methods might also 
be oriented by incentives granted to motivate managers’ compliance and endeavours in 
working for the good of the company and for the realization of profits for shareholders. A 
good example of the institutional model prevailed under the Corporate Law of Delaware 
in the USA discussed below (7.3.1). 
Contrarily, the legislative or legal model is characterised by the substantial weight it 
gives to mandatory and regulatory provisions dictating managers and officers’ duties 
and obligations. Unlike the institutional model it relies more on the use or legal 
instruments to regulate and implement corporate governance.		
7.2.1 Characteristic of the institutional model 
7.2.1.1 This Model Suits Developed Economies 
As stated above, the institutional approach consists of a number of elements that 
participate in forming an integrated governance system that exists beside the law. The 
law in this regard is ‘simply one part of a much more complex set of formal and informal 
institutions’.378 It can even be said that such a role that the law plays is even secondary, 
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meaning that the law will not function in the absence of such other factors, which ‘work 
together to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts’.379  
The USA model of corporate governance under the Corporate Law of Delaware380 is 
often discussed as a primary example of the institutional model for two main reasons:  
1. The U.S. market is considered an advanced market to a degree that it developed 
mechanisms that compensated for the absence of mandatory rules, and it provides 
a good a degree of protection for shareholders' rights through certain powers that 
they can exercise.  
2. It was foreseen that companies should also be given some liberty to tailor their 
mechanisms and rules to their own needs. It was, therefore, fairly said that 
‘companies have different business needs, different corporate cultures and ways 
of doing things, and different people and personalities, all of which are subject to 
change’.381 Reflecting this understanding, Section 141 (a) of Delaware General 
Corporation Law provided that ‘business and affairs of every corporation ... shall 
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors’, giving director so 
wide discretion, that is however not left without any caps. Such caps will be further 
detailed below. 
As stated above in discussing the components and the complements of the institutional 
model, such an approach consists of a wide spectrum of components that are spread 
over legislations, case law, personal consciousness of directors and managers, market 
factors, institutions, fiduciary duty, etc. markets develop The combination of these 
mechanisms are developed gradually by markets over time. The economic activity 
always comes to existence before the law thereof, which then comes to cure any 
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distortions. Economic activity in this sense advances the legislation; therefore, a system 
may not depend on such factors unless these factors are well rooted. For example, an 
important character of the institutional system is the autonomy that is given to the 
managers to run the company though such an obligation was stated by the less 
extensive provisions of law. It is the set of customs, which were well-developed over 
time that set for directors how this duty is to be discharged. It is fair to say that directors 
should do so with observing their fiduciary duties. Again, fiduciary duties relevant to the 
execution of the mandate of the directors and officers are a concept that developed over 
hundreds of years in time.  
7.2.1.2 The institutional model suits common law countries 
The distinctive feature of common law that is relevant to the subject matter of this 
research is that it consists of the law of the courts as expressed in judicial decisions. 
The grounds for deciding cases are found in precedents provided by past decisions, as 
contrasted to the civil law system, which is based on statutes and prescribed texts.382 
 
The common law is formed by judges, who have to resolve specific disputes in 
particular cases. Precedents from judicial decisions, as opposed to contributions by 
scholars, shape common law.383 However, it has been remarked that common law 
courts are not absolutely bound by precedent, but can, for demonstrably good reason, 
reinterpret and revise the law, without legislative intervention, to adapt to new trends in 
political, legal and social philosophy.384  In this sense, the difference between the 
institutional and the legislative approach of corporate governance seems to be a 
reflection to this classical difference between Civil law and Common law approaches. 
What is considered as good governance is a concept that develops over time. 
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Therefore, what courts consider to be a good observation to the fiduciary duty also 
develops in the eyes of common law judges who actually state what is right and what is 
not. Common law judges can use flexible fiduciary duties to root out more effectively 
insider abuses by filling the inevitable gaps left by statutes. Civil law judges, on the 
other hand, are relegated to interpreting the relevant code and have less flexibility to 
apply general standards of loyalty, due care, and good faith to fill problematic gaps.385 
Parades also expressed a view that, when compared to civil law countries, the common 
law countries demonstrate greater respect for individual autonomy over governmental 
authority. Accordingly, property rights are more secure, particularly from state 
expropriation, in common law systems, and the state is less intrusive in economic and 
commercial affairs, leaving these matters to the private sector.386 
7.2.1.3 The contractual character of the model 
As already discussed, shareholders own the corporation and accordingly, directors and 
officers are regarded merely as stewards for the shareholders' interests. An alternative 
view describes the shareholders as merely one of many factors of productions bound 
together in a complex web of explicit and implicit contracts. However, as per the agency 
theory discussed in this research, others perceive directors and officers as agents of the 
shareholders, with fiduciary obligations to maximise shareholders wealth. Accordingly, 
shareholders retain a privileged position among the corporation's various 
constituencies, because their contract with the firm has ownership- like features, 
including the right to vote and the fiduciary obligations of directors and officers.387 
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Management can be perceived as a correlative relation. That is, it is simultaneously a 
duty on managers and a right that is vested with shareholders. However, for the lack of 
time and experience388, the shareholders delegate the management to a board of 
directors who will supervise the operation of the company, as such operation is 
executed by managers. In return of their efforts in executing such delegated duties, 
managers are granted a set of incentives, but they are under the supervision of the 
shareholders as can be exercised, for example, in general assembly meetings. 
The contractual approach in this meaning refers to the liberty that founders of a 
company (naturally institutional founders in particular can be more influential in this 
regard) have in order to set what they believe better serves the good governance of the 
company. Legislation may contain voluntary rules and leave to the founders and the 
shareholders the liberty to decide on the articles of incorporation of the company. 
Founders can also choose the way in which they intend to fill the gaps that are left by 
the less comprehensive pieces of legislations when a company founders are willing to 
set certain rules that go beyond that minimum standards set by the law. Further, and as 
the institutional approach is more described as an enabling approach, it leaves some 
room for the parties to contract against such terms without this be seen as a breach of 
the law, and without this resulting into the imposition of a penalty.  
7.2.1.4 Managers autonomy and non- legislative compliance tools  
In a well-established, mature financial market, managers are expected to possess and 
demonstrate awareness of what their mandate implies in terms of professional 
capabilities or ethics. It can be said that certain values have autonomously developed 
with time to form an integral part of the consciousness of managers to observe good 
governance practices. The U.S. corporate governance system relies on directors and 
																																								 																				








officers to do the right thing" by voluntarily taking steps to maximize firm value even 
when nobody is watching and there is little of any risk of market or legal sanction’.389 
What makes a right thing in this context may vary. Such a notion is ‘defined by 
circumstance, psychology, and culture’390  and, therefore, such a concept might be 
difficult to shape or describe precisely. However, these notions of norms and 
professionalism are softer and less well understood than the other institutions, but that 
doesn’t mean that they’re absent, or that they’re unimportant.391 
Another factor that might be relevant in this regard is the incentives that the institutional 
system grants to managers. Managers are compensated with financial and non-financial 
packages that make the good of the company a good for the managers at the same 
time; thus, motivating the managers to act in the best interest of the company in order to 
indirectly expand the benefits that they acquire.  
Further, market forces and trends can also be seen as influencing factors in this regard. 
Taken with the reaction shareholders can take to respond to it, either through general 
assembly meetings or through exercising their choice in selling out the shares they own, 
shareholders still retain an important role to play. A well-stated example on the 
importance of such a factor was given by Parades; 
 
Companies need to be run efficiently and managed properly to succeed in a 
competitive marketplace. Further, if profits drop, a company should face a higher 
cost of capital, which could further impede its competitiveness against 
companies with lower cost structures and perhaps less constraining debt 
covenants and less burdensome principal and interest payments. If a company 
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is not run well or its governance is questionable, its shareholders can always 
follow the "Wall Street Rule" and sell into the market, putting downward pressure 
on the company's share price. At some point the company might become a 
takeover target, in which case the board and top executives are likely to be 
ousted. Short of the company being acquired, the board might remove senior 
executives if the company's share price continues to fall. It is also possible for 
shareholders to elect new directors if they become dissatisfied with the direction 
in which the incumbent board is taking the company.392 
7.2.1.5 The model does not imply the absence of a role for law 
It should be first clarified that the description of the model as 'institutional', and the fact 
that the approach does not give major importance to legal provisions may not mean that 
the law has no role at all to play. The United States, with its mature and well established 
financial market, represents a classical example of an institutional corporate 
governance system. Notwithstanding this fact, a major component of such a system is 
the law in a number of ways.  
For example, corporate law plays a significant role in 'lighting the way' for directors and 
managers in practicing their duties and responsibility, and on the other, the U.S 
executed a sui generis act for corporate governance. To distinguish the role that law, in 
particular corporate law, plays in the institutional approach from that it plays in the legal- 
mandatory approach, and by taking the corporate law of Delaware as an example, it can 
be said that the role that the law generally plays under an institutional system is more 
an enabling role. In other words, it provides for the officers and the managers of a 
company the necessary freedom to manage the company the way they deem fit. The 
law in this context, unlike in the legislative- mandatory approach, will not look over- 
detailed to tell the directors what to do, but it may tell them what they should not do. 
																																								 																				








The role that the law plays differently in the two models was also linked to the timing on 
which the judiciary or even regulatory authorities as entities entrusted with the 
enforcement of good practices intervene to enforce the rules of corporate governance. 
The mandatory approach can be said to be more ex ante, meaning that it states what 
should be done in advance. The enabling approach concentrates more on examining 
the legitimacy of the actions taken in light of the parameters of good practices on an ex 
poste basis. It means that it gives weight for the enforcement efforts that take place 
after the actions were taken in the frame of dispute resolution procedures, either before 
courts regulatory authorities or alternative dispute resolution methods.393 
Although this classical differentiation between the roles that the law plays in both 
approaches might be seen as logical and reasoned, it can be seen that the law is 
playing recently a more important role even in the countries with institutional approach.  
The United States governance system responded to the economic scandals in the early 
years of the 2000s. For example, it responded to the scandals of Enron and WorldCom 
that raised questions and worries on the integrity of managers and officers and their 
observation of the good practices they are supposed to observe. Consequently, the 
protection that shareholders in publicly held companies enjoy against the misuses and 
the abuses of the managers, by further intervention from the side of the legislators in a 
more mandatory- like piece of legislation that aimed to restore confidence on the 
integrity of the U.S financial market after the mentioned scandals by issuing what is 
commonly called as "Sarbanes–Oxley" act, that was enacted on July 30, 2002.   
 
Therefore, it was rightfully said that, ‘many economists and legal academics contend 
that the law has a central role to play in protecting shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders, and thus in influencing corporate finance and ownership structures 
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around the globe’.394 Without such a result, the institutional approach loses its primer 
character, which is the voluntary commitment with the sound practices as opposed to 
the mandatory role of law. 
7.2.1.6 The Role of Judiciary 
Judges also play an important role in covering the matters that are left uncovered by the 
relevant pieces of legislation. When judges intervene to decide on whether certain 
practices are sound corporate practices or not, they are supposed to identify the rules 
constituting the standards for separating good practices from those that are not. They 
are also required to give the sufficient analysis and reasoning, by which they do not only 
decide on the particular matter in question, but they also set precedents that become a 
reference for good and sound practices for future instances alike. Therefore, they 
participate in the integration of the fresco of an institutional corporate governance 
complete system. As it has been remarked: 
[J]udges often express their views of the best corporate practices in dicta, 
laying out "roadmaps" instructing management how to conduct itself, while 
at the same time finding the defendants in the particular case at hand not 
liable.395 
As to be further discussed below, judges in common law jurisdictions are expected to 
play a greater role in this regard, with less extensive pieces of legislations. Precedence, 
rules of equity, and most importantly, the overtime-shaped fiduciary duties, become 
sources of the commitment of good governance, as crystallised by judiciary into a 
considerable body of case law. 
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Again, reflecting this role that judiciary plays in the U.S corporate governance system, 
and in particular the experience of the judges of Delaware in this regard, it can be said 
that: ‘Delaware has a very well-developed body of case law, making it more rule-like. 
More importantly, a very sophisticated and experienced judiciary administers the law of 
fiduciary duties against the background norm of shareholder primacy’.396 
 
It was seen as a draw back in this regard that such judicial control is ‘about procedural 
due care and not substantive due care’.397 Courts review the decision-making process 
of directors and officers, but generally do not regulate the substance of their business 
decisions.398 Though if this was considered to be right, I believe that this character can 
be seen coherent with the considerable degree of liberty granted to managers and 
officers to reasonably manage the company in the way they reasonably deem fit. 
Further, the following examples may be given as acts found in contradiction with 
fiduciary duties though they are not procedural in nature:  
 
Controllers who steal from the firm have typically violated one of those 
duties. Controllers who divert business opportunities from the firm to 
themselves will typically violate one of those duties. Controllers who 
force the firm to sell a product at a low price to the controller’s (or the 
controller’s relative’s) wholly-owned private firm will typically violate one 
of those duties.399 
7.2.1.7 Supporting Institutions 
As suggested by its name, the institutional approach will not be so without the role that 
various institutions will have to play in this regard. In this sense, institutions are among 
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the various elements that the combination of which forms the integrated governance 
system in the institutional model. 
 
The institutional model involves a number of institutions, including: the body of 
shareholders (both influential and non-influential), directors and managers, and each of 
which represents an ‘institution’. However, for such institutions to play their role in 
corporate governance, every one of which should be aware of its roles and 
responsibilities. Such bodies can be and were described as influential, so as the well-
developed relevant markets, i.e. a product market, a capital market, and a labour 
market. Add to these are the markets of management and control. Further, other private 
parties such as lawyers, auditors, accountants, consultants, bankers and other financial 
facility providers all play an important role in this regard and in forming an institutional 
approach of corporate governance. 
Without denying the influential roles that the above mentioned institutions play in 
disciplining company controllers, there also exist official institutions that were formed 
and crystallized over time in developed markets to play a regulatory - supervisory role 
over the activities of company controllers.  
7.2.1.8 Supporting Legal Duties 
As already discussed, the adaptation of the institutional model does not mean the 
absence of any role for the law to play. As mentioned before, the institutional model is 
the result of combining various aspects and elements that are joint together to set what 
the discipline of managers and officers should look like.  The Corporation Law of 
Delaware, which represents a remarkable example of the laws existing in the 
institutional corporate governance jurisdiction, provided the following: 
In addition to the powers enumerated in § 122 of this title, every corporation, its 








powers and privileges granted by this chapter or by any other law or by its 
certificate of incorporation, together with any powers incidental thereto, so far as 
such powers and privileges are necessary or convenient to the conduct, 
promotion or attainment of the business or purposes set forth in its certificate of 
incorporation.400 
It can be inferred from the above text that, while officers, managers, and shareholders 
enjoy all the powers and privileges provided under the relevant part of the law such 
authority is not absolute as it is tied with the condition that exercise of such powers is, 
as the text provides, necessary or convenient to the conduct, promotion or attainment of 
the business or purposes set forth in its certificate of incorporation. 
 
Also, in the particular case of the United States, certain duties that Sarbanes- Oxley's 
act imposes some obligations on the officers which are not, as such, directly related to 
the powers of directors and officers. For example, section (303) of the mentioned act 
prohibits on officers and directors any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, 
manipulate, or mislead any independent public or certified accountant engaged in the 
performance of an audit of the financial statements of that issuer for the purpose of 
rendering such financial statements materially misleading. 
What can also be considered a good example of the mentioned is the enhanced 
requirements of disclosure and prevention of conflict of interest as provided for under 
title IV of the mentioned act. The same is also supplemented with the obligations 
imposed on directors by virtue of the Federal Securities Law, which "plays a critical role 
in U.S. corporate governance by ensuring that investors, with the assistance of the 
supporting institutions described above, have adequate information to exercise their 
rights to vote, sell, and sue."401 
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7.2.2 Characteristics of the Legislative Model  
The legislative or legal model for corporate governance application, as defined above, is 
characterised by the substantial weight it gives to mandatory and regulatory provisions 
dictating managers and officers’ duties and obligations. It is a mandatory model of 
corporate law in which the state, as opposed to the marketplace, plays a central role in 
shoring up shareholder protections by fashioning mandatory rules that define 
shareholder property rights’.402 
The crucial word in the above description of this approach is the word "mandatory." The 
term "mandatory" as used here means legally mandated, with penalties applying to 
those who fail to comply with the legal rule in question’.403  Thus, it differs essentially 
from the institutional model which gives a considerable degree of freedom for the 
controllers of the companies to apply what they consider good, and enables decision 
makers of the company to apply what they deem most appropriate regarding the best 
interest of the shareholders. The role that law plays within the legislative model was 
rightly characterised as follows: ‘the established legal regime is a command - and - 
control structure in which public officials establish the law and market actors either 
comply or face penalties’.404 
With less liberty given to officers and managers to manage the affairs of the company, it 
can be said that this model is better described as a set of legislative and regulatory 
provisions that put, in mandatory way, what is permitted and what is not with regard to 
managing the affairs of a company. In doing so, the legislation can vary from being 
intensive subject, in the terms that it provides detailed description of what is permitted 
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and what is not, to the imposition of the applicable penalty in the case of non-
compliance, or it can adopt a more enabling approach. In this last mentioned approach, 
the tool that contains the corporate governance provisions can best be described as a 
guideline, or a code of best practices rather than being legislation in the obligatory 
sense of the word. 
7.2.2.1 Legal model Can be Prohibiting 
The corporate governance system of the United States can be classified as an 
institutional jurisdiction, in particular with regard to the corporate law of Delaware as a 
clear example of such an approach, where a considerable number of U.S companies 
are registered. As the mentioned jurisdiction grants fewer rights to shareholders in 
favour of more freedom to officers and directors, the system of Delaware is frequently 
given as a classical book example of this approach. However, Sarbanes-Oxley Act that 
was enacted in the U.S on the federal level in the aftermath of a number of corporate 
crises gives a good example of a prohibiting and legally binding corporate governance 
law.405 
7.2.2.2 Suitability for developing countries 
Various streams of literature support the idea that a mandatory model is more 
appropriate for developing countries that lack the complements that make altogether the 
institutional corporate governance system. Developing countries are also keen, at the 
same time, to develop financial markets so that such markets will ensure the needed 
access to financing, and ultimately for financial markets in such developing countries to 
play their role in economic development. It was said in the regard of describing the 
behaviour of developing countries for adopting the legal approach that: 
																																								 																				









[I]f the state accords primary importance to a certain objective, such as 
investor protection, it will likely seek to ensure that this objective is 
achieved through mandatory legislation. The assumption is that the 
mandatory law is a means to achieve the goal directly because market 
participants will be compelled to comply with the law, not wishing to face 
the regulatory penalties for non-compliance.406 
 
Shareholders still need to have the incentive to invest their savings in the financial 
markets in order to offer the needed financing for new companies to be established or 
for current companies to expand. Therefore, the law needs to provide a concrete, firm, 
and certain legal system to ensure such protection.  
It was, therefore, said that the law is the element that matters in the development of 
financial markets and the protection of shareholders, which is commonly known as 'the 
law matters thesis'. Since non-controlling shareholders do not typically run the company 
day- today, the “law matters thesis” argues for legal protections that shield these 
shareholders from abusive practices at the hands of the insiders and controlling officers 
who actually run the business. For example, the law may protect shareholders from the 
following: excessive executive compensation; insiders’ placing friends and family in 
high-ranking positions; self-dealing transactions involving management; theft; and 
shirking by executives.407 
7.2.2.3 Legal Approach Can Be Self-Enforcing 
Jurisdictions can vary as regard to the approaches taken towards corporate 
governance. As indicated above, it is not a black -or– white kind of option. Even the 
jurisdictions that are considered classical examples of institutional approaches give 
certain weight to legally binding sets of legislations to tackle some certain matters that 
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should not be left to the company executives. The jurisdictions that adopt the legal 
approach can vary with regard to the degree to which the legal rules are intensive and 
mandatory.  
In some countries, corporate governance codes were issued to address managers and 
directors. Those mentioned codes were issued in the form of recommendations or 
guidance for the controllers of listed companies to observe. A good example of the 
mentioned codes is the United Kingdom Corporate Governance Code issued by the 
Financial Reporting Council, 408  which was issued in June 2010. The code was 
described in paragraph four of the introduction thereof as a guide to a number of key 
components of effective board practice. It is based on the underlying principles of all 
good governance: accountability, transparency, probity and focuses on the sustainable 
success of an entity over the long term. 
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code drawn by the Committee on Corporate 
Governance was also indicated as an example of this self-enforcing characteristic since 
it contains what can be described as recommendations for sound management, 
effective supervision and accountability.409 
7.2.2.4 Characteristics of Developing Economies in Favour of the Legal 
model 
The differentiation between institutional v legal model of corporate governance has 
enjoyed a considerable attention in literature in the context of discussing the matter of 
the suitability of the institutional approach, where law is only one element among the 
various elements that constitute the system, to the application in developing countries 
and emerging economies. Therefore, the characteristics of the legal model have always 
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been linked to certain characteristics that exist in developing countries. It is worthwhile 
to highlight in this subsection additional elements and their link to the characteristics of 
developing countries in favour of the legal model towards corporate governance. 
 
1. Immature Capital Markets 
Many of the developing countries have a very short history of liberalising markets, and 
their economies are not equipped with the needed experience to deal with capital 
markets efficiently. Such developing countries are either ex- communist countries, as is 
the case of the member states of the former Soviet Union, or countries that are starting 
to adopt free market approaches where the state itself is withdrawing from being a 
market player by itself or from being an institutional holder of a considerable portion of 
publicly held companies. 
This situation was best described by Troy Parades as follows:  
‘to the extent developing countries have closed economies, protectionist 
trade policies, or businesses otherwise subsidized by the state, 
managers are insulated from the pressures of stiff competition for goods 
and services. ….. There is no reason to assume that the majority of 
companies in developing economies will be capitalized by selling 
common stock to public investors. Not every company is ready to be 
publicly held. Indeed, not every company capital needs merit a public 
offering’.410 
Further, if the separation between ownership and control is an important value that the 
endeavours of corporate governance seriously focus on, such a matter does not enjoy 
																																								 																				








the same important value where companies are, to a wide scale, privately held with 
considerable share either held by the government, an individual, or a family. 
Therefore, Parades represents a trend of literature, in particular with regard to the well-
established practices within the market. In this literature, it was argued that companies 
in developing countries are ready to turn into being publicly held and gain access to a 
pool of funding.  Importantly, the state itself is not ready to surrender certain historical 
roles that it plays within financial markets.411 
 
2. Lack of Institutions in Support of Good Governance 
Similar to the above illustrated immaturity of capital markets in developing countries, it 
was also truly said that  
‘[D]eveloping countries lack most of the formal and informal institutions 
that are necessary to complement an enabling corporate law, 
characterized as having relatively few shareholder protections to create 
an effective system of governance. Developing countries lack the capital 
markets and markets for corporate control that are keys to the U.S. 
system. Indeed, the whole point of the reform efforts is to create 
securities markets’.412 
Therefore, a legal system should be available to compensate the lack of such 
institutions if a developing country is willing to adopt sound governance measures. 
3. Limited Expertise 
An institutional approach towards corporate governance is also supplemented with what 











experienced in order to offer the needed support to the endeavours towards corporate 
governance. "The "second-order" institutions, such as investment bankers, accountants, 
lawyers, and the like, are largely non-existent in developing economies. At the very 
least, they are not as experienced and ubiquitous as in developed economies.413 
Even investors who are turning to the financial markets to generate the profit that they 
are looking for might need some guidance, may be in the form of legal provisions, to be 
accustomed to the requirements and the ethics of financial dealings, and for their own 
protection alike. In a comparison in favour of the U.S market as a well-developed 
financial market, it was said that: 
U.S. capital markets are populated by sophisticated entrepreneurs, 
directors, officers, and financiers, not to mention sophisticated judges. 
Equally important is that U.S. capital markets are populated by what Ron 
Gilson calls "transaction cost engineers. Broadly speaking, these are the 
investment bankers, securities analysts, accountants, and lawyers.414 
7.2.2.5 Nature of the Role of Judiciary in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
A number of commentators argue that there the civil law tradition offer weak protection 
of shareholders. The generalized terms of this argument put forward by Parades and 
others seems to me questionable, in particular with regard to putting all the civil law 
countries in one basket and being labelled as developing countries with less 
shareholders’ protection and applauding common law jurisdictions on the account of 
civil law jurisdictions. The differences between the two systems of law, and the role that 
judiciary plays in each, were the subject of deep and continued discussion.415 
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According to Parades, developing economies characteristically lack an effective judicial 
system, including basic property right in addition to contract enforcement mechanisms, 
let alone a highly regarded judiciary with the sophistication and experience of the 
Delaware courts. In his view, judges in a civil law system may be reluctant to exercise 
the kind of discretion required to apply open-ended fiduciary duties. The law of fiduciary 
duties is ineffectual if judges are not willing to exercise their discretion when called on to 
apply those standards or if the judges are not respected enough for their decisions to 
have legitimacy. 
Major Supporters of this idea are Rafael de La Porta and others, who concluded to say 
that: 
[C]ommon law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil 
law countries the weakest, legal protection of investors, with German 
and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. … Civil laws 
give investors weaker legal rights than common laws do, independent of 
the level of per capita income …. The quality of law enforcement is the 
highest in Scandinavian and German civil law countries, next highest in 
common law countries, and again the lowest in French civil law 
countries."416 
 
This view, which under- estimates civil law jurisdiction in favour of the superiority of 
common law jurisdictions in providing better protection to shareholders and in providing 
basis for financial and economic development, was challenged. However, it can be said 
that the role judiciary plays in a legal approach environment is commensurate with the 
overall character of the legal approach towards corporate governance itself. A judge in a 
common law country plays dual roles. He/she establishes the rule then applies it. By 
																																								 																				








this application, he/she also lays down the precedent to apply on future similar 
instances, while the role of the civil law judge in establishing the rule is not equivalent, 
as he/she plays limited role in creating the rule. 
 
While I see the logic in acknowledging the role of judiciary in forming the institutional 
approach, I do not agree with the suggested necessary link between economic 
development and protection of shareholders, on one hand, and common law, on the 
other hand. The law itself, as applied by civil law judges, can be formed in a way that 
grants the needed protection and participates in economic development.   
7.2.3 Approximating the Two Approaches 
7.2.3.1 Institutional Approach is the Ultimate Goal for the Legal Approach 
The institutional approach was always perceived as the superior approach that best 
realizes the goals of corporate governance. Parades and other commentators, who 
argue against the transplantation of the institutional approach into developing countries, 
believe, as noted severally above, that the developing countries are not ready to 
accommodate such a system in a way that suggests the superiority of the institutional 
approach. The ultimate goal for choosing the legal approach is to pave the way towards 
the institutional approach as the markets in the developing countries develop. It was 
said, in regard of the role that various market players play in corporate governance that 
some intermediaries can only gain experience over time as the private sector develops 
and as they are repeatedly called on to structure transactions, evaluate business 
opportunities, and resolve disputes. Accordingly it can be suggested it may be overly 
optimistic to expect many of the "transaction cost engineers" who work in developing 
economies to have the experience and sophistication on which private ordering 
depends.417 
																																								 																				








7.2.3.2 Legislative Approach is Perceived Transitional (Gradual 
Forbearance) 
Building on the above idea, the same commentators suggest that the legislative 
approach is needed to fill the need for firm and well defined legal provisions and 
obligations that set the firm basis for corporate governance. Also, governments, 
legislators, and regulators should have to withdraw, i.e. gradually forebear, from the 
roles they play in favour of a greater freedom on the side of chief company executives.   
It was, therefore, said that "a corporate governance regime based on private ordering 
and market monitoring cannot be achieved overnight. Even under the best of 
circumstances, it can take decades to develop the necessary institutions. As Douglass 
North explained, institutions are the "product of a long gestation" and the "process of 
[institutional] change is overwhelmingly incremental …. nothing assures that by 
privatizing or adopting market-based corporate governance model today that the 
requisite market institutions will follow to fill the gaps left by an enabling corporate law 
that offers relatively few shareholder protections as investors enter the market in 
response to strong legal protections, market-supporting institutions are likely to follow, 
though it could take years.418 
Parades himself and other commentators, who support the advantages of the 
institutional approach, acknowledge a value that this approach has proven and acquired 
with time.  
The enactment of the Sarbanes- Oxley's Act was a step on the right way to restore the 
public confidence in the financial markets that faced extraordinary cases that raised 
public worries as to the integrity of the behaviour of managers. However, it is a 










mandatory tool to fill a gap left by the absence of non-mandatory rules, which, in my 
opinion, negate the myth of the superiority of the institutional approach.   
 
7.3 The USA: From Delaware to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
7.3.1 Delaware Corporate Law: Why Most US Companies Are 
Incorporated in Delaware? 
A phenomenon that can be clearly observed in the US scene is that the greater share of 
US companies is incorporated in the State of Delaware. In term of numbers, there are 
currently over 680000 companies incorporated in Delaware419 , including more than half 
the corporations that make up the Fortune 500.420 
 
It is then legitimate to pose the following question: what are the reasons that make 
Delaware so attractive to investors to incorporate their companies in it? Before giving 
the straightforward answer that is actually stemming from the 'marketing' of Delaware in 
the market for incorporation,421 it can be said that there are two sides of the coin. On 
one hand, the authorities in Delaware are, as normally expected, promoting the benefits 
of incorporating companies in Delaware, and they are highlighting the benefits that large 
investors and majority shareholders can enjoy. On the other side of the fence, there is 
little guidance on how such benefits are in the favour of (or may be, not in the favour of) 
other stakeholders. Therefore, the Delaware Corporate 'environment for doing business' 
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The Delaware Department of State- Division of Corporations takes some kind of a 
promoting standing. "There is a mix that makes Delaware appealing to corporations and 
other business forms."422 It includes the Delaware General Corporation Law, which is 
one of the most advanced and flexible corporation statutes in the nation. It includes the 
Delaware courts and, in particular, Delaware’s highly respected corporations court, the 
Court of Chancery. It includes the state legislature, which takes seriously its role in 
keeping the corporation statute and other business laws current. It includes the 
Secretary of State’s Office, which thinks and acts more like one of the corporations it 
administers than a government bureaucracy.423 
 
Delaware judicial system enjoys a national and international renown. For the seventh 
year in a row, the opinions of the US lawyers polled by the US Chamber of Commerce 
revealed that the judicial system of Delaware is ranked the first in the United States.424 
Examples of the strength points of the judicial system of Delaware were "judicial 
competence, judicial impartiality, timeliness of summary judgment or dismissal, 
treatment of class action suits, and overall treatment of tort and contract litigation."425 
 
From the investors' point of view, Delaware is particularly preferred as a domicile for 
corporations for a number of other benefits, including the flexibility of the system to the 
extent that a corporation can be incorporated in one day without stipulating a minimum 
number in terms of capital. One person may hold all the corporation offices. The fact is 
that there is no state residency required, and that a number of taxes that are imposed 
on a number of other states do not exist in Delaware. 
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Over and above, the dominant character of the Delaware Corporate Law that makes it 
particularly appealing to investors lays in the fact that the Delaware Corporate law, 
including as well the application thereof by courts, represents the classical book 
example of an enabling approach towards corporate governance as was explained in 
the fourth chapter of this research. The corporate system in the State of Delaware 
"depends on a host of other formal and informal mechanisms, such as incentive-based 
compensation and hostile takeovers, to hold managers and directors accountable; …  
[and] "that parties can opt out of in crafting their governance structures … Corporate law 
in Delaware allows directors, officers, and shareholders to order their affairs as they see 
fit.”426 
 
This 'advantage' that the Delaware Corporate Law provides for investors was seen to 
some extent detrimental to the rights of minority shareholders and other stakeholders. It 
is not a surprise in the light of the conflicting interests in the grid of any corporation that 
the Corporate Law of Delaware was seen to fall short in guarding the interests of 
stakeholders. "Section 141(a) of the code provides that the “business and affairs of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.” Section 141(a) grants expansive authority to the board and, in effect, to the 
officers to whom the board delegates managerial control. Thus, the Section deprives 
shareholders of any legal control over day-to-day business affairs and overall corporate 
policy, although shareholders, particularly institutional investors, can and do involve 
themselves informally on those matters."427 
 
The legal and corporate system of the United States, and particularly prior to the 
introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley's Act, depended largely on the traditional sources of 
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law establishing the fiduciary duties and encountering the breach of trust. Some of 
these examples are the common law and the general principles of equity as established 
by courts, in particular those of the State of Delaware to fill the need for detailed 
provisions gapped by the Corporate Law of Delaware. 
 
The courts in Delaware are acting briskly to fill the gap that is left with the absence of 
affirmative, clear-cut and detailed legal provisions. A clear example that can be given in 
this regard is the enhancement of the well-known 'business judgment rule'. It was ideally 
defined in Gimbel v. Signal Cos.428 as  an American case law-derived concept in 
corporations law whereby the "directors of a corporation . . . are clothed with [the] 
presumption, which the law accords to them, of being [motivated] in their conduct by a 
bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation whose affairs the stockholders have 
committed to their charge."429 
However, even courts application of those doctrines, which were intended to capture the 
freedom and the autonomy of company insiders in the management of the company, 
have sent confusing messages to the observers by adopting a relatively lenient 
treatment. For example, back to the business judgment rule in a famous precedent 
before the Delaware Chancellery Court, it was decided that "while boards of directors 
should be encouraged to embrace “best practices” of ideal corporate governance as 
those practices evolve from time to time, Delaware law does not hold fiduciaries liable 
for a failure to comply with what the court termed “inspirational ideals."430 
The principle itself might even be confusing if taken from the perspective of the 
stakeholders or other parties seeking to counter the authority of the insiders, or, say, 
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from the perspective of the plaintiff in the manner it allocates the onus of proof. No 
matter what the behaviour was, the plaintiff needs to prove that the way the directors 
perform their duties is in fact breaching the fiduciary duties and the requirements of 
good faith. 
The above illustrated method of application could not prevent certain instances of abuse 
of such directors and other professionals’ duties that such abuses were likely to be 
destructive to the national US economy and the international economy alike. This 
reveals that the existing legal tools need to undergo a serious revision. 
7.3.2 A Free Fall in the Market in 2002 and the Need for Serious 
Intervention 
After a considerable deal of prosperity in the US financial market during the nineties of 
the previous century, the market faced a serious crash in the beginning of the current 
century. What was at that time called 'accounting scandals' was in fact an accounting 
malpractice that created false impression on the factual financial situation of a number 
of the leading companies in the US financial market at that time, in a manner that might 
even account into fraud. This even caused the value of the shares of certain companies 
to increase radically without any factual support. Early at this century, this phenomenon 
was commonly called 'the internet bubble'431, and in fact, this bubble burst in the 
collapse of a number of the biggest companies at that time. The substance of the 
problem was in fact a scandal of serious misbehaviours of company insiders and other 
professionals. "Global Crossing, Enron, and WorldCom were each guilty of destroying 
significant amounts of shareholders wealth as well as negatively impacting a host of 
other stakeholders."432 For the sake of further description of the reasons behind such 
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collapse and though opinions split, it can be said that the description of the causes 
really differed due to the different points of view in looking into the matter. Therefore, 
most of what was said was factual. Among the given reasons for the collapse were the 
following quotations: "the principal causes of the corporate scandals of 2002 and the 
accompanying collapse in the stock market can be traced to the development over 
several decades of an investing and managing ethic that favours short-term increases in 
stock prices over the long-run profitability and well-being of corporation."433 
 
"Recent scandals at Enron and elsewhere highlight a core concern about boards of 
directors that has preoccupied corporate law … Concerns about director accountability 
and independence are not new. What the disasters at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, 
Tyco, and elsewhere suggest, however, is that the problems relating to board structure 
and performance are more widespread— and the consequences of board failure are 
more serious—than people had thought. In short, there is a new realization that 
corporate governance really matters… Note, though, that all of these corporate 
governance devices were in place when the wave of corporate scandals, led by Enron, 
broke in 2001 and 2002."434 
 
"Enron’s collapse boiled down to massive accounting fraud and irregularities, a principal 
feature of which was the use of structured finance techniques designed to get debt off 
Enron’s balance sheet and inflate Enron’s profits"435 
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What can be outstanding is that corporate governance norms were in place at the time 
the scandal happened, but it was admitted that the norms then in place fell short in 
addressing the problem and in curing deficiencies in the relations of the agency.  
 
The US legislature was urged to intervene, and it was found necessary to introduce a 
compulsory body of law. This was an important attempt to discipline the market players 
and other professional people, whose misbehaviour was the cause of such scandals. It 
was also an attempt to prevent the reoccurrence of such detrimental situations and fill 
the gap that was left by a lenient corporate law that gives a great deal of autonomy and 
flexibility for insiders in the management of the company,  
 
While such introduction might look in the opposite side of the usual trend of the US free 
market and the light laws therein, "some might say that corporate governance could not 
be much worse than in recent years."436  Furthermore, a distinctive feature of the 
distorted reality at that time was the involvement of the 'gate keepers' who were not 
observing their professional duties, and who used to be bound by the provisions 
covering their professions only without being subject to particular provisions covering 
their duties towards the corporation to which they are providing their services. "Many 
things contributed to Enron’s demise. There were breakdowns all around accountants, 
lawyers, securities analysts, and credit rating agencies (the “gatekeepers”)".437It is in 
response to all this chaos, that the Sarbanes Oxley's act came to existence.  
7.3.3 The Sarbanes Oxley's Act 
Beside the reasons mentioned above that called for the legal intervention, and once the 
new piece of legislation came to existence and became a given fact, it was hoped that 
the new act would also participate in achieving certain further goals. This was based on 
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good governance. For example, there should be effective flow of information from inside 
to outside of the corporation, setting responsibilities in clear- cut provisions, and putting 
greater responsibilities on supporting professionals, such as lawyers, auditors, and 
analysts, in reversing a trending behaviour in the financial market. That is to look for the 
increase in the share value rather than the good of the company in term of real and 
tangible advancement, thus hoping to increase the interest in investing as opposed to 
trading. However, "there any evidence yet that investment and managerial norms have 
changed in this respect as a result of the crisis, it remains the most complete and 
cogent explanation of an era in which managing earnings, often to the brink of fraud and 
sometimes crossing that line, and the domination of finance over management."438 
 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, enacted July 30, 2002, is also known as the 'Public 
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act' (in the Senate) and 
'Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act' (in the House) and is 
commonly called Sarbanes–Oxley, Sarbox or SOX. It is a United States federal law 
enacted on July 30, 2002439, which set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public 
company boards, management and public accounting firms. It is named after sponsors 
U.S. Senator Paul S Sarbanes and U.S. Representative Michael G. Oxley.440It was 
enacted "in response of the series of corporate scandals that followed the bursting of 
the internet bubble … [it] was probably the most radical and dramatic change to US 
federal securities laws since the 1930s legislations."441 
 
The introduction of the Sarbanes- Oxley's Act marked various fundamental changes in 
the way the United States do business. For example, it brings into the realm of internal 
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governance the gatekeepers that once stood outside the box, including auditors, 
analysts and lawyers. Second, it significantly enhances the legal status and centrality of 
corporate governance to the chief executive officer and the audit committee...Third, it 
federalizes an important dimension of the internal laws of corporate governance, 
creating a new (albeit arguably narrow) duty of care for the CEO and audit committee 
and reintroducing serious prohibitions on conflict of interest transactions that have 
eroded to nothingness in the hands of the Delaware judiciary and legislature.442 
7.3.3.1 The Sarbanes Oxley's Act: A Closer Glance on the Content 
The Sarbanes Oxley's Act can be truly described as the first piece of legislation that is 
fully devoted to tackle corporate governance issued from its various aspects in an 
extensive way. This part of the research aims at spotting light on the major aspects of 
the act that gave its particular character. 
7.3.3.2 Disclosure Controls 
Explicitly spelled out, Section 302 of the Act requires the officers of a company to 
acknowledge, with regard to each periodic mandatory disclosure that the same certify 
that the signing officer has reviewed the report. The report should not contain any 
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements 
were made, not misleading. Also, the financial statements and other financial 
information included in the report fairly present in all material respects the financial 
condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in 
the report. This section also establishes the responsibility of the officers for the internal 
control, and it leaves no room for companies to bypass the compliance by the 
mentioned provisions by foreign reincorporation.  
 
																																								 																				








Such commitment of the officers has also a criminal aspect; Section 906 of the Act 
subjected the certification of any statement knowing that the periodic report 
accompanying the statement does not comport with all the requirements set forth in this 
section shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years. 
The section also punishes for the wilful certification of any statement knowing that the 
periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all the requirements 
set forth in the section with a fine not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more 
than 20 years, or both. 
7.3.3.3 Internal Control 
This matter is dealt under section 404 of the Act. Within the annual report, management 
is required to provide a report on the management for establishing and maintaining of 
an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting, and on the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting. It will be attested by the general accounting firm, which handles the accounts 
of the company. 
 
Section 404 of the Act also gives a mandate to the SEC to "prescribe rules requiring 
each annual report required", and for this particular sake, "the SEC imposed a 
recognized internal control framework that has been developed through a due 
process… One widely used framework is known as the COSO framework, which 
contains the recommendations of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the 
Tread way Commission. 
 
Indeed, such a system will not be what it is without the existence of such institutions that 
support and ensure the execution and the enforcement thereof. One of these entities 








unique features of the Act, that is, the establishment of the responsibility of 
gatekeepers; is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 
 
The PCAOB was established to oversee the application of the requirement that the act 
introduces for the first time in history that is to subject the auditors of U.S. public 
companies to external and independent oversight, after a prolonged period of time 
during which the profession was self-regulated. 443  The PCAOB aims to “protect 
investors and the public interest by promoting informative, accurate, and independent 
audit reports. The PCAOB also oversees the audits of broker-dealers, including 
compliance reports filed pursuant to federal securities laws, to promote investor 
protection."444 
7.3.3.4 Criminal Penalties 
Enough controversial, the Act came with new provisions that penalize for the breach 
thereof with imprisonment. Section 802 of the Act provides that whoever knowingly 
alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any 
record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the 
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation 
to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned 
not more than 20 years, or both. Also, section 1107 of the Act provides that whoever 
knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including 
interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a 
law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible 
commission of any federal offense, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more 
than 10 years, or both. 
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7.3.3.5 The U.S. Experience: A Closing Note 
Much of what can be said in the assessment of the experience of the United States of 
America in corporate law reform might look no more than a reiteration of what was 
concluded in the Chapter Four of this research. The law of companies in the United 
States was very lenient, and this idea was the character that marked the U.S system for 
a long period of time. That was supported and applauded by many commentators, who, 
in some instances, were implying an idea of the superiority of the U.S free model in 
doing business. 
 
When shocked by the well-known financial scandals, the U.S found no other way to 
cure what was admitted to be a distortion other than introducing a mandatory piece of 
legislation. It is the Sarbanes Oxley's Act, which was very strict in terms of compliance 
and bringing into its scope the supportive profusions, i.e. gatekeepers. It penalized, as 
shown above, with fine and imprisonment cases of non-conformity with the Act. By this, 
it has created a new form of a raw model for developing markets to transplant; i.e. a sui 
genres act that came to existence and that many developing economies were likely to 
adopt. For this particular regard, the thesis of Troy A. Parades on the suitability or non-
suitability of such an Act for transplantation in developing markets would again seem 
relevant. 
 
A legitimate question to ask in this regard is whether the introduction of such an Act is 
effective in serving the objective for which such an Act came into existence in first place. 
That is the prevention of the reoccurrence of the well-known financial scandals, or, if 
seen from the confronting prospective, providing the needed degree of protection for 
shareholders, in particular, minority shareholders, and in the wider sense, stakeholders. 
It was truly said in implying a comparison between the situation before and after the act 








interests were better served in the days when corporate officers could, in effect, allow 
the numbers to be made up and then file an 'I didn't know defiance."445 
 
However, the introduction of the new obligations under the Act was seen to add 
substantially to the burdens of the U.S companies, costing them great amounts of 
monies to conform therewith. It can in some instances "[kill] the creation of new public 
companies in America, hamstrung the NYSE and Nasdaq (while making the London 
Stock Exchange rich), and cost U.S. industry more than $ 200 billion by some 
estimates."446 
 
It might be appropriate in this regard to subject the Act to a cost-benefit analysis. 
Whereas the result of such analysis can vary and look very different from the 
prospective of the shareholders if compared to the prospective of the companies and 
their insiders themselves, it can be confidently said that the almost free self-regulated 
companies before the introduction of the Act failed the test of the internet bubble, by this 
assuming credit and advantage to any effort that aim to discipline the companies and 
their insiders. 
 
7.4 The Enabling v Mandatory Model: The United Kingdom 
Some commentators447 debate what is characterised as the enabling v the mandatory 
models of corporate governance. These models share essential features overlapping 
with the Legal Origins and the institutional v the legislative models discussed in sections 
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(240) and (7.2), respectively. This section discusses the enabling v the mandatory 
model and provides analysis of the corporate governance system on the United 
Kingdom as major example of the enabling model. 
7.4.1 The UK model of corporate governance 
The regulatory framework of corporate governance in the UK is established through a 
combination of two sources. The first of these is parliamentary acts enacted by the 
legislative power, and the second consist in rules established by self-regulatory (non-
official) organizations, such as the Securities and Investment Board, which is 
responsible for oversight of the securities market.  
Unlike the case in USA, and unlike the case for non-statutory framework in the UK itself, 
statutory framework for corporate governance in the UK is limited and straightforward. 
As a matter of law, the consecutive revisions of the UK Companies Act opted, as a 
general rule, to limit the role of the law in having regard to 'the' enabling role’. That is 
allowing for doing business through corporations and partnerships. However, some 
limited statutory interference to touch on corporate governance norms can be seen in 
the Companies Act of 2006, particularly in parts 15-16 & 43.448 
 
Part 15 of the Act (Accounts and reports) contained notable extensively detailed 
provisions on how a company should prepare its accounts, reports and reviews that 
need to be published. Part 16 of the Act (Audit) came with no less detailing on the 
auditors and their duties, remarkably giving, in Chapter 5 of the act, the right for a 
member in the company to raise audit concerns at audit meetings, and having as 
obligation on the company, to make available a website on which the statements shall 
be published. 
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Part 43 of the Act came to codify an interesting principle of transparency, incorporating 
“the transparency obligations directive” 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council relating to the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market.” 449  It also gives the competent authority the mandate to issue detailed 
provisions to insure transparency and availability of information. 
7.4.1.1 "The Phenomenon of Codes" 
The major landscape in the UK non-statutory framework is the Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance450. However, since 1992 and in line with the consecutive reviews 
of the Companies Act, a considerable number of efforts or initiatives have aimed at 
tuning up the scene, in a trend that was best described by Alan Calder as 
"hyperactivity."451 It is truly a trend that, whenever a failure or a shortcoming arises, a 
committee appears to report on recommendations or to draw a guideline to avoid the 
reoccurrence of such failure. 
 
Following some serious failures in the performance of corporations in the UK, the 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance came into existence to be a good example of 
the continuous efforts that UK faced, which took the form of forming groups or 
committees to report on certain recommendations to cure such instances of 
shortcomings, being the work of Cadbury Committee. "At the heart of the committee 
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recommendations is the Code of Best Practice which is to apply to all listed companies 
registered in the UK.452 
 
"The report embodied recommendations based on practical experiences and with an 
eye on the US experience, further elaborated after a process of consultation and widely 
accepted. The final report was released in December 1992 and then applied to listed 
companies reporting their accounts after 30th June 1993."453 
 
Sir Cadbury described the major concern of the Code in the provision of "guidance on 
the board's role including in particular the need to insure that the board is not dominated 
by one individual."454 It is also to ensure that "boards have an appropriate balance of 
external non executive directors and internal executive directors…"455  though it is 
remarkable that the Code did not recommend that the chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer should be necessarily split. 
 
Sir Cadbury himself described the recommendations and the code by saying that “The 
Code itself is based on the need for openness, integrity, and accountability."456 
 
Following on the same trend, "[t]he second stage in the development of good 
governance recommendations in the UK was the establishment in 1995 of the Study 
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Group on Directors' Remuneration."457 The Greenbury report, which came to deal with a 
shortcoming concerning the non-reasonable privileges that board members might enjoy, 
"focused on the directors of UK listed companies and recommended a code of best 
practice on executive remuneration that was based on the principles of accountability, 
transparency, and linkage of rewards to performance."458 
 
Such two major initiatives were truly described as "responses to issues of public 
concern, and made recommendations that if they had been in place earlier, might have 
prevented the series of abuses, malpractice, and fraud that had taken place."459 In fact, 
the rationale behind such efforts was highlighted by Sir Cadbury himself as curing the 
"perceived low level of confidence in financial reporting and in the value of audits. The 
underlying factors were seen as the absence of clear framework for insuring that 
directors kept under review the controls in their business…"460 
 
While such efforts were described as backward looking461, there were also some sets of 
recommendations that were the fruit of a fresh forward looking prospective. The efforts 
of the Hampel Committee, which aimed at assessing the compliance with the above 
mentioned reports and arriving into the appropriate recommendations on Code, are a 
good example here. 
 
It can be fairly said that the above-mentioned efforts of Cadbury and Greenbury are, 
indeed, a reaction to an emerging particular need, taking this with the non-statutory 
nature of the recommendations. It was normal that, in course of implementation, some 
application difficulties might arise, and this called to the effort of further committees to 
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recommend on the particular issues for which the difficulty arise. Here, the guidance in 
internal control by Turnbul Committee can be a good example, so as the 
recommendations of Myners as regard to institutional investment.  
7.4.1.2 The 'Phenomenon of Codes' Scrutinized 
It is clear, then, that such codes came to fill in an emergent need that the statutory 
framework fell short to fill in light of not only "events [that] led concern about the 
reputation of London markets but also to widespread public and political concern."462 
Indeed, no wonder that they were "regarded as recognition of deficiencies in a legal 
framework for governance which is so flexible that it leaves gaps in the framework of 
board and other governance processes. On this analysis one might expect the 
recommendations and norms emerging to be likely to graduate, as a result of public 
policy pressures towards Corporate Law."463 
 
By saying this, it can be fairly astonishing that such shortcomings did not literally into 
provisions to be incorporated into the Companies act, as long as the conditions calling 
therefore are that serious! 
 
The effort of Cadbury Committee, in particular, which marked the launch of such a 
phenomenon, will be used severally in this Chapter as a case study representing such 
efforts. These efforts were a response to a major wakeup call with great expectations 
being awaited by the public and the financial business sector from the committee to the 
extent that  "The Committee found itself the centre of unanticipated public attention, […] 
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While the question of what, in particular, called for such trend to take place can be given 
the above straight forward answer; it seems to raise certain doubts amongst 
commentators, and was really perceived as opinion splitting. While some see it the 
result of "pressures from capital markets and institutional investors, and their rationale 
as investor protection in response to market failures…."465 others, like Ben Pettet; 
commenting on the idea of Mr. Rickford, see  that "[t]he main begetter of British 
Corporate Law since its origin has been financial scandal, where I feel the emphasis is 
inappropriate"466 in support of the idea that the codes just came to facilitate business 
rather than to react to scandals; responding assertively to a statement that Corporate 
Law; and the aligning initiatives, can work as a record for the series of historical 
corporate scandals!467 
 
How effective was such an approach and to what extent it paid back? Though such a 
trend, as shown above, was seen to be adaptive to the needs of the business, leaving a 
room for a flexibility that cannot be found on a rigid statutory framework. As even was 
expressed with regard to the works of Cadbury Committee: "The committee has 
recognized the diversity of companies and of those responsible for running them. It has 
not attempted to impose a single pattern of governance, but rather to state the 
principles on which it considers good governance should be based, leaving it to those 
responsible to decide how best to implement it."468 However, Guido Rossi does not 
seem to be a defender of such trend. "All the corporate governance recommendations 
have been drafted as self-regulatory rules, but the inconsistent provisions of statutes 
and case law regarding the nature of the corporation can also be found in these rules. 
There is no resolution of questions about the appropriate constituents and concerns of 
corporations…. It appears to be extremely difficult to examine one by one the rules of all 
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the codes of best practice in order to determine what could be considered a "good 
recommendation" and what would not be."469 
 
A remarkable fact about such codes, recommendations, and guidelines is that they 
were all the fruit of the efforts of private sector players, and, in particular, senior figures 
in well-known companies that were even market makers. This might legitimately raise 
concerns of impartiality and conflicts of interest470, but it seems truly as was interestingly 
said that "The government has liked the development of corporate codes, it is getting 
much of regulation of the corporate sector very cheaply. Overall, its role has been that 
of an enthusiastic spectator rather than a driving force."471 
Contrary to the above arguments of Guido Ferririni, Rickford asserts that "While the 
governance codes may have demonstrated weaknesses in areas not covered by the 
British legislation, it by no means follows that legislation is the best response."472 
Additionally, Sir Adrian Cadbury himself stated that "It is hard to frame legislation which 
will frame governance standards."473 It worth noting, however, that "Voluntary codes of 
best practice seem to be most influential in countries such as the UK, where institutional 
shareholders are powerful and the financial press is sensitive to governance issues"474 
not to forget the popularity and the deep historically rooted economies of scale and 
scope.  
7.5 Models from Emerging Economies: Russia and Malaysia  
As discussed in the preceding chapters the concept of corporate governance refers to 
the system by which the control over a company takes place, and how such control 
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corresponds to the risk assumed by each player in the chain of corporate control 
(managers, directors, and shareholders).475  
The concept is also driven by various factors and aspects including historical, social, 
and economic factors which play a considerable role in shaping what is considered a 
good or sound governance practice in a given economy. More and more economies 
might be following on the footsteps of the United States, or more generally the 
"Western" style in market liberalization. This started after more particularly after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the countries thereof to a liberal 
market style, leaving behind the days when government used to play the roles of the 
three players along the control chain altogether. Companies now are growing a big and 
influential market power that is usually exercised by managements. Then, it would be 
fair to say that the chosen approach toward corporate governance may vary according 
to the characteristics of capital markets and the degree of maturity and development 
thereof. This chapter aims at highlighting these approaches and the relevance of market 
characteristics to such approaches. 
7.5.1 The Role of Capital Markets in Economic Development 
The transforming markets described above are undergoing reform programs towards 
more privatisation. Privatisation in this sense refers to the need to replace governmental 
ownership and financing of corporations with private ones. Naturally, transforming 
economies are expected to maintain a degree of subsidy that should be withdrawn 
gradually or subside with time. At the same time, it can be fairly said that fostering 
economic growth in the developing countries can depend on the development of a well-
established securities market which affords a source of financing. Accordingly, a well-
																																								 																				
475 See Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘The Cultural Roots of Corporate Governance’,  in Joseph J. Norton, Jonathan Rickford 
and Jan Kleineman (eds.), Corporate Goverance Post-Enron: Comparative and International Perspectives (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 2006) p. 66. According to Salacuse, this approach reflects how 
corporate governance can be defined from a legal prospective. However, he provided various definitions from the 








established securities market will attract corporations who have a surplus to give it up to 
other corporations in need of financing to support their productivity in return of an 
expected profit. A well-established securities market will also be attractive to small 
investors who would be more interested in holding stakes in companies and buying 
securities. In this meaning, savings will finance the activities and the endeavours of 
companies with the attendant economic and social gains.476 
Towards that end, there should be some assurance to comfort both corporate and 
individual investors to surrender their savings and surpluses to invest in securities 
without fearing that such monies be misused or expropriated by insiders, who might 
abuse their powers and at the same time for shareholders and other stakeholders to 
surrender a portion of their shares. In some other instances, new securities may be 
issued to enhance economic development and even to build greater confidence when 
dealing with other stranger market players.477 What matters in this regard is the notion 
of corporate governance that is established to contribute to capital market development 
and all the attendant benefits mentioned above. 
 
A central feature of corporate governance is the separation between ownership and 
control, at least in common law countries where this idea enjoys greater attention and 
importance. It is a pivotal idea around which revolve all practices aiming at ensuring the 
sound commitments of insiders such as managers towards shareholders and other 
outsiders and the rights of shareholders to limit the authority of managers. Where did 
such commitments come from? This could be a difficult question to answer. Some 
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commentators see that the law plays a vital role in this regard by insuring that 
shareholders rights are enforceable and adequately influential.478 
It was said that empirical studies in various jurisdictions have shown a direct relation 
between the degree of shareholder protection and enforceability of such rights, on one 
hand, and the securities market development, on the other hand. By assessing factors 
that relate to the abilities that shareholders, particularly small shareholders have to 
influence the decision of a corporation. For example, shareholders who hold fewer than 
ten percent of a company's shares are able to call for a special shareholders' meeting, 
and they might have the ability to challenge perceived directors' oppression.479 
 
Though the above mentioned rights were described to be "determined by laws; they are 
not inherent in securities themselves."480 Others believe it is not only the law that 
matters, rather there are some other influencing factors, such as the political factors 
which, as commentators say, are more important than the law itself.481 It can be said 
that all these factors contribute to what is to be considered a good or sound governance 
notwithstanding where such rules are coming from, and they all, therefore, complement 
each other in insuring the good practices and the prospers of corporate governance on 
economic development. 
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7.5.2 Capital Market Development as an Influencing Factor for Choosing 
the Approach towards Corporate Governance 
While countries with transforming economies can now make their choice on which 
approach can be better for them, the matter looks different for countries with economies 
and markets that developed over a considerable period of time. In a developed 
economy, for example the U.K market, the statute may not be as important as other 
factors. The market is mature enough to give greater room for the managers to decide 
on the matters of the company, while at the same time maintaining good protection for 
the rights of shareholders. How this balance was achieved? It can be said that a 
considerable set of practices, norms, and customs that companies followed for their 
integrity developed as the market itself was developing over a considerable period of 
time. There are also the set of fiduciary duties highlighted early in this research that 
such managers observe though the same may not necessarily be codified, not to forget 
the existence of institutions that regulate the relevant practices on ex poste basis as pre 
requirements for adopting the institutional approach. Moreover, while ‘legal and 
regulatory structures are essential, the capital market, with adequate transparency and 
accountability in place, can ultimately reward or punish firms for their governance 
practices’.482  It is clear that the existence of established factors like transparency, 
accountability and other voluntary practices for compliance, beside reflecting a 
developed market, will make up for the law not being so detailed or not so mandatory. 
For countries with a transforming economy may face a number of challenges in 
establishing and institutional approach. 
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First, such countries often as already discussed, where a country’s overall corporate 
governance and property rights system are weak, voluntary and market corporate 
governance mechanisms would consequently have limited effectiveness. 
Moreover, ‘developing and emerging economies are constantly confronted with issues 
such as the lack of property rights, the abuse of minority shareholders, contract 
violations, asset stripping and self-dealing’.483 This inherent factor in its turn may impose 
the need for a more extensive body of law to tackle.  
 lack such factors, making it difficult, therefore, to depend on less extensive role for the 
law to play. 
 
7.5.3 Russian Corporations and the Transplantation of Western 
Corporate Law Norms 
Russia is a unique example for two of the major models that were discussed in this 
research. On one hand, Russia is a good manifestation of the political and economic 
factors that could influence corporate law reform and twist the applicable norms. On the 
other hand, Russia can be a real life evidence that elements other than the law in the 
books matter such as social, political, and economic norms. Such a situation agrees 
with the thesis of Troy A. Parades484 , i.e. transplantation of the corporate law of 
developed economies into less developed markets is not the answer for corporate 
governance reform makes a lot of sense. 
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7.5.3.1 A Glance on History 
Russia has undergone serious efforts to apply corporate governance norms, though 
there is a lot to be done down the way. The present situation is that Russia might be 
better than ever before, thanks to a series of trials and errors. This part of the research 
will shed light on a particular era in the evolution of the Russian sphere for doing 
business that is the most relevant to this research.485 That would show how a less 
prudent effort was more backfiring than beneficial until some corrective measures were 
put in place. 
 
 The transformation of Russia from being a communist country into a free market 
economy was not expected to take place in a period of days. A history of being the 
extreme opposite to a free market economy approach will for sure influence the effort of 
transformation over the two decades since the disintegration of the Soviet Union of the 
Soviet Union; however, such element was not ideally considered when the reform was 
planned. 
 
Away from a detailed examination of the history of Tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia, it 
can be said that Tsarist Russia had a remarkable acknowledgement of corporate forms 
of corporation similar to those known in Western Europe at that time. However, what 
came afterwards was "70 years of communism and central planning… [then] during the 
early years of perestroika and glasnost, there was no private ownership of commercial 
or industrial enterprises. There were no shareholders, since the State was the owner of 
all productive assets and organizations, and thus, there was no role for corporate 
governance in the sense that it is generally understood in a market economy."486 
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The mid-eighties was indeed the period of time when the wind of change started 
blowing at the USSR in a decade time. Russia, or to be more accurate, the USSR had 
some forms of 'security'. Those were the "“shares” [which] represented some financial 
tools that were placed mainly among the employees in order to involve additional funds 
for the enterprise development."487 
 
More like what is commonly known as 'employee options' in our nowadays free market 
economy, such an application looked homogeneous with the life of the USSR at that 
time. Looking behind, the Soviet Union was the cradle of the communist economic, 
labour oriented theories, and looking ahead. The Union was trying to provide sources of 
funding for companies. However, the importance of such applications stems from the 
fact that it was the inception point from which many efforts followed to revive the 
corporate, or the joint-stock company method in doing business.488 That ended with the 
"systematization of legal regulation of corporate forms of business [that] occurred only in 
the middle of 90-es of the last century with the acceptance of the first part of the Civil 
Code in 1994 and the Law on joint-stock companies in 1995."489 
7.5.3.2 Russia after the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: The Dilemma of 
Privatization 
Moving to describe the situation in Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it 
was not a surprise that the effort of that time tried to eliminate the dominance of 
government ownership in corporate, being the major call for reform. However, it was 
also expected that "seven decades of communism and central planning had provided 
little or no experience in dealing with issues of ownership and shareholder rights."490 
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Indeed, "mass privatization was imposed on a country without any underlying free 
market infrastructure".491  
 
In indicating what should have been the expectations of the mass privatization, it was 
said that, "Mass privatisation was designed to destroy governmental control, in favour of 
private investors… However, just as the Utopian socialists’ prediction that law would 
disappear in the Soviet Union proved to be ill-founded."492  
 
 The scene at that time seemed to call for privatization. It was characterized by 
"centralized  government control and the political framework and state control resulted 
in sluggish improvement and growth of the organization … three fifth of the Russian 
joint stock companies in operation today appeared as a result of mass privatization. 
Mass sale of shares in privatized enterprises was done through freely transferable 
vouchers". 493 
 
Such trend in selling shares as vouchers that can be transferred with minimal 
restrictions, taken with the above illustrated historical trend in issuing 'options' to 
companies’ personnel, resulted in the concentration of the interests over enterprises in 
the hands of insiders. By this, one of the major norms on which good corporate 
governance should be based was negated, i.e. the separation of ownership and control, 
the very normal consequence was that "managers were working with short term 
perspectives for their personal gains and minority shareholders rights were violated."494 
 
																																								 																				
491	Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance and Russia - Coming Full Circle’ In Guenther Doeker-
Mach, Günther Doeker-Mach and Klaus A. Zieger (eds) Law, Legal Culture and Politics in the Twenty First 
Century - Essays in Honour Of Alice Erh-Soon Tay (Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 153.	
492	Ibid 12.	
493	Molotnikov (n 487).	
494 Rajesh Pathak, ‘Corporate Governance in Russia: A Report (March 10, 2011), 1 








A report on corporate governance in Russia495 reported a number of factors that led to 
such situation. Unsurprisingly, political factors were at the top of such factors. For 
example, relationships that insiders had with politicians, the prevailing culture against 
disclosure and transparency, let alone the weakness of the legal system and its 
enforcement, and the carelessness of minority shareholders in invoking their rights; 
submitting to a feeling of uselessness.496 
7.5.3.3 The Need for Corporate Governance 
After years of repeated, grave malfeasances against minority shareholders and fierce 
battles for assets, controlling owners of Russian firms have begun to understand that 
the only way to sustain the development of their companies is by attracting external 
funds. Alternatively, some of the large owners simply want to exit their businesses by 
selling their assets at a good price.497 
 
The need for reform was considered to be imminent, and at that point in time, many of 
the 'modern' norms of corporate governance were introduced in the legislative 
framework of Russia, at least in the law in the books. However, the same above 
mentioned report indicates that the improvement in that regard was slow, being an 
expected consequence of a long-term history of ignorance of the good corporate 
governance norms. 
 
How did all this transformation take place? The relevant period of time was marked with 
a debate between two schools, a school calling for a gradual transition into more good 
governance norms while the other was calling on a shock change, fearing that a 
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"reversion to Communism might occur."498 Unsurprisingly, this approach "was strongly 
supported by a number of major US governmental institutions, such as Treasury and 
the IMF."499 
 
As a result of such 'shocking' corporate reform as well as the 'mass' privatization efforts, 
it was a clear fact that the initiative towards bringing Russia into conformity with the 
commonly accepted norms of corporate governance failed. It also resulted into 
disastrous consequences on the economy that "In the decade following its transition 
from a socialist State to a market economy, Russia’s economy deteriorated significantly, 
with GDP less than two-thirds its pre-privatization level. It has been reported that 
corporate governance problems associated with the privatisation resulted in a loss of 
around US$ 50 billion in market capitalisation for the Russian stock market."500 
7.5.3.4 The Experience of Russia: A Closing Note 
As shown above, the market and the whole economic environment in Russia were very 
different from that in the United States. The grave differences were characterized "with 
the absence of all the basements of a free market economy characters. It was still the 
trend that the government set production quotas to companies, decisions of banks were 
dominated by the authority, and as indicated above, the method applied for 
privatization, being the freely negotiated vouchers representing securities in auctions 
resulted in the concentration of the interests in companies in the hands of insiders."501 
 
In looking for the reasons behind the failure of reform in Russia up to the above 
illustrated point in time, it was said that such shocking and dramatic change, which was 
forced in a very short period of time, should have been expected. In their substance, 
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such efforts were indeed trying to force the adaptation of the U.S corporate model, while 
"Russia’s underlying institutions and economic conditions differed radically from the US 
system, on which its economic transformation was based."502 This brings us back to the 
argument of Troy A. Parades on whether the transplantation of a corporate law is the 
answer for distortions in corporate governance practices; no effective law reform may 
take place before setting the basis for a well-functioning market, including finding the 
appropriate approach for privatization, let alone the problem of enforcement. 
	
7.5.4 Malaysia, Mature Norms for an Emerging Market Economy 
Malaysia is a good example for a corporate governance system in an emerging market. 
The most distinctive thing about the Malaysian experience is that it had good 'laws in 
the books' at the time the Asian financial crisis hit that area of the world, which called for 
strengthening the laws and the applicable norms in light of the weakness revealed in the 
enforcement and application of such norms. For the presentation of this experience, the 
research will give a narration that highlights the situation before the crisis, the 
shortcoming discovered, the measures taken to cure the shortcomings, and the 
advancement that such measures realized.  
 
In addition, a feature of the corporate management system that is applied by some 
companies to put in place an 'Islamic corporate governance system' will also be 
highlighted. 
7.5.4.1 Malaysia and the Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis of the year 1997 was very detrimental for some of the emerging 
markets in the Far East. The area faced one of the worst financial crises in history on 
the reaction to the currency crisis of Thailand, turning the economies of the area from 
																																								 																				








being among the most booming economies to economies that needed major rescue. 
This raised doubts and worries amongst the investors as regard the safe investment in 
the area. Malaysia was one of the countries of the area that suffered badly from this 
situation.503 
 
"The Malaysian Ringgit experienced waves of speculative pressure. It depreciated 40% 
against the US Dollar by the end of August 1998 from its level in June 1997. The Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Composite Index fell by 79% from a high of 1,271 
points in February 1997 to 262 points in September 1998."504 
 
It is remarkable, though, that, at that time, Malaysia had in place good applications for 
corporate governance. A system in place at that time was based on the Common Law 
practices, but it was localized to the local needs. To give an example on the developed 
system at that time, it is noteworthy to mention that "the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
listing rules evolved a number of provisions that provided for checks and balances to 
enhance transparency and accountability. It introduced the requirement for independent 
directors on boards of publicly listed companies in 1987 and the establishment of audit 
committees in 1993."505 Not to forget of course the well-developed Corporate Law that 
was in place since the year 1965, the law of the securities industry as per the law of the 
year 1973, the law establishing the securities commission in the year 1993, and the 
																																								 																				
503 In the same meaning, Boo Yeang Khoo, ‘Review of Corporate Governance in Asia: Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia’ (November 2003) <http://adbi.adb.org/files/2003.11.10.corporate.governance.malaysia.pdf> accessed on 
02/01/2013 
504 Ibid 2, citing The Central Bank and the financial system in Malaysia”, 1999, Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala 
Lumpur, 560. 
505 Philip Koh Tong Ngee, ‘Corporate Governance in Malaysia: Regulatory Reform and Its Outcomes’, In Eduardo 
T. Gonzalez (ed)  Best Practices in Asian Corporate Governance (The Asian Productivity Organization, Tokyo, 









good regulation for banks, etc., which all indicate a well-developed corporate 
environment.506 
 
As is the story in many of the systems of corporate governance, reform usually starts in 
the aftermath of serious financial crisis. Malaysia, of course, was not away from such a 
phenomenon. The financial crisis of 1997 "…highlighted weaknesses in corporate 
governance in Malaysia, which led to efforts to rectify and overhaul the entire corporate 
sector in Malaysia”507 and generated a substantial amount of analysis and debate 
largely focused on macro-economic issues, systemic stability as well as issues 
pertaining to the regulation of international investors, the role and function of regulators 
and the need to improve disclosure and the governance system."508 
7.5.4.2 Malaysia after the Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis revealed many areas of weakness in the corporate governance 
system in Malaysia. Major examples of such areas of weaknesses were "the weak 
financial structure of many companies; over-leveraging by companies; lack of 
transparency, disclosure and accountability; existence of a complex system of family 
control companies; little or no effective laws to ensure that controlling shareholders and 
management treat small investors fairly and equitably; assets shifting; conglomerate 
structures that were perceived to be given preferential treatment; allegations of 
cronyism."509 Among the weaknesses that the crisis revealed in Malaysia were also "the 
ineffective board of directors, weak internal controls, poor audits, lack of inadequate 
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disclosure and lax legal enforcement characterized in corporate governance in many 
Southeast Asian countries."510 
 
Malaysia reacted on 25 March 1999 by issuing a code of corporate governance. The 
Code was introduced by the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) and 
aims to set out principles and best practices on structures and processes that 
companies may use in their operations towards achieving optimal governance 
framework. 
 
The code contained two types of rules, the prescriptive and the non-prescriptive rules. 
The prescriptive model sets standards of desirable practices for disclosure of 
compliance. The Non-prescriptive model requires actual disclosure of corporate 
governance practices. 
 
The code took a flexible approach and contained a set of principles and best practices 
equivalent to those internationally accepted and adopted. It also contained principles 
and best practices for other corporate participants, along with the necessary 
explanatory notes. It "essentially aims to encourage disclosure by providing adequate, 
timely and relevant information to the investing public so as to facilitate informed 
investment decisions being made and to evaluate the performance of the 
companies."511 
 
What is noteworthy to mention about the Malaysian Code of Corporate governance is 
that it took a hybrid approach; as regard to Part One which sets out broad principles for 
corporate governance. It requires PLCs to annually disclose a narrative account on how 
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they applied the principles to their structures and processes. However, in part 2, it lists 
best practices that PLCs follow, on a comply-or- explain basis. 
 
By examining the first part of the code, certain examples can be given for the treatment 
of some particular corporate governance issues and the method by which the same 
were treated under the code. It can be said that it mainly concerns the board of 
directors. It provides that a PLC should be supervised by a board of directors, which 
should be formed by a balanced number of executives and non-executives. Such 
executives should be appointed following a transparent manner, and there should be in 
place a clear mechanism for the supply of information to the board to enable it to do its 
duties. In addition, there should be a re- election for directors, every three years at 
maximum. The remuneration of the directors should be fair, specified in a transparent 
manner, and disclosed and reported.512 
The code also encourages the dialogue between shareholders (institutional in 
particular) and the companies, and it sets that general meeting should be an 
appropriate chance for such communication. 
 
Beside the issuance of the codes, there were also tremendous efforts towards better 
disclosure, transparency, training and qualification for directors, etc.513 
7.5.5 Malaysia and Islamic Corporate Governance 
At first, it should be noted that the matter of adhering to the norms of Islamic corporate 
governance is a matter of choice for Malaysian companies, but it is with no wonder that 
a considerable number of Malaysian companies are taking such a choice. 
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As further detailed elsewhere in this research, Islamic corporate governance is 
somewhat a modern term that brings together the norms of corporate governance and 
the principles of Sharia'a that encourages faithful practices and denies certain acts for 
being forbidden by the sources of Sharia'a. 
 
The intention to abide by the norms of Islamic Corporate Governance is clearer in the 
case of Islamic financial institutions. Malaysia has in place “Guidelines on the 
Governance of Shariah Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions."514 Also, there 
exists a Sharia'a Advisory Council which is the sole reference as regard to the 
compliance with Sharia by Islamic financial institutions. 
 
The Guidelines provide that every Islamic financial institution should establish a Sharia'a 
Committee, the members of which, three at minimum, are appointed by the board of 
directors. However, the appointment is subject to the approval of Bank Negara Malaysia 
(The Central Bank of Malaysia). The Committee plays an advisory role, but it is required 
to endorse certain decisions and documentations of the company. 
 
This kind of a distinctive initiate in Malaysia is surely positive. However, the Guidelines 
were criticized on a number of grounds, the major among which concern the advisory 
role of the Committee, and urges that the Committee should have greater interference 
with the daily business of the company to ensure compliance with Sharia'a.515 
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7.5.6 The Experience of Malaysia: A Closing Note 
An impression about corporate governance in Malaysia will sure be positive with good 
and modern norms being in place since an early time, albeit some drawbacks in 
application. This might be expected with regard to the fact that the Malaysian economy 
at that time was still developing and hence had the character of a developing economy 
in terms of concentrated ownership and dominance of family businesses, not to forget 
the weaker implementation and enforcement. 
 
The financial crisis hit Malaysia at the time the economy was prospering, but it seemed 
that Malaysia had, to some extent, a fast recovery. An observer would believe that it 
enjoyed certain degree of immunity, thanks to the norms previously in force, as well as 
to the serious efforts of reform that followed the crisis.  
 
7.6 Lesson from cross-country models of corporate governance 
It is clear that Saudi legislation seeks to adopt rules and standards that regulate the 
management of joint stock companies listed on the stock market to ensure their 
compliance with the best governance practices. This is in order to guarantee the 
protection of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of stakeholders.516  
However, there are characteristics which assimilate the Saudi system to both the 
common and the civil law.  On the other hand, the Saudi legal system, including its 
corporate governance regime, is based on civil law as is the case in Germany and 
France. The system also contains many rules that protect and regulate rights and 
interests of stakeholders' groups and minority shareholders as well as providing some 
limitations to CEO power. For example, Saudi law prevents the position of the chairman 
																																								 																				








of the board of directors from being simultaneously held with any other executive 
position in the company. 517  
Moreover, unlike the Anglo-Saxon model, the government in Saudi Arabia dominates 
most labour, financial, services and business sectors, and recently it has tended to 
privatise some of them under its supervision  
Additionally, the ownership structure of many large Saudi joint stock companies has 
been occupied by state-concentrated ownership. This environment to some extent 
boosts the state’s role and control over the corporate sector. 
In relation to the common law tradition, the corporate governance theory and the 
adopted model in Saudi Arabia seems to be much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model and 
more in harmony with its general theory which aims to generate a fair return for 
shareholders. Saudi legislation and the corporate governance regulations adopt the 
unitary board of directors and do not provide an option to approve a two-tier model  
Furthermore, the Saudi system does not support the trend of a bank-oriented or any 
other long-term dominant ownership. Furthermore, Saudi corporations are not subject to 
any legal enforcement or compliance that gives employees a right to participate in 
strategic management decisions or to have any representative form.  
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8.  Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This thesis investigated the subject of reform of the legal framework of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, and the challenges of building such a framework in the 
country focusing on the following problem areas: 
First: the research attempted an analysis and assessment of the prevalent corporate 
governance structures in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in order to establishing the 
shortcomings and the required reforms. 
Second: given that the Saudi legal system is fundamentally based on Islamic legal 
principles, the thesis also explored the question of compatibility or otherwise between 
modern principles of corporate governance (i.e. OECD) and Islamic principles of 
corporate governance.   
Third: the thesis adopted a modelling approach drawing on international standards of 
good corporate governance and cross-country models and experiences for insights to 
reform and enhance efficiency of the institutional and legislative framework of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. 
The conclusions and recommendation of this thesis can be summarised in the following 
two sections. 
8.1 The importance of corporate governance reform in Saudi 
Arabia 
The thesis argued that Saudi Arabia should leverage the positive correlation, proven in 
empirical studies, between good corporate governance and economic growth, 








objectives and to transform the Saudi national economy from oil-dependent into a 
diversified resource economy envisaged in Vision 2030. Thus, the drive for corporate 
governance reform in Saudi Arabia is qualitatively distinct from crises or scandal imbued 
reforms such as experienced in recent decades in e.g. the USA and Malaysia. 
8.2 The proposed normative model of corporate governance is a 
suitable analytic framework  
One of the main conclusions and contributions of this thesis is that the global standards 
of corporate governance could be modelled into a universal -or universalizable- 
normative model. Thus, the thesis proposed in chapter 2 a generic three-layer 
taxonomic model of normative corporate governance standards consisting of: a) core 
layer of corporate governance values, including transparency, accountability, 
responsibility and fairness; b) a medium layer of supra-national standards (i.e. Islamic 
and OECD Principles), and c) a final layer of national frameworks of corporate 
governance standards in individual countries.  
This model may be regarded to play a threefold role in the analysis of corporate 
governance globally. First the model discerns not only the layers but also the relations 
between the normative levels of corporate governance standards. Second, from a legal 
point of view, the model discerns the desirable legal compatibility between the various 
sets of standards starting from the outermost towards the core layer. Consequently, 
national standards of corporate governance exemplified in legal rules in various 
countries are desired to be compatible with the supra-national principles of corporate 
governance and the later, in turn, are required to be compatible with the core value of 
corporate governance. 
Thirdly, the model provides a perspective to analyse and evaluate the efficiency of 








respect, the efficiency of the national legal system is measured progressively according 
to the proximity of the national standards to international principles of corporate 
governance. 
8.3 The Saudi institutional framework of corporate governance 
The analysis and critical assessment in this thesis focused on two level of the Saudi 
institutional framework of corporate governance: law-making and institutionalisation of 
state authorities and the level of law application. 
Institutionalization and law-making: while the Saudi Basic Law of Governance (i.e. 
constitution) includes three (executive, judicial and regulatory) state authorities, the 
institutionalization of state power is contrary to the principle of separation of powers. 
This is due the fact that the institution ultimately vested with the regulative (legislative) is 
ambiguous. Additionally, ultimate authority over all executive, judicial and   regulative 
power (legislative) in concentrated in the hands of the monarch. 
Law application: The absence of separation of powers ramifies on the level of 
application and weaken the principle of the rule of law. Consequently, the Saudi 
institutional framework is defined by the following characteristics: 
8.3.1 Weak legislative process 
lack of clear demarcation of institutional competence of the state agencies 
The lack of technical personnel in the legislative system of the Kingdom, compared to 
legislative systems of other countries and the many tasks commissioned to such a 
system.  
The legislative system in the Kingdom lacks institutional view to build the capacities of 








The legislative system is currently no more than a range of executive cycles with limited 
competences, lacking an institutional methodology to form a coherent legislative view.  
8.3.2 The Slow Wheels of Reform 
One of the major requirements of enhancing commercial investment is the continuous 
review for the legislations that support investment and provide stability for financial 
markets. This is due to the lack of comprehensive reform plan but also due to the 
institutional lack of clarity and vision. 
8.3.3 Weak Methodology 
The making of Saudi legislation is carried out without any procedural guide, which 
determines the necessary procedural steps to be taken towards making of the 
legislation.  
8.3.4 Uncontrolled Legislative Delegation 
The lack of clear separation of powers results in uncontrolled legislative delegation and 
delegation of legislative power. The Council of Ministers, in absence of any real 
legislative power with Ashura Council (the Saudi Parliament), exercises both legislative 








8.3.5 Lack of Legitimacy Due to the Absence of Legislative Delegation 
Instrument   
8.3.6 Exceeding the Scope of Legislative Delegation and Contradiction 
of the Implementation Regulation to the Main Law  
8.3.7 Heavy Transplantation 
8.3.8 Duplication 
8.3.9 Unregulated judicial review 
8.3.10 Disparity in judicial decisions 
8.3.11 No uniform judicial structure 
 
8.4 Reform of the Saudi framework: First phase: 1965 – 2012 
The characteristics of this phase can be summarized in the following points: 
8.4.1 Voting rights must be strengthened 
Provisions of the Companies Law 1965 on voting rights are inconsistent with good 
corporate governance practices. According to the Companies Law 1965, shareholders 
are entitled to all the rights attached to the share and this includes also the right to 
attend, participate in deliberations, and vote at GSMs. The same rights shall also be 
entrenched in the company articles of association specifying which categories of 
shareholders are entitled to attend the GSM. However, the CL allows each shareholder 
holding at least twenty shares to attend the meetings, even if the statutes or articles of 








governance practices, this provision may constitute a procedural obstacle that impedes 
entitled shareholders from participating and voting in an AGM. Accordingly, the CMA 
may be recommended to consider lowering the threshold to include all the holders of 
shares, irrespective of the number of shares held. 
8.4.2 There is need to enhance minority protection from controlling 
shareholder abuse 
Shareholders have pre-emptive rights to purchase new shares, to protect against share 
dilution and expropriation through capital increases. The Council of Ministers can cancel 
or restrict pre-emptive rights in six instances including: case of concession, public utility 
company, in companies where the state guarantees a certain rate of profits and or is 
subsidized and or participated by the government, in case of banking institutions. 
8.4.3 Approval of board and key executive remuneration 
The board report (distributed at the AGM) must include the remuneration packages of 
its members and its five highest paid executives on an individual basis, but it does not 
appear that the shareholder meeting approves the actual remuneration. Companies are 
not required to disclose their remuneration policies, which good practices would call for 
to explain the link between executive remuneration and company’s performance. 
8.4.4 Inefficiently broad provisions relating to sales of major corporate 
assets 
According to the CL provisions, the board cannot decide to conclude loans of terms 
exceeding three years, sell or mortgage company real estate, sell or mortgage company 








8.4.5 Capital market transparency and regulatory consultation must be 
strengthened 
1) There is insufficient disclosure of non-financial information (especially on beneficial 
ownership) which requires intervention by the regulatory agencies to approximate the 
standards and practices to the level required by the OECD principles.  
2) an absence of foreign competition (foreign companies are not allowed to access the 
Tadawul).  
3) Prevalence of improper conduct and abuse of position by brokers and industry 
insiders.  
4) CMA should engage more actively with stakeholders in a comparable level and 
approach to that adopted by SAMA’s formal consultative process. 
8.4.6 The non-financial disclosure framework for listed companies 
should be revised and harmonized 
Listed companies have already been under significant disclosure obligations under the 
Listing Rules (LRs), and recommendations of the CGR. However, some of the 
nonfinancial disclosure recommendations of the OECD Principles are not implemented. 
The CMA and its stakeholders are recommended to consider revising the nonfinancial 
disclosure requirements contained in the regulation and LRs. 
8.4.7 The position of company secretary could be introduced into the 
corporate governance framework by the CGR 
The CGR could introduce a requirement to establish the institution of company 
secretary in listed companies. Company secretaries are employees of the company, but 








provide timely and relevant information to their boards and a professional company 
secretary charged to manage the proper and effective functioning of the board could be 
considered. 
8.4.8 Minority shareholder rights should be strengthened by mandating 
that acquirers of 50% of a company’s capital have to extend a 
tender offer to the remaining shareholders 
8.4.9 The review and approval framework of related party transactions 
should be upgraded 
8.4.10 Greater use should be made of skilled independent directors 
8.4.11 Experience with cumulative voting should be reviewed 
8.4.12 Stakeholders should work in partnership to build awareness of the 
value of corporate governance. 
8.4.13 The CMA and SAMA should roll out a corporate governance 
awareness raising campaign 
8.4.14 All stakeholders should be encouraged to develop high-quality 
training programs for directors 









8.5 Reform of the Saudi framework: Second Phase: 2015 - 2017 
Since 2015, the legal framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia witnessed a 
significant impetus towards greater efficiency through the enactment of the new 
Companies Law (2015) and the new Corporate Governance Regulations (2017). Since 
these two instruments have only recently come into force, it is too early now to assess 
the practical impact they would have on the legal framework of corporate governance in 
Saudi Arabia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2004, and the precipitous 
growth of foreign direct investment. 
Growth of the Saudi Arabian stock market, including the recent opening of the 
stock market to foreign investment and the development of a vibrant sukuk 
market. 
Diversification of the Saudi Arabian economy into new industries beyond the 
traditional hydrocarbon based economy. 
The larger role small and medium enterprises play in the economy, which 
requires a more efficient regulatory environment for their success.  
The need for the private sector to play a larger role in the Kingdom’s economic 
development. 
8.6 Impact of the new Companies Law 2015 
8.6.1  Audit committees 
The new law has introduced an audit committee to monitor the business of JSC. 
Moreover, a whole Chapter (4) has been dedicated to dealing with this essential issue 








8.6.2 Cumulative voting 
The new law also introduced cumulative voting in the election of the Board of Directors. 
Accordingly, Article 95 states that cumulative voting must be used in the election of the 
board of directors, so that individuals may not use the right to vote more than once per 
share. 
8.6.3 Prohibition on combing the post of Board Chairman with an 
Executive position 
The third point is that the Companies Law 2015 prohibits combining the post of 
Chairman of the Board of directors and any other executive position in the company in 
Article 81 paragraph 1.  
8.6.4 Types of Companies  
The old Companies Law involved three rarely used forms of corporate entity under 
which are no longer permitted by the new Law. These are – namely - Cooperative 
Companies, partnerships limited by shares and Variable Capital Companies (Article 3). 
Accordingly, the main forms of corporate entity used will continue to be the Limited 
Liability Company (LLC) or Joint Stock Company (JSC). 
8.6.5 Absence of a general duty of loyalty 
The new Companies Law does not, however, change the substance of the situation 
which prevailed under the old law. While, on the one hand, a general duty of loyalty 
appears to be founded in the more concrete duties bestowed on directors by the 
Companies Law such as Articles 71 and 72 of the Companies Law, Article 75 (1), on the 
other hand provides for the principle regulation on the powers of directors only to the 
extent that directors must have the "widest authority" to manage the company and does 








8.6.6 Liability under Companies Law 
The issue of management liability is regulated for both JSCs and LLCs in individual 
sections of the new Companies Law. LLC managers responsibilities are governed by 
Article 165 (2), while JSC directors' liability is regulated by Article 78 (1) of the 
Companies Law. However, both provisions stipulate that persons engaged in the 
management of a company will be individually and jointly liable towards the company, 
its shareholders and third parties for the following acts: violations of their duties under 
the Companies Law; breaches of the company's articles; and errors of management. 
8.6.7 Infringement of Director duties 
The duties of a manager of an LLC are not explicitly regulated by the Companies Law. 
However, based on the generally accepted conventional wisdom that the duties of JSC 
directors in the old Saudi Arabian Companies Law (Royal Decree M/6 of 1385 Hijri) 
applied analogously to LLC managers it could be argued that the same understanding 
will be applied to the new Companies Law, and the articles of the Companies Law 
governing the liability of JSC directors will be applied to LLC management particularly 
because the management liability regime was not changed within the new Companies 
Law 
8.6.8 Infringement of company's articles 
The Companies Law does not explicitly state that the duties of a director may be 
expended in the company's articles. However, this follows indirectly from the fact that 
the articles of association of a company may deviate from the Companies Law, insofar 








8.6.9 Error of management 
Neither Article 78(1) nor Article 165(2) of the Companies Law define what constitutes an 
'error of management' that would prompt liability of management under these 
provisions. Thus, even minor mistakes could produce management liability according to 
Articles 78(1) and 165(2) of the Companies Law. Since this would significantly hinder 
the operation of a company, economic considerations suggest that an error of 
management within the meaning of Articles 78(1) and 165(2) should be interpreted 
more restrictively. Nonetheless, since no relevant jurisprudence is available from the 
Saudi Arabian courts, it is unclear whether the courts would follow this interpretation. 
8.6.10 Prohibition of competition 
Pursuant to Article 72 of the new Companies Law, a director may not engage in any 
commercial activity that is in competition with a business activity carried out by the 
company or conduct business in any branch of the activities carried out by the 
company, unless with the permission of the company.  
8.6.11 Prohibition of self-dealing 
Article 71 of the Companies Law prohibits directors from having a direct or indirect 
interest in any transaction or contract concluded for the account of the company.  
8.6.12 Lack of statutory definition of fraudulent act and abuse of 
authority 
The liability of JSC directors and LLC managers for damages or loss caused by their 
fraudulent actions is provided for by Articles 78(1), 78(3), 165(2) and 164(4) of the 
Companies Law. However, what constitutes a fraudulent act is not defined by the law. 








of something untrue by someone who does not believe his or her statement to be true; 
or the suppression of that which is true by someone with knowledge of that fact. 
8.6.13 Penalties and punitive measures 
Chapter 11 of the new Companies law deals with penalties. Accordingly, directors may 
be subject to legal penalties pursuant to Article 212 and following of the Companies 
Law.  
  
8.6.14 The mandatory nature of the new Regulations 2017 
The new Corporate Governance Regulations (2017) depart significantly from the 
voluntary mode of application which characterised the old Regulations. Rather than 
being merely ‘guiding principles’ Article 2 (b) states that the new Regulations ‘are 
mandatory to companies except the provisions that contain a reference of being guiding’  
8.6.15 A new regime of greater transparency 
Furthermore, the Regulations reiterate the importance for companies to adopt clear, 
efficient and sound decision-making processes. First and foremost, these processes 
help protect shareholders and stakeholders.  
8.6.16 Shareholder Rights 
Key rights are set out in Articles 4 to 15 of the Regulations and include: fair and equal 
treatment among shareholders, non-discrimination among shareholders of the same 
class, fair distributions, equal rights related to access of corporate information and 
communications, rights to attend and vote in general assemblies and board and audit 








a) The Board is obliged to seek shareholders' rights protection to ensure fairness and 
equality among them.  
b) The Board and the Executive Management of the Company is obliged not to 
discriminate among shareholders who own the same class of shares nor prevent them 
from accessing any of their rights.  
c) The Company shall specify in its internal policies the procedures that are necessary 
to guarantee that all shareholders exercise their rights. 
 
8.6.17 Board of Directors 
Detailed rules and principles governing board of directors (which also include that of the 
chairman, independent directors and the secretary of the board) (together, the Board) 
are set out Articles 16 to 41 of the Regulations and cover matters including: board 
formation, composition, appointment, conditions of membership, termination, 
responsibilities, main functions, independence, distribution of competencies and duties 
(including vis-à-vis those in executive management positions), agenda setting, meeting 
procedures, auditing, and training. Furthermore, the Regulations enshrine the fiduciary 
duties to adhere to the principles of truthfulness, honesty and loyalty. 
8.6.18 Conflicts of Interest 
The Regulations also cover the Board’s avoidance, assessment and disclosure of (and 
dealings with) conflict of interest situations. There is a need to establish policies and 
procedures in relation to related party transactions, conflicts scenarios (with or for the 
company or its competitors), conflicted persons, accepting gifts, and complying with the 










Provisions dealing with the formation, composition, membership, powers, procedures, 
responsibilities, policies, meetings and announcements of committees for remuneration, 
risk management, audit, corporate governance and nomination are set out in Articles 83 
to 88 of the Regulations.  
8.6.20 Audit and Internal Control 
Also outlined are the requirements as to the composition, appointment, roles and 
responsibilities of internal and external auditors. Listed companies should have internal 
control systems in place, along with audit plans and regular published reports. Listed 
companies must also maintain policies on effective corporate governance, and have an 
internal corporate governance committee regularly review compliance. 
8.6.21 Stakeholder rights 
Boards of listed companies are now required to produce policies on their dealings with 
various stakeholders, including employees and incentives given to them. These drafted 
policies should describe how to protect their respective rights, deal with complaints, 
confidentiality of information, professional conduct, social contributions, treatment of 
employees, and dealing with non-compliance with these policies and procedures. 
Employee incentive schemes and payouts must be documented. Separate policies 
governing professional and ethical corporate standards, social responsibilities and 
social initiatives are also to be made available. 
8.6.22 General Disclosures and Transparency 
There is a general requirement to disclose and make available up-to-date and accurate 
information to the company’s various stakeholders. The board must maintain policies on 








committee’s report and regularly maintain information on the company’s website. 
Remuneration of board members and the executive management must be disclosed 
pursuant to a standard template, as set out in the Regulations. All records of the 
company must be maintained for a period of ten years, or longer if, any potential claims 
are pending.  
8.7 Islamic and international principles of corporate governance 
are compatible 
Another major conclusion of this thesis is that the international standards of corporate 
governance are compatible with the principles Islamic Shari’a. This is particularly 
important to stress because the Saudi legal system is fundamentally based on Islamic 
legal and religious principles. 
Moreover, an additional contribution of this thesis is the distinction proposed between 
formal and substantive compatibility between international/supranational standards of 
corporate governance and the principles of Islamic Shari’a. This distinction departs from 
the conventional exclusive focus by students in the field on the similarities and 
regulative import between Islamic and particularly OECD principles. 
8.7.1 Formal Compatibility 
One of the main conclusions of this thesis is that the normative model of corporate 
governance proposed in section 2.4.1 lends a distinct perspective through which 
another aspect of compatibility emerges, namely a formal compatibility between Islam 
and OCED principles. 
The OECD principles and their underlying pillars of corporate governance are both 








principles designate the basic principles which underlie corporate legal frameworks, or 
upon which national corporate laws are to be formulated. 
This same characteristic also applies to Islamic principles of corporate governance 
since the legal character of these principles should equally constitute the Islamic 
foundation on which national corporate governance frameworks may be established. 
Thus, the Islamic principles may be applied across a broad range of national 
jurisdictions. The ensuing national laws need not necessarily be uniform since the 
operationalization of the Islamic principles can be adapted to the conditions and 
requirements of individual national jurisdictions. 
8.7.2 Substantive compatibility 
As already noted above, substantive compatibility relates to similarity of the regulative 
import of Islamic and OECD principles.  These similarities include both the core values 
of corporate governance including fairness, accountability, responsibility and 
transparency. Substantive compatibility also includes similarities between Islamic 
principles and the six OECD principles. 
The main conclusion in this regard is that, owing to its fundamental basis in Islamic law, 
the Saudi corporate system can be ameliorated consistently with Islam corporate 
principles when the latter are clearly elucidated and articulated. In addition, owning to its 
reciprocal relationships internationally, the Saudi system can also utilize international 
standards to streamline its corporate governance system with those of its partners and 









8.8 International Standards are desirable criteria to approximate 
efficiency of the Saudi framework of corporate governance  
Having established the compatibility between OECD and Islamic principles of corporate 
governance, the thesis concludes that modern international standards of corporate 
governance, as embodied in the OECD Principles, constitute the desirable criteria to 
enhance and achieve greater efficiency of the Saudi legal framework of corporate 
governance. Notably, the OECD principles have greatly advanced the global corporate 
governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory 
initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries worldwide. In the analysis of the 
Saudi framework of corporate governance in this thesis, the OECD principles are 
perceived to set the standard of legal efficiency as these play a number of related aims: 
Informative aim: the comparative analysis of OECD principles both with Islamic 
principles and the prevalent legal framework of Saudi Arabia aim is to inform policy 
options designed to enhance the efficiency of the legal framework of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia not only of the existence but also of the relevance of a pool 
of instruments which can profitably be utilised. In particular, the OECD Principles are 
particularly relevant to Saudi Arabia on account of the country being a member of the 
G20 which is a partner to the latest version of OECD Principles published in 2015. More 
generally, however, there is a need to shed light on the international standards and 
efforts by inter-governmental organisations in relation to standardised corporate 
governance rules in the context of corporate governance and the GCC. These 
standards include many aspects, such as by providing benchmarks and 
recommendations to enhance the national legislative, institutional and regulatory 








8.9 Lesson learned from cross-country models 
Notwithstanding the mixed nature of the Saudi legal system indicated in section 
(1.1.2.1), the adoption of some laws from one legal tradition into another with a different 
legal culture is not equivalent but rather leaves a particular tradition (usually the 
indigenous tradition) as the dominant one the country. It is therefore important to pose 
the question of the impact of legal origins debate on the Saudi legal system. In this 
respect, there are a number of factor which need to be taken into account, including: 
In principle, there is agreement between the main presupposition of this thesis and a 
basic tenet of the legal origins thesis to the effect that there is a correlation between the 
quality of legal rules and positive economic impact. This thesis argues for an enhanced 
and a robust legal framework of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia to attract 
investment, increase growth and realize development goals. The correlation argued for 
by LSSV goes much deeper in claiming that the quality and economic efficiency of 
corporate governance rules is determined by their legal origin. 
The Saudi system is based fundamentally on the Islamic legal system. Thus, Islamic 
principles constitute the foundations of Saudi legal culture which may not be surpassed 
or superseded by legal transplantation from the French civil law. 
The Saudi legal system has a religious base. This is in contradistinction to the mainly 
secular base of both the common law and civil law, and several sub-traditions—French, 
German, socialist, and Scandinavian—within civil law. 
Thus, the scope of influence of the legal origin and the French civil law in particular on 
the Saudi legal system can be expected to be confined to the commercial sphere. 
Moreover, even within this limitation, it should be remembered, that Islamic law 









It is clear that Saudi legislation seeks to adopt rules and standards that regulate the 
management of joint stock companies listed on the stock market to ensure their 
compliance with the best governance practices. This is in order to guarantee the 
protection of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of stakeholders.518  
However, there are characteristics which assimilate the Saudi system to both the 
common and the civil law.  On the other hand, the Saudi legal system, including its 
corporate governance regime, is based on civil law as is the case in Germany and 
France. The system also contains many rules that protect and regulate rights and 
interests of stakeholders' groups and minority shareholders as well as providing some 
limitations to CEO power. For example, Saudi law prevents the position of the chairman 
of the board of directors from being simultaneously held with any other executive 
position in the company. 519  
Moreover, unlike the Anglo-Saxon model, the government in Saudi Arabia dominates 
most labour, financial, services and business sectors, and recently it has tended to 
privatise some of them under its supervision  
Additionally, the ownership structure of many large Saudi joint stock companies has 
been occupied by state-concentrated ownership. This environment to some extent 
boosts the state’s role and control over the corporate sector. 
In relation to the common law tradition, the corporate governance theory and the 
adopted model in Saudi Arabia seems to be much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model and 
more in harmony with its general theory which aims to generate a fair return for 
shareholders. Saudi legislation and the corporate governance regulations adopt the 
unitary board of directors and do not provide an option to approve a two-tier model  
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Furthermore, the Saudi system does not support the trend of a bank-oriented or any 
other long-term dominant ownership. Furthermore, Saudi corporations are not subject to 
any legal enforcement or compliance that gives employees a right to participate in 
strategic management decisions or to have any representative form.  
Similar to the Anglo-Saxon model and more in harmony with its general theory Saudi 
legislators adopted the unitary board of directors and have not supported the bank-
oriented system which creates long-term dominant ownership. Furthermore, there are 
no regulations that support any form of employee representation or participation in 
decision-making. 
8.10 The efficiency legal framework in Saudi Arabia needs to be 
strengthened 
The Saudi legal framework of corporate governance, like that of any other country, must 
be regarded as subject to continuous development and change. Accordingly, to answer 
the two main research questions above, the Saudi legal framework of corporate 
governance was divided in this thesis into two historical phases: a) earlier phase from 
1965 – 2012; and b) a latter phase since 2015. 
8.11 Efficiency of the institutional framework must be further 
strengthened 
Lack of consistency of application of corporate governance provisions has been a major 
drawback in the earlier phase from 1965-2012. This is due mainly to the fact that court 
rulings and interpretations related to legal provisions are not made public; it is therefore 
difficult to monitor the consistency of interpreting the law. There are some 








Additionally, efficiency of contract enforcement is relatively weak. The standard 
measures developed by the World Bank indicate that contract enforcement in Saudi 
Arabia is relatively slow and expensive when compared to OECD countries. It also 
takes more procedures to enforce a contract in the county making the whole process 
more costly when compared to the OECD average. 
8.12 The CMA and other relevant regulators should further 
strengthen their enforcement activities 
The CMA should consider the development of a process to systematically assess 
whether company disclosure is in compliance with the CGR. The CMA could enforce 
disclosure of compliance and issue warning letters, and fines when needed. These 
results should also be disclosed on the CMA and the Tadawul website. 
8.13 CMA should consider focusing its enforcement activities on 
compliance with disclosure requirements, particularly 
nonfinancial disclosure 
The CMA should continue to focus its enforcement efforts on disclosure, working 
towards full compliance with the CGR’s ‘comply or explain’ requirements, and 
requirements with other non-financial disclosure rules. Enforcement could be 
strengthened in the area of public disclosure of ownership and adherence to the CGR. 
In addition to focusing on the largest companies in terms of market capitalization, the 
regulators may wish to focus their efforts on some of the smaller issuers, where 








8.14 Policymakers should review policies related to accounting 
standards development, particularly convergence to IFRS 
An Accounting and Auditing ROSC should be carried-out to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of convergence with IFRS. Additional resources are essential for SOCPA to 
continue the revision, update, and interpretation of the accounting standards. The 
regulators should also consider increasing coordination between the Supervision and 
Financial Disclosure Department of the CMA and SOCPA to ensure consistency. 
Additional resources could be made available to SOCPA. 
8.15 A “Code of Islamic Principle of Corporate Governance’ should 
be enacted 
It is strongly recommended that a Code of Islamic Principles of Corporate Governance 
should be enacted in Saudi Arabia. Such a code will serve many purposes, including: 
1. Strengthen the corporate governance framework and the extant regulations. 
2. Provides a nexus between the residual legal-religious character of Islamic 
principle and voluntary adherence. 
3. It is expected that the code will receive much acceptance and adherence due to 
the religious base of its content. 
4. The Saudi statutory system is still lacking full realization of the fiduciary duties of 
directors. Sharia principles provide a basis for fiduciary duties. 
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